供应商选择与管理的激励机制研究

用博弈模型研究了采购企业在缺乏有关供应商实际业务能力和服务成本等信息的情况下，通过基于合同目标的长期报酬机制和基于实际业务能力的短期报酬机制来激励和约束供应商，可使交易双方都达到满意收益，并用显示原理分析了最优报酬机制的特征，最后证明了在上述报酬机制下的最优合同，与采购企业对供应商综合能力和成本的先验认识无关。

Study on the Incentive Mechanism of Supplier Selection and Management

We use game-theoretic models to study how to motivate and restrict suppliers to achieve win-win by long-term payment mechanism based on contract objective and short-term payment mechanism according to actual capability, under the circumstances that the information of the capability and the cost of suppliers are not available to the buyer side. The optimal contracts are characterized with the Revelation Principle. In addition,it is proved that the proposed optimal contract is independent of ex-ante beliefs,which the buyer has on the capability and the cost of the supplier.