| 考虑互惠利他偏好和政府补贴的绿色供应链最优决策研究 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 张子元,傅端香. 考虑互惠利他偏好和政府补贴的绿色供应链最优决策研究[J]. 工业工程, 2020, 23(5): 149. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.05.020 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 张子元 傅端香 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 上海大学 管理学院，上海 200444;2. 河南理工大学 工商管理学院, 河南 焦作 454000 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502050)；河南省高等学校重点科研项目(18A790019)；河南省软科学项目(192400410200) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 为了研究政府补贴、绿色供应链制造商及零售商的互惠利他偏好对双方定价策略、利润、产品绿色度及绿色供应链整体利润的影响，运用博弈理论结合数值仿真方法对4种决策情形下的绿色供应链成员最优策略进行了研究。结果表明，制造商或零售商单方面的互惠利他偏好均会降低自身利润，提高产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润，且当双方互惠利他程度相同时，零售商的互惠利他偏好更能有效提高产品绿色度;无论是制造商或零售商具有互惠利他偏好，政府增加补贴均会在一定程度上增强其互惠利他偏好对产品绿色度、对方利润及供应链整体利润的提升作用，但不同的是，当制造商具有互惠利他偏好时，政府增加补贴会在一定程度上加重其互惠利他偏好对其自身利润的损害作用，当零售商互惠利他时则不会出现这种情况。
|
| 关 键 词： | 绿色供应链 互惠利他 政府补贴 最优决策 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-06-22 |
A Research on the Optimal Decision of Green Supply Chain Considering Reciprocal Altruistic Preference and Government Subsidies |
| |
| ZHANG Ziyuan,FU Duanxiang. A Research on the Optimal Decision of Green Supply Chain Considering Reciprocal Altruistic Preference and Government Subsidies[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2020, 23(5): 149. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2020.05.020 |
| |
| Authors: | ZHANG Ziyuan FU Duanxiang |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. School of Management, Shanghai Vniversity, Shanghai 200444, China;2. School of Business Administration, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, China |
| |
| Abstract: | In order to study the impact of government subsidies, the reciprocal altruism preferences of the manufacturer and the retailer in a green supply chain on two parties’ pricing strategies, profit, product green degree and overall profit of green supply chain, the green supply chain members’ optimal strategies are studied by using game theory and numerical simulation method. The research shows that the unilateral reciprocal altruistic preference of the manufacturer or retailer will reduce its own profit and increase the product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain. Moreover, when both sides have the same degree of reciprocal altruistic preference, the retailer’s reciprocal altruistic preference can improve the product green degree more effectively; whether the manufacturer or the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will enhance the promotion impact of its reciprocal altruism preference to product green degree, the counterparty’s profit and the overall profit of the supply chain to some extent, but the difference is that when the manufacturer has reciprocal altruism preference, the increase in government subsidies will aggravate the damage of its reciprocal altruistic preference to its own profit to certain extent, and such case will not happen when the retailer has reciprocal altruism preference. |
| |
| Keywords: | green supply chain reciprocal altruistic preference government subsidies optimal decision |
|
| 点击此处可从《工业工程》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《工业工程》下载全文 |
