| 基于委托代理理论的建造师薪酬激励模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王雪青,林雪,郭思佳. 基于委托代理理论的建造师薪酬激励模型研究[J]. 工程管理学报, 2013, 0(5): 12-17 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王雪青 林雪 郭思佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学 管理与经济学部 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目（71172148）;住建部软科学研究项目（2011-R3-18）. |
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| 摘 要： | 为了解决传统的薪酬激励机制难以对建造师信用行为进行有效治理的问题，以委托代理理论为基础，建立了以提高业绩水平和信用水平为双重激励目标的建造师薪酬激励模型。通过建造师工作情况评价测量业绩水平和信用分值作为模型输入，并结合风险规避系数和努力成本系数的调节作用，基于委托代理中激励相容、参与约束和效用最大化理论建立建造师总薪酬计算模型，并评价薪酬激励效果以对模型进行持续改进。通过实例分析得出，该模型可根据不同的业绩水平和信用分值差异化地设计建造师薪酬，使薪酬与业绩和信用联动，能够达到较好的激励效果，验证了该模型的可行性和适用性。
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| 关 键 词： | 建造师 委托代理理论 薪酬激励模型 |
The Compensation Incentive Model for Constructors Based on Principle-agent Theory |
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| WANG Xue-qing,LIN Xue,GUO Si-jia. The Compensation Incentive Model for Constructors Based on Principle-agent Theory[J]. Journal of Engineering Management, 2013, 0(5): 12-17 |
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| Authors: | WANG Xue-qing LIN Xue GUO Si-jia |
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| Affiliation: | College of Management and Economics，Tianjin University |
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| Abstract: | In order to solve the problem that traditional compensation incentive models cannot stimulate the credibility of constructors, a modified model is developed based on principle agent theory, with duel incentive objectives of increasing work performance and improving credibility. First, work performance levels and credibility scores of constructors are measured as the input for the model. Then the principle-agent model is constructed to calculate the compensation. At last the incentive effectiveness is evaluated. Through sample test, it shows that this model can link the compensation with the work performance and credibility, so that to achieve the incentive objectives, and it has certain feasibility and applicability. |
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| Keywords: | constructors, principle-agent theory compensation incentive model |
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