| 第三方负责回收再制造闭环供应链契约设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈菊红,史成东,郭福利.第三方负责回收再制造闭环供应链契约设计[J].工业工程与管理,2010,15(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈菊红 史成东 郭福利 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安理工大学,工商管理学院,陕西,西安,710048
2. 西安理工大学,工商管理学院,陕西,西安,710048;山东理工大学,电气与电子工程学院,山东,淄博,255091 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(70602017);;山东省软科学研究计划项目(2009RKA173) |
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| 摘 要： | 以博弈论为基本研究方法,考查了制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商构成的Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链中,节点企业为了取得最优利润,如何确定产品的批发价、销售价,废旧产品的回收价和回收转移价等,发现在分散决策(非合作博弈)下系统的利润要低于集中决策(合作博弈)下系统的利润。通过设计收入费用共享契约,增加了产品的销售量和废旧产品的回收量,提高了制造商、销售商、第三方物流服务商的利润和消费者的效用,实现了Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链系统的协调。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 Stackelberg闭环供应链 供应链协调 收益费用共享契约 |
Contract Design on Closed-loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing Based on Third-party Collecting |
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| CHEN Ju-hong,SHI Cheng-dong,GUO Fu-li.Contract Design on Closed-loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing Based on Third-party Collecting[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2010,15(2). |
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| Authors: | CHEN Ju-hong SHI Cheng-dong GUO Fu-li |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Business Administration;Xi'an University of Technology;Xi'an 710048;China;2.School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering;Shandong University of Technology;Zibo 255091;China |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,we address how the agents make their price decision including wholesale price,retail price,collection price and return transfer price in the Stackelberg closed-loop supply chain(SCLSC) with product remanufacturing composed of manufacturer,retailer and third-party logistics provider based on game theory.It's indicated that the system profit in the decentralized SCLSC is less than in the centralized SCLSC.Therefore,a revenue-and-expense sharing contract is presented to coordinate the SCLSC.The r... |
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| Keywords: | game theory stackelberg closed-loop supply chain supply chain coordination revenue-and-expense sharing contract |
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