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基于纳什谈判的共享经济区块链网络PoS共识传播博弈分析
引用本文:谭春桥,杨慧娟,易文桃.基于纳什谈判的共享经济区块链网络PoS共识传播博弈分析[J].控制与决策,2022,37(1):219-229.
作者姓名:谭春桥  杨慧娟  易文桃
作者单位:中南大学 商学院,长沙 410083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71971218).
摘    要:针对共享经济中的信任问题,利用区块链技术搭建基于PoS(权益证明)共识机制的共享经济区块链网络,实现去信任化和去中心化.在Po S共识机制中,区块链用户提供交易费用,从而激励矿池招募验证者进行区块传播验证,区块链用户与矿池都能从更多的验证者数量中获益,但验证者越多,双方付出的成本越高.首先,从纳什谈判的角度研究共享经济区块链网络PoS共识机制中区块链用户与矿池的利益冲突问题,在交易费用与验证者数量之间进行权衡,构建纳什谈判博弈模型;然后,证明区块链用户与矿池的纳什谈判博弈模型中纳什谈判解的存在性和唯一性,得到区块链用户和矿池的最优决策;最后,通过数值算例分析通信成本和验证者数量对区块链用户和矿池的最优决策以及效用的影响.研究结果表明:区块链用户与矿池都能从较低的通信成本中获益;纳什谈判博弈模型能够有效解决共享经济区块链网络中用户与矿池的利益冲突,提高网络效率.

关 键 词:共享经济  区块链  矿池  PoS共识机制  纳什谈判  交易费用

Game analysis for PoS incentive consensus propagation in sharing economy blockchain network based on Nash negotiation
TAN Chun-qiao,YANG Hui-juan,YI Wen-tao.Game analysis for PoS incentive consensus propagation in sharing economy blockchain network based on Nash negotiation[J].Control and Decision,2022,37(1):219-229.
Authors:TAN Chun-qiao  YANG Hui-juan  YI Wen-tao
Institution:School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China
Abstract:Aiming at the trust problem in the sharing economy, the blockchain technology is used to build a shared economic blockchain network based on the proof-of-stake(PoS) consensus mechanism to achieve de-trust and decentralization. In PoS, the blockchain user provides transaction fees to encourage the mining pool to recruit verifiers for block propagation verification. Both the blockchain user and mining pool can benefit from more verifiers, but get the higher cost. This paper studies the conflict of interest between the blockchain user and mining pool in PoS of the sharing economic blockchain network from the perspective of Nash negotiation, and weighs the transaction fee and the number of verifiers to construct the Nash negotiation game model. Then, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash negotiation solution in the Nash negotiation game model is proved, and the optimal decision of the blockchain user and mining pool is obtained. Finally, numerical examples are used to analyze the impact of the communication cost and the number of verifiers on the optimal decision-making and utility of the blockchain user and mining pool. The research results show that both the blockchain user and mining pool can benefit from lower communication costs. And the Nash negotiation game model can effectively solve the conflict of interests between users and miners in the sharing economic blockchain network and improve network efficiency.
Keywords:sharing economy  blockchain  mining pool  Po S consensus mechanism  Nash negotiation  transaction fee
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