对流密码LILI-128的差分故障攻击

对LILI-128算法对差分故障攻击的安全性进行了研究。攻击采用面向比特的故障模型, 并结合差分分析和代数分析技术, 在 LILI-128 算法LFSRd中注入随机的单比特故障, 得到关于LILI-128算法内部状态的代数方程组, 并使用Crypto MiniSAT解析器求解恢复128位初始密钥。实验结果表明, 280个单比特故障注入就可以在1 min内完全恢复LILI-128全部128位密钥。因此, LILI-128密码实现安全性易遭差分故障攻击威胁, 需要对加密设备进行故障攻击防御, 以提高LILI-128密码实现安全性。

Differential fault attack on LILI-128

This paper examined the strength of LILI-128 against differential fault attack. On the basis of the bite-oriented fault model, combining with differential analysis and algebraic analysis, it implanted the attack on the LILI-128 to generate equations for its internal states by inducing faults in LFSRd to recover its 128 bits secret key. Experimental results show that the attack could recover the whole 128 bits secret key by inducing only 280 faults in a minute. The LILI-128 is vulnerable to differential faults attack. To strengthen the security of the LILI-128, it should take measures to protect the encryption device from differential fault attack.