| Collision attack on reduced-round Camellia |
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| 作者姓名： | WU Wenling & FENG Dengguo State Key Laboratory of Information Security Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing China |
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| 作者单位： | WU Wenling & FENG Dengguo State Key Laboratory of Information Security，Institute of Software，Chinese Academy of Sciences，Beijing 100080，China |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)，国家重点基础研究发展计划(973计划) |
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| 摘 要： | Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6, 7, 8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8, 9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 210 chosen plaintexts and 215 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 212 chosen plaintexts and 254.5 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2112.1 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2113.6 chosen plaintexts and 2121 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2111.1 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2175.6 encryptions. Th
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Collision attack on reduced-round Camellia |
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| WU Wenling & FENG Dengguo State Key Laboratory of Information Security,Institute of Software,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing ,China.Collision attack on reduced-round Camellia[J].Science in China(Information Sciences),2005,48(1):78-90. |
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| Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Wu?Wenling?Email author Feng?Dengguo |
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| Affiliation: | State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China |
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| Abstract: | Camellia is the final winner of 128-bit block cipher in NESSIE. In this paper, we construct some efficient distinguishers between 4-round Camellia and a random permutation of the blocks space. By using collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to attack on 6, 7, 8 and 9 rounds of Camellia with 128-bit key and 8, 9 and 10 rounds of Camellia with 192/256-bit key. The 128-bit key of 6 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 210 chosen plaintexts and 215 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 7 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 212 chosen plaintexts and 254.5 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2112.1 encryptions. The 128-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 2113.6 chosen plaintexts and 2121 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 8 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2111.1 encryptions. The 192/256-bit key of 9 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 213 chosen plaintexts and 2175.6 encryptions. The 256-bit key of 10 rounds Camellia can be recovered with 214 chosen plaintexts and 2239.9 encryptions. |
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| Keywords: | block cipher collision attack key data complexity time complexity |
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