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供应商损失厌恶情形下组装供应链协调
引用本文:付红,马永开,唐小我.供应商损失厌恶情形下组装供应链协调[J].控制与决策,2013,28(10):1465-1472.
作者姓名:付红  马永开  唐小我
作者单位:电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都,610054
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金项目(71101019);教育部博士点基金项目
摘    要:鉴于决策者的风险偏好特性和产品内分工的迅速发展,构建由多个损失厌恶零部件供应商和单个风险中性组装商构成的组装供应链模型,其中各供应商均采用拉式契约向组装商提供一种互补性零部件。首先,给出拉式契约下各节点企业的最优策略,发现拉式契约下各零部件的最优产量均小于集中化情形下的最优产量;然后,通过引入价格补贴策略设计契约协调机制;最后,通过数值分析验证了该契约协调机制的有效性。

关 键 词:组装供应链  损失厌恶  价格补贴  协调
收稿时间:2012/6/28 0:00:00
修稿时间:2012/11/14 0:00:00

Coordination of assembly supply chain with loss-averse suppliers
FU Hong,MA Yong-kai,TANG Xiao-wo.Coordination of assembly supply chain with loss-averse suppliers[J].Control and Decision,2013,28(10):1465-1472.
Authors:FU Hong  MA Yong-kai  TANG Xiao-wo
Abstract:

In view of the risk appetite characteristics of decision makers and the rapid development of intra-product specialization, an assembly supply chain model with multiple loss-averse component suppliers and a risk-neutral assembler is established. In the model, each supplier provides a complementary component to the assembler with a pull contract. Firstly, the study derives the optimal strategy of each enterprise under the pull contract, and finds that the optimal production quantity of each component under the pull contract is less than that of centralized system. Then, it designs the coordination mechanism by introducing the price subsidy policy. Finally, numerical analysis verifies the effectiveness of coordination mechanism.

Keywords:assembly supply chain  loss-aversion  price subsidy  coordination
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