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建筑工业化发展的多群体演化博弈与仿真研究
引用本文:王 华,沙皓月.建筑工业化发展的多群体演化博弈与仿真研究[J].工程管理学报,2022,36(5):7-012.
作者姓名:王 华  沙皓月
作者单位:沈阳工业大学 管理学院
摘    要:新型建筑工业化具有高质量、低消耗、可循环发展等特征,其推广已上升到国家战略层面。利用演化博弈方法,建立“政府-开发商-银行” 的三方动态演化博弈模型,进行各博弈主体策略的演化稳定性分析,并针对初始状态、奖惩力度、借贷风险和开发成本等对演化结果的影响进行动态仿真。在此基础上, 考虑开发商群体的网络拓扑特征对演化真实性的影响,引入复杂网络理论, 以无标度网络为载体描述开发商个体的连接偏好和决策机制,构建政府监管下的建筑工业化扩散模型,并通过仿真深入研究相关因素对扩散深度的影响作用,最后结合仿真结果给出相应对策建议。

关 键 词:建筑工业化  政府引导  多群体演化博弈  复杂网络  仿真分析

A Study on Multi-agent Evolutionary Game and Simulation ofBuilding Industrialization Development
WANG Hua,SHA Hao-yue.A Study on Multi-agent Evolutionary Game and Simulation ofBuilding Industrialization Development[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2022,36(5):7-012.
Authors:WANG Hua  SHA Hao-yue
Affiliation:School of Management, Shenyang University of Technology
Abstract:New building industrialization is characterized by high quality, low consumption, and recyclable development, and itspromotion has been elevated to the level of national strategy. This article uses the evolutionary game approach to establish athree-party dynamic evolutionary game model among "government-developer-bank", analyzes the evolutionary stability of eachgame subject’s strategy, and conducts dynamic simulation on the effect of the initial state, reward and punishment, borrowing riskand development cost on the evolutionary outcome. On this basis, this paper investigates the effect of network topologycharacteristics of developer groups on evolutionary veracity by introducing complex network theory. Then, the individual developers’connection preferences and decision-making mechanisms are described using scale-free networks to construct a model ofconstruction industrialization diffusion under government regulation, study the effect of relevant factors on the depth of diffusionthrough simulation, and finally give corresponding countermeasure suggestions with simulation results.
Keywords:building industrialization  government guidance  multi-agent evolutionary game  complex network  simulation analyses
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