高铁建设管理中危岩落石治理管控博弈分析

我国高铁项目建设中的危岩落石治理管控问题越来越受到参建各方的重视。从建设方的角度对高铁项目建设中危岩 落石治理管控的主要任务进行了阐述，分析了高铁建设管理各阶段参建各方的行为对危岩落石治理管控的影响，建立并求解 了建设方、设计方与咨询方的三方博弈模型，得出不同参数关系下的纳什均衡解，说明在项目建设前期至施工图设计阶段， 建设方制定办法，加大惩罚力度，加强对关键性工程的检查，提高监督成效，会减少设计方、咨询方不履职尽责的概率，有 利于危岩落石问题的根本解决。通过分析，对建设方采取适宜的策略督促各参建单位在危岩落石治理方面尽职尽责提出了具 有管理学意义的建议。

Game Theory for the Management and Control of Perilous Rockfall in the Process of High-speed Railway Construction

The management and control of perilous rockfall in the construction of high-speed railway projects in China has been paid more and more attention by all stakeholders involved in the construction. From the perspective of the contractor, this paper analyzes the major responsibility of all parties involved in the control of perilous rockfall，and establishes the three-party game model for the contractor，the designer and the consultant. The Nash equilibrium solution is obtained based on different parameters. The results indicate that it will reduce the probability of derelict of the designer and the consultant by formulating measures，increasing penalties，strengthening inspections of key projects，improving supervision effectiveness，which are the fundamental solutions to the problem of perilous rockfall. Through the analysis，this article puts forward some managerial suggestions for the contractor to adopt appropriate strategies, which can urge the project stakeholders to perform their duty in the management of perilous rockfall.