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基于身份的可验证加密签名协议的安全性分析
引用本文:张振峰.基于身份的可验证加密签名协议的安全性分析[J].计算机学报,2006,29(9):1688-1693.
作者姓名:张振峰
作者单位:中国科学院软件研究所信息安全国家重点实验室,北京,100080
基金项目:国家自然科学基金;国家重点基础研究发展计划(973计划)
摘    要:利用Hess的基于身份的数字签名方案,Gu和Zhu提出了一个基于身份的可验证加密签名协议,并认为该协议在随机预言模型下是可证明安全的,从而可以作为基本模块用于构建安全的基于身份的公平交换协议.文章对该协议的安全性进行了深入分析,结果表明该协议存在如下的安全缺陷:恶意的签名者可以很容易地构造出有效的可验证加密签名,但是指定的仲裁者却不能把它转化成签名者的普通签名,因此不能满足可验证加密签名协议的安全需求;而且该协议容易遭受合谋攻击.

关 键 词:基于身份的签名  可验证的加密签名  密码分析  双线性映射
收稿时间:2006-04-05
修稿时间:2006-04-052006-06-16

Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme
ZHANG Zhen-Feng.Cryptanalysis of an Identity-Based Verifiably Encrypted Signature Scheme[J].Chinese Journal of Computers,2006,29(9):1688-1693.
Authors:ZHANG Zhen-Feng
Affiliation:State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080
Abstract:Based on Hess's identitybased signature scheme,Gu and Zhu proposed an identity-based verifiably encrypted signature scheme in CISC 2005.The authors claim that their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model and can be used as a primitive to construct identity-based optimistic fair exchange protocols.However,this paper shows that their protocol is insecure: A malicious signer can easily generate a valid verifiably encrypted signature,which can not be extracted into an ordinary signature by a designated adjudicator.Moreover,the protocol is also vulnerable to colluding attacks.
Keywords:identity-based signature  verifiably encrypted signature  cryptanalysis  bilinear pairing
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