考虑有限理性的电力系统连锁故障多阶段动态博弈防御模型

为了防御由连锁故障引发的大停电事故,提出一种考虑参与人有限理性的连锁故障多阶段动态博弈防御模型。基于故障方的有限理性假设和故障方行动的关联性假设,综合考虑元件自身故障、外界环境、潮流转移和隐性故障等因素对元件停运概率的影响,提出基于实时运行条件的元件停运概率表征有限理性的故障方不完美的选择能力;根据可掌握的事故状态信息,提出潮流转移严重度和系统失负荷严重度表征故障方追求自身利益的意识;基于风险分析方法,生成故障方的策略集合。从风险理论的角度出发,将运行风险作为收益函数,用于定量评估防御方行动的有效性。以IEEE 39节点系统为例,验证了所提模型的合理性。

Defence model based on multistage dynamic game with consideration of bounded rationality against power system cascading failure

A defence model based on the multistage dynamic game with the consideration of bounded rationality against the cascading failure is proposed to prevent large-scale blackout of power system. Based on the consumptions of fault-side bounded rationality and action correlation and with the comprehensive consideration of the impacts of different factors on the component outage probability, such as component failure, external environment, power flow transfer, hidden failure, the component outage probability based on the real-time operating conditions is adopted to characterize the imperfect selection capability of fault-side with bounded rationality. The power-flow transfer severity and system load-loss severity are adopted to characterize the consciousness of fault-side in pursuing its own interest according to the possessed fault information. The strategy set of fault-side is generated based on the risk analysis. According to risk theory, the operational risk is taken as the revenue function to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of defence-side action. As an example, IEEE 39-bus system is taken to verify the rationality of the proposed model.