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谈判能力不对称对供应商质量选择的影响分析
引用本文:张雄会,陈俊芳,黄培.谈判能力不对称对供应商质量选择的影响分析[J].工业工程与管理,2008,13(5).
作者姓名:张雄会  陈俊芳  黄培
作者单位:上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
摘    要:供应链成员的谈判能力不对称会影响供应商的质量改进投入.在谈判能力不对称情况下,建立一种供应商质量改进的决策模型,研究发现供应商的质量改进投入不能达到供应链最优水平.当供应商拥有较强谈判能力时,购买商对质量改进评价过程中存在的道德风险将降低供应商的质量改进投入;当购买商拥有较强谈判能力时,如果购买商提供给供应商长期的交易契约,质量改进投资风险率越大,供应商质量改进投入越低.经仿真比较,当供应商的初始质量较高时,供应商质量改进投入在购买商拥有较强谈判能力的情况下高于在供应商拥有较强谈判能力的情况.

关 键 词:供应链  质量改进  谈判能力不对称

Impact of Negotiation Power Asymmetry on Decisions on Supplier's Quality
ZHANG Xiong-hui,CHEN Jun-fang,HUANG Pei.Impact of Negotiation Power Asymmetry on Decisions on Supplier's Quality[J].Industrial Engineering and Management,2008,13(5).
Authors:ZHANG Xiong-hui  CHEN Jun-fang  HUANG Pei
Affiliation:ZHANG Xiong-hui,CHEN Jun-fang,HUANG Pei(Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai Jiaotong University,Shanghai 200052,China)
Abstract:The asymmetry of negotiation power among the members of the supply chain will affect the investment of the supplier in quality improvement.Under the condition of asymmetry of negotiation power,a decision model of supplier for quality improvement was built in this paper.It is found that the investment of the supplier in quality improvement cannot achieve the optimal supply chain level through quantitative analysis.When the supplier has more negotiation power,the investment of the supplier for quality improve...
Keywords:supply chain  quality improvement  negotiation power asymmetry  
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