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信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商参与的价格补贴契约设计
引用本文:刘珩,潘景铭,唐小我.信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商参与的价格补贴契约设计[J].控制与决策,2011,26(1):111-114.
作者姓名:刘珩  潘景铭  唐小我
作者单位:电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都,610054
基金项目:教育部科学技术研究重点项目,国家自然科学基金重点项目,四川省软科学项目
摘    要:运用前景理论和委托代理理论,探讨信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性供应商参与的价格补贴契约设计问题.通过对零售商订货行为和供心商定价策略的研究,发现信息小对称时零售商的最优订货量小于系统的最优订货量.因而价格补贴契约不能使整个供应链达到协调.最后通过算例进行丁验证.

关 键 词:前景理论  委托代理理论  价格补贴契约  信息小对称
收稿时间:2009/10/30 0:00:00
修稿时间:2010/3/30 0:00:00

Design for markdown money contract with a loss-averse retailer under
asymmetric information
LIU Heng,PAN Jing-ming,TANG Xiao-wo.Design for markdown money contract with a loss-averse retailer under
asymmetric information[J].Control and Decision,2011,26(1):111-114.
Authors:LIU Heng  PAN Jing-ming  TANG Xiao-wo
Affiliation:(School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China.)
Abstract:

Based on the prospect theory and principal-agent theory, this paper studies how to design the markdown money
contract under asymmetric information when the supply chain is composed of a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral supplier.
Through analyzing the order behavior of the retailer and the pricing strategy of the supplier, it is found that the order quality
under asymmetric information is lower than the optimized quality of the centralized system. So the markdown money contract
can not coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information. Finally, a numerical analysis is given to prove the results.

Keywords:

Prospect theory|Principal-agent theory|Markdown money contract|Asymmetric information

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