电力市场三种寡头竞争模型的市场力分析比较

市场在经济学中表现为市场参与者能够抬高市场价格的能力，在寡头竞争电力市场中则表征市场内电力公司影响市场结清电价的能力。应用博弈论分析研究了寡头竞争电力市场的市场力。以完全竞争市场下的均衡发电量和均衡电价为基准，分别比较了按Cournot模型、Stackelberg模型(领导者—跟随者模型)和Forchheimer模型(领导者—价格接受者模型)模拟寡头竞争电力市场情况下的电力公司所拥有的市场力，并且分析生产成本、市场中的电力需求弹性、市场中作为领导者的电力公司数量以及容量限制对市场力的影响。研究表明，在3种模型市场中，Cournot模型市场拥有的市场力为最大，Stackelberg模型市场次之，Forehheimer模型市场为最小。

COMPARISON OF MARKET POWER IN THREE OLIGOPOLY MODELS OF ELECETRICITY MARKET

In economics, market power indicates the ability of a firm to raise market price. In the oligopolistic electricity market, market power measures the ability of a generation firm to raise the clearing price of electricity market. Based on game theory, market power in the oligopolistic electricity market is analyzed. After the market clearing price of perfect competition is calculated as base price, the percentage mark-ups of market prices w. r. t. perfect competition in Cournot, Stackelberg (i.e. Leader-Follower) or Forchheimer (i.e. Leader-priceTaker) models are evaluated analytically, which acts as an index of the market power in the corresponding electricity market. The impacts of cost function coefficients, elasticity of demand, the number of generation firms as leaders and capacity constraints on market power are also discussed. The results of this research show that among the three models the Cournot model possesses the highest market power, the Forchheimer model has the least.