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智能住宅小区的需求响应主从博弈模型
引用本文:代业明,高岩,高红伟,袁光辉.智能住宅小区的需求响应主从博弈模型[J].电力系统自动化,2017,41(15):88-94.
作者姓名:代业明  高岩  高红伟  袁光辉
作者单位:青岛大学数学与统计学院, 山东省青岛市 266071,上海理工大学管理学院, 上海市 200093,青岛大学数学与统计学院, 山东省青岛市 266071,上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院, 上海市 200433
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571008);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2015GZ007);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2016M602104)
摘    要:针对含有多个售电商的智能住宅小区,建立了售电商和用户之间的主从博弈模型。在该模型中,用户间的电力消费行为用含有个人隐私的演化博弈模型进行模拟,售电商之间的价格竞争通过非合作博弈模型进行模拟。同时证明了该博弈模型均衡解的存在性并设计算法进行求解。数值结果表明所提出的算法能够快速收敛且具有可扩展性,同时售电商和小区用户之间基于价格的需求响应行为有利于实现电力供需平衡,从而维持智能小区电力系统安全运行。

关 键 词:主从博弈  演化博弈  非合作博弈  需求响应
收稿时间:2016/11/22 0:00:00
修稿时间:2017/6/8 0:00:00

Leader-follower Game Model for Demand Response in Smart Residential Grid
DAI Yeming,GAO Yan,GAO Hongwei and YUAN Guanghui.Leader-follower Game Model for Demand Response in Smart Residential Grid[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2017,41(15):88-94.
Authors:DAI Yeming  GAO Yan  GAO Hongwei and YUAN Guanghui
Affiliation:School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China,Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China,School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China and School of Information Management and Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, China
Abstract:A leader-follower game between power retailers and residential users is established to study the demand response problem in residential grid with multiple retailers. In this model, the price competition among power retailers is formulated as a non-cooperative game, while the power coordinate among the residential users is formulated as an evolutionary game considering the private information of power retailers and residential users. The existence of leader-follower game equilibrium is proved and the algorithm is designed to implement the convergence of equilibrium and obtain the equilibrium solution. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithm can fast convergence and has the extendibility. On the other hand, the demand response behaviors based on price between power retailers and residential users are helpful to realize power supply and demand balance, so as to maintain the safe operation of the power systems.
Keywords:leader-follower game  evolutionary game  non-cooperative game  demand response
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