| 发电市场的失代竞价机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 耿建,王锡凡,等.发电市场的失代竞价机制[J].电力系统自动化,2002,26(9):1-6. |
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| 作者姓名： | 耿建 王锡凡 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学电气工程学院 陕西省西安市710049
(耿建，王锡凡，陈皓勇)，西安交通大学电气工程学院 陕西省西安市710049(王建学) |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目 (5 993715 0 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 建立了发电市场迭代竞价模型。该模型在竞价过程中给出了充分的市场信息，发电商可以合理、经济地组织生产，确定竞标策略。电力购买者赋予了议价能力，协调各厂商竞价，促使市场高效地运作。实例模拟表明，在完全竞争的市场环境下，各厂商的发电资源可以得到充分利用，市场处于Nash均衡，出清价收敛于传统的系统边际成本附近，发电系统接近于经济运行状态。比较了迭代竞价机制与单轮投标机制的市场效率。模拟了发电商串通行为的形成，为此有必要制定有效的规则对市场竞价加以约束。
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| 关 键 词： | 发电市场 迭代竞价机制 竞价策略 Nash均衡 电力工业 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年11月13 |
ITERATIVE COMPETITIVE BIDDING MECHANISM IN GENERATION MARKET |
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| Geng Jian,Wang Xifan,Chen H aoyong,Wang Jianxue Xi'an Jiaotong U niversity,Xi'an ,China.ITERATIVE COMPETITIVE BIDDING MECHANISM IN GENERATION MARKET[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2002,26(9):1-6. |
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| Authors: | Geng Jian Wang Xifan Chen H aoyong Wang Jianxue Xi'an Jiaotong U niversity Xi'an China |
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| Affiliation: | Geng Jian,Wang Xifan,Chen H aoyong,Wang Jianxue Xi'an Jiaotong U niversity,Xi'an710 0 4 9,China |
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| Abstract: | An iterative competitive bidding m echanism in generation market is proposed.With sufficientinformation from this mechanism ,power producers can optimize bidding strategies according to costs.Market operator is licensed to negotiate, which brings out an efficient m arket by coordinating bidding.Sim ulation result shows,in a perfect com petitive market,all producers can utilize their units efficiently;clearing price m aintains a reasonable level;market arrives at Nash equilibrium; the whole system operates econom ically.In addition,iterative com petitive bidding is also an efficient model to analyze the market perform ance.Collusion is figured out,that indicates the necessity of m arket regulation. |
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| Keywords: | electricity market com petitive bidding mechanism competitive bidding strategies Nash equilibrium collusion |
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