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制造商竞争与合作下双渠道供应链联合减排的微分博弈分析
引用本文:周艳菊,叶欣,詹结祥,徐选华.制造商竞争与合作下双渠道供应链联合减排的微分博弈分析[J].控制与决策,2018,33(11):2021-2028.
作者姓名:周艳菊  叶欣  詹结祥  徐选华
作者单位:中南大学商学院,长沙410083,中南大学商学院,长沙410083,中南大学商学院,长沙410083,中南大学商学院,长沙410083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71221061, 71171201, 71171202, 71431006, 71471178, 71502178);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2011RWSK003).
摘    要:以两个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链为研究对象,分析制造商竞争与合作模型下供应链的最优均衡策略,并探讨系统关键参数对供应链各成员利润的影响.研究发现,只有当减排效率差异水平满足一定条件时,两制造商才会同时选择合作,且合作模型下制造商的利润总和增大,而减排努力、广告分担率、广告努力和零售商的利润减小.随着传统渠道市场占有率、减排竞争和广告竞争的增大,竞争模型下零售商的利润增大,而合作模型下的利润与广告竞争无关;制造商的利润变化取决于减排效率、网络渠道和传统渠道的边际利润.

关 键 词:制造商竞争与合作  联合减排  双渠道供应链  微分博弈

Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies in a dual-channel supply chain considering manufacturers' competition and cooperation
ZHOU Yan-ju,YE Xin,ZHAN Jie-xiang and XU Xuan-hua.Differential game model of joint emission reduction strategies in a dual-channel supply chain considering manufacturers' competition and cooperation[J].Control and Decision,2018,33(11):2021-2028.
Authors:ZHOU Yan-ju  YE Xin  ZHAN Jie-xiang and XU Xuan-hua
Affiliation:School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China,School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China,School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China and School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China
Abstract:Considering a dual-channel supply chain based on a differential game involving two competing manufacturers and one retailer, we study the optimal equilibrium strategies in both competition and cooperation models, and analyze how the key coefficients affect supply chain members'' profits.The results suggest that, the cooperation between the two manufacturers will occur only if the emission reduction efficiency difference is limited, and the two manufacturers'' total profits are higher, but their emission reduction efforts and advertising participation rates, as well as retailer''s advertising efforts and profit are lower in the cooperation model. Furthermore, as the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel increases and competition intensifies, retailer''s profit in the competition model will increase, while the profit in the cooperation model is independent of advertising competition; the two manufactures'' profits are both depending on their emission reduction efficiencies, direct channel and retail channel''s marginal profits.
Keywords:
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