损失厌恶下考虑参照利润效应的供应链决策模型

针对由一个风险中性供应商和一个损失厌恶零售商构成的二级供应链,研究随机需求下考虑零售商参照利润效应的供应链决策问题.在回购政策下,建立以供应商为主方、零售商为从方的Stackelberg主从博弈模型.结合参照依赖偏好模型分别得到集中和分散供应链决策,分析供应链最优决策与损失厌恶程度、参照利润强度和零售商乐观水平之间的关系,并进一步设计能够实现供应链完美协调的回购契约机制.研究结果表明,在集中和分散供应链决策下,零售商订货量均随着损失厌恶和乐观程度的增加而减少.而当零售商损失厌恶程度较低时,订货量随参照利润强度的增加而增加;反之,亦成立.对于批发价格决策,则存在一个阈值,当高于该阈值时,批发价格随着零售商损失厌恶、乐观程度和参照利润强度的增大而增加;低于该阈值时,批发价格随着损失厌恶、乐观程度和参照利润强度的增大而降低.

Decision model of supply chain considering reference profit under loss aversion

The decision of a two-tier supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a loss aversion retailer who considers the reference profit is studied under stochastic demand. The Stackelberg model, in which the supplier is the leader who decides the wholesale price and the retailer is the follower who decides the ordering quantity, is developed under buyback policy. Through the reference dependence model, the optimal ordering quantity and wholesale price are derived for both the centralized and the decentralized supply chain system respectively, and the relationships between the optimal decision and the loss aversion, reference profit intensity, as well as the retailer''s optimism level are analyzed. Furthermore, the buyback contract that can perfectly coordinate the supply chain is presented. Results show that, for both the centralized and decentralized supply chain, the ordering quantity decreases with the loss aversion degree and optimism level. However, the ordering quantity increases with the reference profit intensity when the retailer is less loss aversion, and vice versa. For the wholesale price decision, it increases with the loss aversion degree, optimism level and reference profit intensity when exceeding a threshold, and vice versa.