基于微分博弈的供应链合作减排和政府补贴策略

低碳背景下,将产品的减排量作为状态变量,借助微分博弈研究由供应商和制造商组成的两级供应 链长期动态合作减排和政府补贴策略问题.分别构建集中式和无成本分担的分散式微分博弈模型,并通过引入成本分担契约实现供应链系统利润的Pareto改善,得出并比较了3种决策情形下供应商和制造商各自相应的最优反馈均衡策略,以及产品减排量随时间变化的最优轨迹;然后,讨论政府补贴行为与企业选择合作减排行为之间的互动博弈,发现政府减排补贴的引入改变了3种决策情形下供应链成员的最优减排努力水平和利润的大小;最后,通过算例对相关参数进行灵敏度分析,验证了结论的有效性,为供应链上下游企业长期开展合作减排以及政府制定补贴政策提供了科学依据.

Reduce emissions in cooperation and government subsidies strategies in supply chain based on differential game

With the aid of differential game, the government subsidies strategies and the long-term dynamic problem about reducing emissions in cooperation in a supply chain which consists of a single supplier and manufacturer is studied under the background of low-carbon, in which the carbon emission reduction of products is used as a state variable. This paper establishes centralized and decentralized without cost-sharing contract differential game models, also the cost-sharing contract is introduced to achieve Pareto improvement for the profits of the supply chain. As for the three decision-making situations, the supplier''s and manufacturer''s optimal feedback equilibrium strategies and their own optimal trajectory of the carbon emission reduction of products over time can be obtained and compared respectively. Then, the interaction game between government subsidies behaviors and companies'' choice of reducing emissions in cooperation is discussed. It is found that the introduction of government subsidies for the carbon emission reduction changes the optimal emission reduction efforts and the profits of supply chain members under the three decision-making situations. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the relevant parameters is conducted by using the proposed method to verify the validity of conclusions, which provides scientific basis for long-term reducing emissions in cooperation and subsidies made by government in a supply chain.