基于Bertrand博弈的共享单车定价与投放联合策略研究

基于共享单车租赁所具有的随机性特点,构建随机环境下共享单车企业在寡头市场中关于租赁定价与投放数量联合决策的二维Bertrand博弈模型,研究差异定价与协同定价两种情形下共享单车企业的最优策略组合,分析市场潜在需求量和用车区域覆盖难度系数对企业策略以及经营利润产生的影响.研究表明:在差异定价情形下,当用车需求具有概率性特点时,共享单车企业之间的博弈存在唯一的纳什均衡解,且低价企业对市场价格的影响力升高有利于竞争双方利润增加;在协同定价情形下,共享单车市场的平均租赁价格较低,且随市场潜在需求量的增大而增大,但与差异定价情形相比增速较小;协同定价有利于维持共享单车企业在市场规模较小时的盈利,差异定价有利于抑制共享单车企业在市场规模扩大时的过度投放.

Joint pricing and launching strategy for bike-sharing enterprises based on Bertrand game

Based on the randomness of shared bicycle rental, this paper uses Bertrand game theory to construct a model of joint decision making of rental pricing and launching between shared bicycle enterprises in a random environment, and studies the optimal strategy combination of price and quantity of shared bicycle enterprises in two cases: differential pricing and collaborative pricing. The paper analyzes the impact of market potential demand and vehicle area coverage difficulty on the corporate strategy and operating profit. The research shows that: 1) In the case of differential pricing, when the demand for shared-bikes is satisfied with probability, there is a unique Nash equilibrium solution for the game between bike-sharing enterprises, and when the pricing power of low-price enterprises increases, the profits of both companies will gain growth; 2) In the case of collaborative pricing, the average rental price of the shared bicycle market is lower and increases with the potential demand of the market, but the growth rate is smaller than the differential pricing situation; 3) Collaborative pricing is conducive to maintaining the profit of bike-sharing enterprises when the market size is small, while differential pricing is conducive to restraining the excessive release of shared bikes when the market size expands.