Inaccurate reporting and inappropriate variables: A reply to Vecchio's (1990) examination of cognitive resource theory.

In an article in the Journal of Applied Psychology, R. P. Vecchio (see record 1990-17057-001) purported to test cognitive resource theory (F. E. Fiedler, 1986; Fiedler and J. E. Garcia, 1987). The authors present evidence that Vecchio's article seriously misrepresented previous work on cognitive resource theory and also contained several flaws in methodology that call into question his conclusions regarding the validity of cognitive resource theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comments on Paivio's imagery theory.

Discusses the differences between A. Paivio's (see record 1976-01839-001) imagery theory and a model of simultaneous and successive processing proposed by J. P. Das et al (see record 1975-08765-001). The latter model, which emphasizes the primacy of cognitive processes as opposed to task materials or instructions, is viewed as more sound. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Inaccurate implications of philosophy of science and rational-emotive therapy": A rejoinder.

Replies to R. DiGiuseppe's (see record 1988-30290-001) comments on the present author's objections (see record 1988-30350-001) to DiGiuseppe's conceptualization of rational-emotive theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the psychological meaning of information about competence: A reply to Ryan and Deci's comment on Butler (1987).

The comment by R. M. Ryan and E. L. Deci (see record 1989-34660-001) addresses a study (R. Butler; see record 1988-21628-001) in which I investigated the motivational effects of different kinds of information. Findings were related to several issues, including the different emphases of J. G. Nicholls's (see record 1984-28719-001) theory of task/ego involvement and their cognitive evaluation theory. Ryan and Deci's comment on my article reflects cognitive evaluation theory's emphasis on perceived autonomy as the major determinant of intrinsic motivation. I discuss certain methodological and conceptual limitations of their approach in understanding the impact of different achievement goals and competence strivings on intrinsically motivated behavior. I suggest that it would be fruitful to work toward a synthesis between cognitive evaluation theory and achievement theory that would clarify the relation between perceptions of autonomy and conceptions of competence. Such a synthesis should be helpful in achieving their common aim of promoting task-involved, intrinsically motivated learning in the classroom. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On melding psychometric science and clinical acumen in neuropsychological assessment: Reply to Snow and Hynd.

Responds to the comments of J. Snow and G. Hynd (see record 1984-30457-001) on inappropriate approaches to neuropsychological test profiles. The present author contends that he noted their objections in his original article (see record 1982-27041-001); it is suggested that the criticism reflects a general neglect of basic concepts (e.g., empirical evaluation of clinical interpretation) that are relevant to assessment in neuropsychology. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The empirical claims of maximization theory: A reply to Rachlin and to Kagel, Battalio, and Green.

H. Rachlin (see record 1984-02970-001) and J. H. Kagel et al (see record 1984-02959-001) reported errors in the present author's (see record 1982-22589-001) critique of maximization theory. They presented new evidence that demonstrated that maximization accounts better for equilibrium behavior on schedules of reinforcement than did matching. In this article, Prelec argues that the allegations of mathematical and conceptual errors are without substance and the new data do not differentially favor maximization or matching. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Loss as the active ingredient in stress: Response to Arnold Lazarus.

Addresses comments made by A. A. Lazarus (see record 1990-19727-001) in response to the article by S. E. Hobfoll (see record 1989-29399-001). These include (1) Lazarus's argument that loss leads to depression and not to other indicators of distress and (2) the role of hassles in conservation of resource theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A new vision of personality...and of personality theory: Reply.

Replies to comments by Maddi (see record 2006-05893-007) on "A Tale of Two Visions: Can a New View of Personality Help Integrate Psychology?" (see record 2005-05480-001). In the original article, the current author proposed a new fieldwide framework for the discipline of personality psychology; in essence, it is a new outline to organize contemporary theory and research in the field. Maddi raised two interrelated objections to that proposed framework. First, he believes that there is a better way to organize the discipline of personality psychology than the one the current author proposed. His method involves comparing and analyzing the grand theories of personality and using the results of his analyses to guide research in the discipline. Maddi's (1968) meta-theory usefully organizes the statements of the grand theories of the early-to-mid-20th century, but the current author is not sure it is sufficient to organize the field. Second, he was concerned that the current author wants to de-emphasize the grand theories of the field. Maddi (2006) believes that disagreements among the grand theories are a fruitful source of research ideas. Although that may be true, there is more to personality psychology than the grand theories alone. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Optimum service delivery to the Black client.

Replies to the comments of H. U. Ashby (see record 1986-17759-001) and P. Bronstein (see record 1986-17774-001) on the author's (see record 1985-26063-001) work on the nondisclosing Black client. Ashby's and Bronstein's objections to the term healthy cultural paranoia are addressed with assertions that the author is not the originator of the term and that the impact of the proposal on the quality of care services to Black clients was not considered by either Ashby or Bronstein. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stages of brain and cognitive maturation.

H. T. Epstein (see PA, Vol 52:9783 and 1986), R. B. McCall (see record 1988-32308-001), and R. B. McCall et al (see record 1984-17419-001) presented discrepant findings regarding the presence of stages in brain and cognitive maturation, as described in Piagetian theory. This article questions whether their variables (e.g., skull circumference and global mental test scores) are appropriate indices from which to make such conclusions. Evidence from direct brain measurements (e.g., the quantitative electroencephalogram [QEEG]) and other neurobiological indices provides stronger support for the conclusion that regional brain maturation exhibits growth spurts and plateaus. The specific neuropsychological functions represented by regional QEEG maturation data give a composite picture of brain growth that is consistent with Piagetian theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Another unaccommodating look at Piaget.

Replies to M. Sziraki (see record 1979-10730-001), restating the position, notwithstanding the objections that have been raised, that Piaget has done no more than put new names on the process of cognitive development. He has not explained it; moreover, he fails to base psychology in biology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Existentialism and development.

Responds to comments made by G. Kose (see record 1993-25090-001), K. Sun (see record 1993-25097-001), and R. K. Meister (see record 1993-25094-001) on B. Vandenberg's (see record 1992-12211-001) article on epistemology and an existentialist consideration of development. Taking exception with Kose's definition of existentialism and Key's remarks on morality and cognitive developments, Vandenberg voices his agreement with Meister on having a developmental perspective on the concept of death. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The applicability of treatment utility.

Replies to the comments of J. D. Cone (see record 1990-02005-001) on the article by S. C. Hayes et al (see record 1988-11276-001) on using treatment utility (TU) to evaluate assessment procedures. The present authors argue that TU is a concept that applies to the relevance of assessment in treatment planning and may be based on assessment that need not have this purpose. From this viewpoint, all of the objections to the TU concept stem from the failure to distinguish between the assessment of proximal and ultimate goals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Microgenetic methods revisited.

Responds to the comments of R. C. Fowler (see record 1993-05092-001) and M. Pressley (see record 1993-05123-001) to the authors' article (see record 1991-27066-001) regarding the microgenetic method (MM) of studying cognitive development. The authors discuss views of development and methodological issues to assert that the MM produces more useful data than available alternatives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commentary on two articles concerning generalized and specific cognitive deficits.

This is a commentary on essays in this journal issue by M. E. Strauss (see record 2001-17627-002) and R. A. Knight and S. A Silverstein (see record 2001-17627-003) on research methodology for studying cognitive deficits. Concentrating mostly on Knight and Silverstein's article, the authors review the psychometric issues in the matched-task design, analyze Knight and Silverstein's "process-oriented" objections to that design, and scrutinize their methods for studying cognitive deficits, examining 2 of their empirical studies as examples of those methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reinstating the original principles of Proctor's unified theory for matching-task phenomena: An evaluation of Krueger and Shapiro's reformulation.

L. E. Krueger and R. G. Shapiro (see record 1982-02747-001) have reformulated R. W. Proctor's (see record 1981-24888-001) unified theory for matching-task phenomena by replacing his inhibition principle with Krueger's (see record 1979-22735-001) internal noise (IN) principle and altering Proctor's facilitation principle from one of sensitivity change to one of criterion change. The present article examines both of these modifications and concludes that they are unwarranted. The IN principle is shown to rely on several unjustified assumptions, the most critical of which seems to render it incapable of explaining the "same–different" RT disparity for which it was developed. On the other hand, empirical evidence for the inhibition principle is shown to be considerably more substantial than acknowledged by Krueger and Shapiro. An examination of facilitation indicates that although it can occur through either sensitivity or criterion changes, the former apparently predominates in the standard matching-task situation. (57 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Level of generality and clear thinking in theory construction and theory evaluation: Reply to Greenberg (1994) and Patton (1994).

L. S. Greenberg (see record 1994-38238-001) and M. J. Patton (see record 1994-38253-001) both address ambiguities in C. J. Gelso and J. A. Carter's (see record 1994-38236-001) theoretical propositions. In this reply, the issue of how general a theory ought to be in order to have maximal impact on research and practice is discussed. A number of Greenberg's assertions about Gelso and Carter's formulations are questioned. Research on complex constructs, for example, transference, is difficult but viable. The field should not shy away from such constructs because of definitional and measurement problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bridging the research traditions of task/ego involvement and intrinsic/extrinsic motivation: Comment on Butler (1987).

In an experiment on the effects of different feedback conditions on motivationally relevant variables, R. Butler (see record 1988-21628-001) tested the hypothesis that the effects of feedback on intrinsic motivation would depend on whether that feedback promotes a task-involving or ego-involving orientation. She interpreted the findings as they relate to J. G. Nicholls's (see record 1984-28719-001) theory of task/ego involvement and our cognitive evaluation theory (E. L. Deci and R. M. Ryan, 1985). Although the data were very interesting, Butler failed to review a series of highly relevant studies, she misportrayed cognitive evaluation theory, and she drew conclusions that were not necessarily warranted given her experimental manipulations and data. This article provides a commentary on that research and presents a discussion of the relation between the two theories that Butler claimed to have tested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)