考虑碳排放权的低碳电力调度及收益分摊

低碳化已经成为当前电力发展的重要目标,而利益格局的剧烈调整是影响低碳转型的最大阻力之一。文中对低碳电力调度的公平性问题进行了研究,建立了考虑碳排放权约束的低碳调度模型。在论证机组碳排放求偿权的基础上,应用加总分配方法,解决了碳排放权的初始分配公平性的争议。对机组碳排放权的合作博弈机制进行了研究,并且对合作减排和非合作减排下的机组运行情况进行了对比,建立了基于Shapley值的碳排放权收益分摊模型。研究表明通过合作减排机制,可以更好地优化系统运行,平衡各方利益,减少低碳调度转型阻力。研究还发现,如果减排目标过于激进,将造成发电成本剧烈上升,甚至需要减负荷运行。最后,结合算例表明了所述模型的有效性。

Low-carbon Power Dispatching and Benefit Allocation Considering Carbon Emission Allowance

Low carbonization is the primary target in power system operation at present, while the abrupt arrangements of the setup of interests is one of the greatest obstacles to affect transfer to low carbon emission among power units. This paper studies the equity issues in low-carbon electric dispatch problems. A low-carbon dispatch model with carbon emission permit constraints is proposed. In China, units are granted carbon emission allowance claims from the government. This paper applies fair allocation based on the claim theory for solving the controversial problem in carbon emission allowance fair allocation. The cooperative game mechanism in unit carbon emission allowance allocation is investigated, and a comparison is made in the unit operation state between cooperative and noncooperative carbon reducing mechanism. A Shapley value-based model is developed to allocate the cooperative surplus fairly. The study shows the cooperative mechanism for carbon reduction can optimize power system operation and balance the interests of different units, which will facilitate actual implementation of low carbon electric dispatch. The study has also found that if the carbon reduction target is set excessively high, the generation cost may rise dramatically and in the worst case cause load shedding. Finally, a numerical example shows that the proposed model is effective.