考虑产品绿色度的闭环供应链政府补贴策略研究

在考虑产品绿色度的基础上，通过以制造商为博弈主导者和零售商为博弈跟随者的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型，研究政府补贴策略对闭环供应链各主体的决策影响。针对制造商在回收废旧产品再制造过程中的2项主要支出，设计了回收活动投资补贴策略(subsidy of investment，SI)和回收产品再制造成本补贴策略(subsidy of cost，SC)，从相同补贴率和相同补贴金额单位补贴效率2个角度对比分析补贴策略的优劣。结果表明，1) 无论何种补贴策略，在合理的补贴率范围内，闭环供应链各主体的利润均随补贴率的增加而增加；2) 以相同补贴率为评价标准，SC补贴策略优于SI补贴策略；3) 以相同补贴金额单位补贴效率为评价标准，SI补贴策略优于SC补贴策略。

A Research on Government Subsidy Strategy of Closed-loop Supply Chain Considering Product Green Degree

In order to study the influence of government subsidy strategies on the decision-making of each subject in the closed-loop supply chain, considering product green degree, a two-stage Stackelberg game model is constructed. In this model, manufacturers and retailers are game leaders and game followers, respectively. Aiming at the two major expenditures of manufacturers in the process of recycling used products, a recycling activity investment subsidy strategy (SI subsidy strategy) and a recycling product remanufacturing cost subsidy strategy (SC subsidy strategy) were designed. The advantages and disadvantages of subsidy strategies are compared and analyzed from two perspectives: the same subsidy rate and the same subsidy efficiency per unit. The results show that: (1) no matter what kind of subsidy strategy, within the range of reasonable subsidy rates, the profits of all entities in the closed-loop supply chain increase as the subsidy rate increases; (2) Using the same subsidy rate as the evaluation standard, the SC subsidy strategy is superior to the SI subsidy strategy; (3) Taking the subsidy efficiency of the same subsidy amount as the evaluation standard, the SI subsidy strategy is superior to the SC subsidy strategy.