基于公平偏好理论的PPP项目收益风险分配机制研究

PPP 模式对于社会资本参与基础设施建设项目具有积极的推动作用。然而，由于基础设施建设周期长、回报低，社会投资方将面临较高的收益风险，因此，我国大部分 PPP 项目的社会资本方为国企或国企与民企的联营体，纯粹的私人资本参与 PPP 项目的积极性并不高。为了激发私人资本参与基础设施项目建设的投资热情，当政府与不同投资方合作时，有必要基于项目参与方的公平偏好程度设置相应风险分配机制，一方面降低私人资本投资方所面临的收益风险，另一方面改变政府承担项目付费的现状，实现风险的合理分配。基于委托代理理论模拟项目收益风险分配机制，在考察投资方公平偏好的前提下，对传统的收益函数进行了调整，构建了基于公平偏好理论的 PPP 项目收益风险分配模型。通过数据分析得出，社会效益会随着投资方公平偏好的增大而增加，投资方承担风险比例亦与其公平偏好正相关

The Revenue Risk Allocation Mechanism of PPP ProjectsBased on the Fairness Preference Theory

PPP（public-private partnership）model has a positive effect on social capital participation in infrastructure constructionprojects. However，social investors will face high income risk due to the long construction duration and low returns. Therefore，mostsocial capital of PPP projects in China are state-owned enterprises or state-owned and private joint enterprises. The enthusiasm ofpure private capital to participate in PPP projects is not high. To stimulate investment enthusiasm of private capital to participate inthe construction of infrastructure projects，it is necessary to set the corresponding risk allocation mechanism based on the fairnesspreferences of project participants when the government cooperates with different investors. On the one hand，this reasonable risksharing mechanism will reduce the income risk of private capital investors. On the other hand，it will change the status thatgovernment pays for projects to achieve a reasonable risk allocation. Based on the principal-agent theory，this paper simulates theproject’s income risk allocation mechanism. The traditional income function is adjusted based on examining the fairness preferenceof the private investor，and the PPP project income risk allocation model based on the fairness preference theory is constructed. Thesocial benefits increase with the growing of investors’ fairness preferences through the data analysis. The risk proportion of theinvestor is also positively related to its fair preferences.