| 发电公司的不完全信息竞价博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 任玉珑,邹小燕,张新华.发电公司的不完全信息竞价博弈模型[J].电力系统自动化,2003,27(9):11-14. |
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| 作者姓名： | 任玉珑 邹小燕 张新华 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆市,400044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70 0 710 36 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈论中的第一价格暗标拍卖原理，研究发电公司的不完全信息竞价博弈模型。该模型考虑了发电公司的单位成本、竞价成功的可能性概率及预期的市场清除价格等因素，通过求解模型得出发电公司报价的一般表达式。最后用算例说明了该方法的合理性和可操作性。
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| 关 键 词： | 最优报价策赂 竞价策略 不完全信息 博弈论 电力系统 电网 发电公司 中国 |
| 收稿时间： | 1/1/1900 12:00:00 AM |
| 修稿时间： | 1/1/1900 12:00:00 AM |
BIDDING MODEL OF POWER PLANT COMPANY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION |
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| Ren Yulong,Zou Xiaoyan,Zhang Xinhua.BIDDING MODEL OF POWER PLANT COMPANY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2003,27(9):11-14. |
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| Authors: | Ren Yulong Zou Xiaoyan Zhang Xinhua |
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| Abstract: | The bidding model of power plant company with incomplete information in unilateral open electricity market is analyzed by using the first price sealed bid auction. In this model, many factors such as the unit cost of the power plant company, the probability of winning the bid, the expected clearing market price et al, are considered. Then the general bidding expression of the power plant company is deduced by solving this model. At last, a simple numerical example is presented to illustrate the presented method. This project is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.70071036). |
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| Keywords: | bidding strategy electricity market power plant company incomplete information game theory |
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