Climate Coalitions in an Integrated Assessment Model |
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| Authors: | Richard SJ Tol |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Centre for Marine and Climate Research, Hamburg University, Hamburg, Germany;(2) Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands;(3) Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A. |
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| Abstract: | An analytically tractable approximation of a numerical model is used toinvestigate coalition formation between nine major world regions withregard to their policies for greenhouse gas emission reduction. Fullcooperation is not individually rational. Assuming non-transferableutility, side payments do not ensure full cooperation either. Withoutside payments, the largest stable coalitions are small and consist ofsimilar regions. With side payments, the largest stable coalitionsexclude either the main culprits or the main victims of climate change.In all cases, optimal emission control is modest. |
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| Keywords: | climate change coalition formation LQ games optimal emission control |
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