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政府补贴和成本共担如何影响平台和企业策略选择-----基于三方演化博弈
引用本文:周晓阳,赵凡,刘莹,汪寿阳.政府补贴和成本共担如何影响平台和企业策略选择-----基于三方演化博弈[J].控制与决策,2022,37(2):293-302.
作者姓名:周晓阳  赵凡  刘莹  汪寿阳
作者单位:西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126;西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049;中国科学院大学数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190;西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126;中国科学院大学数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71871175,71640013);陕西省创新人才促进计划青年科技新星项目(2019KJXX-031).
摘    要:基于地方政府对工业互联网平台和加入平台的制造业企业的补贴,以及工业互联网平台与制造业企业间的成本共担,构建"政府-平台-企业"3个主体之间的非对称演化博弈模型,运用微分方程的稳定性定理分析各博弈主体的策略演化路径以及影响其策略演化的因素,并通过雅克比矩阵探讨系统的演化稳定策略.通过数值仿真分析政府补贴力度和平台成本分担比例对系统演化稳定策略的影响,界定可以促使制造业企业加入平台、工业互联网平台进行优化服务的政府补贴力度和成本分担比例的有效区间,为地方政府、工业互联网平台和制造业企业的行为决策提供理论参考.

关 键 词:政府补贴  成本共担  工业互联网平台  三方演化博弈

How do government subsidies and cost sharing affect platform and enterprise strategy choice---Based on tripartite evolutionary game
ZHOU Xiao-yang,ZHAO Fan,LIU Ying,WANG Shou-yang.How do government subsidies and cost sharing affect platform and enterprise strategy choice---Based on tripartite evolutionary game[J].Control and Decision,2022,37(2):293-302.
Authors:ZHOU Xiao-yang  ZHAO Fan  LIU Ying  WANG Shou-yang
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xián 710126,China;School of Management,Xián Jiaotong University,Xián 710049,China;Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China
Abstract:Based on the local government’s subsidy for the industrial internet platform and the platform of manufacturing enterprises,and the cost sharing between the industrial internet platform and the manufacturing enterprise,this paper constructs the asymmetry evolutionary game model between“government-platform-enterprise”,using the stability theorem of differential equations to analyze the strategy evolution path of each game player and the factors that affect their strategy evolution,and discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of the system through the Jacobian matrix.In the numerical simulation part,the influence of government subsidy intensity and platform cost sharing ratio on the system evolution and stability strategy is analyzed,and the effective interval of government subsidy intensity and cost sharing ratio is defined,which can encourage the manufacturing enterprise to join the platform and industrial Internet platform to optimize the service,and provide a theoretical reference for local governments,industrial Internet platforms and manufacturing enterprises to make behavioral decisions.
Keywords:government subsidies  cost sharing  industrial internet platform  tripartite evolutionary game
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