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具有损失规避零售商的模糊供应链网络均衡
引用本文:胡劲松,赵光丽.具有损失规避零售商的模糊供应链网络均衡[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1899-1906.
作者姓名:胡劲松  赵光丽
作者单位:青岛大学管理科学与工程系,山东青岛,266071
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(71371102);国际(地区)合作与交流项目(71311120090);山东省自然科学基金项目
摘    要:针对模糊市场需求情形,研究具有损失规避行为零售商的无缺货成本的供应链网络均衡问题。利用模糊事件的可信性测度理论,推导具有分段线性效用函数损失规避零售商的模糊期望效用模型,揭示其凹性性质。利用变分不等式理论,描述制造商、零售商和消费者的最优行为,进而构建网络均衡模型。为了简化网络均衡条件,揭示了制造商与零售商内生交易定价机制的等价关系。最后,利用数值分析表明了市场需求的模糊性和损失规避系数对网络均衡的影响。

关 键 词:供应链网络  损失规避  变分不等式  模糊需求
收稿时间:2013/7/5 0:00:00
修稿时间:2013/12/16 0:00:00

Supply chain network equilibrium with loss-averse retailers under fuzzy demand
HU Jin-song ZHAO Guang-li.Supply chain network equilibrium with loss-averse retailers under fuzzy demand[J].Control and Decision,2014,29(10):1899-1906.
Authors:HU Jin-song ZHAO Guang-li
Abstract:

Under the condition of fuzzy demand, the supply chain network equilibrium, in which loss-averse retailers’ shortage cost is not involved, is examined. The expected utility model of retailers with the piecewise-linear loss aversion utility function is derived by the credibility measure of the fuzzy event, and its concavity property is revealed. The optimal behaviors of manufactures, retailers and consumers are modeled by the variational inequality, and the network equilibrium model is built. It is proved that manufactures’ pricing mechanisms are equivalent to retailers’ at equilibrium in order to simplify network equilibrium conditions. Finally, a numerical example shows the impact of fuzzy demand and loss-averse coefficients on network equilibrium.

Keywords:supply chain network  loss aversion  variational inequality  fuzzy demand
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