众包系统中基于双向拍卖的诚实多任务分配机制

现有的众包任务分配模型大都假设仅存在一个任务请求者，难以满足存在多个任务请求者的应用场景.因此，该文假设众包系统中存在多个任务请求者，且每个任务请求者或工人在每轮任务分配中可以请求或完成多个任务，并在此基础上设计了适用于众包系统的双向拍卖机制，以激励众包任务被高效地完成.首先，将对多个任务感兴趣的工人抽象为多个虚拟工人，以低报价优先匹配原则，设计了一个高效任务分配机制；根据统一定价原则，为其设计了诚实的定价机制.然后，通过理论分析，证明了所设计的机制可以满足诚实性、个体理性以及收支平衡这3项经济学特性.最后，通过仿真实验结果验证了所设计机制的有效性.

Double Auction Based Truthful Multi-unit Task Allocation Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Systems

Most of the existing state-of-the-art studies assume that there is only one task requester for the crowdsourcing systems, which is hard to satisfy the scenario of multiple task requesters. Thus, this work focuses on the crowdsourcing systems consisting of multiple task requesters, where all the requesters and workers can bid or complete multiple tasks in each round. On the basis of that, this paper proposes a truthful double auction mechanism for crowdsourcing systems to incentivize workers and allow efficient task completion. First of all, this method abstracts the workers that interested in multiple tasks into multiple virtual workers, and further designs an efficient task assignment mechanism based on the principle of low bids first matching. A truthful pricing mechanism is developed based on the principle of uniform pricing. In addition, a proof is given to show that the proposed mechanism satisfies three essential economic characteristics:truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget balance through substantial theoretical analysis. Finally, extensive simulations are conducted to study the performance of the proposed auction mechanism, and the simulation results corroborate the theoretical analysis.