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基于讨价还价能力的双渠道供应链定价模式选择
引用本文:李 海,崔南方. 基于讨价还价能力的双渠道供应链定价模式选择[J]. 计算机应用研究, 2013, 30(8): 2323-2326
作者姓名:李 海  崔南方
作者单位:华中科技大学 管理学院,武汉,430074
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71131004, 71271097)
摘    要:针对由网络直销渠道和电子零售渠道组成的双渠道供应链进行研究。基于制造商和零售商之间的谈判能力对比, 通过博弈建模分析了三种零售价定价模式下供应链成员的价格决策和物流服务水平决策。研究表明, 在制造商谈判能力较弱的情况下, 制造商统一定价模式是最优模式; 在制造商谈判能力较强的情况下, 以直销价格为协商基础的分别定价模式是最优模式; 在最优模式下, 制造商和供应链的利润都显著占优, 电子零售商提供的物流服务水平也相应最高, 但电子零售商的利润受定价模式的影响不显著, 最优模式也是双方接受的均衡策略。

关 键 词:双渠道供应链  讨价还价能力  Stackelberg博弈  定价模式  服务水平

Study on pricing scheme decision in dual channelsupply chain under bargaining power
LI Hai,CUI Nan-fang. Study on pricing scheme decision in dual channelsupply chain under bargaining power[J]. Application Research of Computers, 2013, 30(8): 2323-2326
Authors:LI Hai  CUI Nan-fang
Affiliation:School of Management, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan 430074, China
Abstract:This paper investigated a supply chain with a direct channel and e-tail channel. Under different bargaining power owned by manufacturer or e-tailer, it analyzed the pricing decision and logistic service level decision of supply chain member by using game theory under three pricing schemes. It was found that uniform pricing decided by manufacturer was optimal when the manufacturer's bargaining power was weak, and unequal pricing scheme with wholesale price negotiated based on direct sale price was optimal when the manufacturer's bargaining power was strong. Under these optimal pricing schemes, the profit of supply chain and manufacturer was dominant and the logistic service level was highest. The profit of e-tailer was slightly influenced by pricing scheme, so the optimal pricing scheme might be the equilibrium strategies accepted by chain members.
Keywords:dual channel supply chain  bargaining power  Stackelberg game  pricing scheme  service level
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