产品差异度与双寡头厂商行为的实验分析 |
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引用本文: | 李建标,王光荣,巨龙,于娟.产品差异度与双寡头厂商行为的实验分析[J].数字娱乐技术,2008(4):58-72. |
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作者姓名: | 李建标 王光荣 巨龙 于娟 |
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作者单位: | 南开大学商学院;南开大学公司治理研究中心;新加坡国立大学经济系 |
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基金项目: | 国家自然科学基金面上项目(70672029);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(05JJD630023);国家自然科学基金重点项目(70532001);南开大学“985工程”哲学社会科学创新基地——“中国企业管理与制度创新”研究项目。 |
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摘 要: | 我们沿着Bertrand理论渊源构建模型,并以此为基础设计实验,在实验室环境中检验产品差异度与双寡头厂商的行为。论文首先分析模型的理论值,其次在实验市场中进行了设置检验。实验结果表明:(1)产品差异度越小,双寡头厂商的博弈平均价格就越低,该价格在重复博弈纳什均衡区间的中间价格附近波动;(2)博弈期数越多,博弈双方的冲突反而越大,这与俗定理预测相悖;(3)对背叛行为的惩罚具有普遍性,惩罚策略主要是针锋相对,惩罚强度随产品差异度减小而增强;(4)产品差异度对共谋的稳定性影响不显著,这与理论预测相悖;(5)折现与平均价格及共谋的关系模糊。
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关 键 词: | 产品差异度 惩罚策略 默契共谋 实验室实验 |
Tacit Collusion of Firm in Experimental Duopoly with Product Differentiation |
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Authors: | Li Jianbiao Wang Guangrong Ju Long Yu Juan |
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Affiliation: | Li Jianbiao Wang Guangrong Ju Long Yu Juan |
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Abstract: | We study competitive and collusive behaviors of firms in experimental duopoly with product differentiation.First,we analyze Bertrand model with product differentiation,then make experimental test in experimental duopoly.Experimental results show:(1) less product dif- ferentiation,lower average game price,and average game prices fluctuate around middle price of Nash supergame equilibrium interval;(2) more game periods,more strong conflict,and this is inconsistent with Folk Theorem;(3) punishment toward defective behaviors is universal behav- ior;punishment strategy is Tit For Tat,punishment grade is increased with decreasing product differentiation;(4) product differentiation is not significant impact with collusion stableness; (5) discount is not significant impact with average game price and collusion. |
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Keywords: | Product Differentiation Punishment Strategy Tacit Collusion Experiment in Lab |
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