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基于零售商创新投入的双渠道供应链协调策略
引用本文:李宗活,杨文胜,陈信同.基于零售商创新投入的双渠道供应链协调策略[J].控制与决策,2019,34(8):1754-1760.
作者姓名:李宗活  杨文胜  陈信同
作者单位:南京理工大学经济管理学院,南京,210094;南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京,211106
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71771122);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(15YJA630087).
摘    要:针对制造商在传统实体渠道的基础上积极开辟网络渠道的双渠道供应链,从消费者效用理论角度构建单一渠道和双渠道供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,在零售商创新投入和消费者渠道偏好扰动因素下,探讨制造商开辟网络渠道形成的渠道竞争效应,寻求供应链系统的组合优化策略,通过一个双重协调机制改善供应链运作效率.研究表明:批发价格、零售价格及创新投入水平的最优组合策略可实现供应链优化;制造商和零售商利润均与创新投入水平呈特定函数关系;网络渠道的引进可降低零售商定价和利润,减少实体渠道市场份额,但总需求增加;双重协调机制可缓解渠道冲突.最后通过数值仿真结果验证了协调机制的可行性.

关 键 词:效用理论  创新投入  双渠道供应链  协调机制  Stackelberg博弈  竞争效应

Coordination strategy based on retailer innovative input in dual-channel supply chains
LI Zong-huo,YANG Wen-sheng and CHEN Xin-tong.Coordination strategy based on retailer innovative input in dual-channel supply chains[J].Control and Decision,2019,34(8):1754-1760.
Authors:LI Zong-huo  YANG Wen-sheng and CHEN Xin-tong
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing210094,China,School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing210094,China and School of Economic and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing211106,China
Abstract:Aiming at the double-channel supply chain where the manufacturer adds a network channel together with the traditional entity channel, the Stackelberg game models of single-channel and dual-channel supply chains are constructed from the perspective of consumer utility theory. Under the disturbance of retailer innovation input level and consumer channel preference, the channel competition effect formed by the open up of network channel is analyzed and the optimization strategy in supply chain is found. Then a double coordination mechanism is proposed to improve the operations efficiency of supply chain. The results show that there is an optimal combination of wholesale price, retail price and innovation input level to achieve supply chain optimization. Manufacturer and retailers'' profits have a certain function relationship with the innovation input. With the introduction of network channel, the retailer pricing, profit and the market share of entity channel will be cut down while the total demand is increased. The channel conflict can be alleviated through the double coordination mechanism which is verified by a numerical simulation.
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