Speeded tests of implicit knowledge.

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that implicit and explicit tasks involve distinct modes of processing. Ss observed rule-ordered letter strings and were asked either to memorize the strings or to try to discover the underlying rules. In Exp 1, they then made well-formedness judgments of novel strings under long-deadline and short-deadline conditions. Rule-discovery Ss, but not memory Ss, were impaired by the short deadline. In Exp 2, all Ss made "similarity" judgments of the novel strings instead of the traditional "rule-based" judgments; there were now no differences between the rule-discovery and memory groups. In Exp 3, Ss explicitly instructed in the rules were significantly more impaired under short deadlines than were memory Ss. An analysis of decision times to individual strings for the rule-trained vs memory groups also showed qualitative differences consistent with the implicit–explicit distinction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judging creativity: A method for assessing how and by what criteria it is done.

In 2 experiments with a total of 90 undergraduates, Ss evaluated fictitious protocols that varied in the number and uniqueness of the answers. In Exp I, Ss were instructed to use criteria for creativity; in Exp II, judgments were made according to creativity, intelligence, or gender. Productivity influenced the ratings under all 3 criteria with the largest effect being on intelligence, followed by creativity. Uniqueness had an independent influence on judgments of creativity, a borderline effect on intelligence, and no significant effect on gender. Protocols which had more answers were judged more "masculine." Results indicate that laymen share the same definition of creativity used by psychometricians and that intelligence is semantically different from creativity. It is concluded that the method offers an unobtrusive but objective way of assessing factors that enter into conceptual judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of performance attributions on others' perceptions of the attributor.

Two studies investigated the effects that performers' attributions actually have on others' impressions. 441 undergraduates served as Ss. "Self-serving" internal attributions for success and external attributions for failure produced slightly higher ability evaluations than did the opposite pattern in 1 of the 2 experiments. However, in both experiments, these self-serving attributions produced lower ratings on a modesty dimension. External attributions were also perceived as relatively dishonest for all Ss in Exp I and for unsuccessful Ss in Exp II. Publicity (Exp I) and task variables (Exp II) did not affect ability, modesty, or honesty judgments made from performance attributions but did strongly affect the influence these dimensions had on overall likability evaluations. In general, Ss who made internal attributions tended to be better liked than those who made external attributions. The implications and limitations of these results are discussed relative to self-presentational considerations. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

You can't not believe everything you read.

Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Exps 1 and 2) or a college student (Exp 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Exps 1 and 2) or time pressure (Exp 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from "unbelieving" the false information they automatically believed during comprehension. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social judgeability: The impact of meta-informational cues on the use of stereotypes.

According to a social judgeability analysis, a crucial determinant of impression formation is the extent to which people feel entitled to judge a target person. Two experiments, with a total of 113 undergraduates, tested the impact of the subjective availability of individuating information on a social judgment independent of its actual presence. In Exp 1, Ss made a stereotypical judgment when they believed individuating information was present even if no information was in fact given. In Exp 2, Ss who thought they received individuating information made more extreme and confident judgments than Ss who thought they received category information. This indicates that Ss' judgments were not simply a function of implicit demand: The illusion of receiving individuating information led Ss to believe they possessed the necessary evidence for legitimate decision making. This result supports the existence of rules in the social inference process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social reference points.

Conducted 2 experiments in which a total of 324 undergraduates were asked to make similarity judgments about social concepts, varying the direction of the comparison specified by the question. Asymmetries in rated similarity were used to diagnose concepts that function as habitual reference points. In Exp I, after completing the Self-Monitoring Scale, Ss were asked to make directional judgments about themselves vs a friend along various dimensions (social and physical). Ss were found to rate a friend as more similar to themselves than vice versa along both social and physical dimensions, suggesting that the self served as a reference point. In Exp II Ss made global similarity comparisons between themselves and typical examples of various social stereotypes. Directional asymmetries were inversely related to the extent of Ss' knowledge about the stereotypes: The self acted as a reference point with respect to stereotypes with few known attributes but not with respect to those with many attributes. The relation between level of self-monitoring and asymmetry effects was weak and inconsistent in both experiments. Results suggest that concepts serving as social reference points vary across judgment contexts in accord with general cognitive models of similarity comparisons. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An evaluation of the total similarity principle: Effects of similarity on frequency judgments.

Memory models that embody the total similarity principle (e.g., G. Gillund and R. Shiffrin, see PA, Vol 71:8340; D. Hintzman, see PA, Vol 76:10832; B. Murdock, see PA, Vol 69:4936; and R. Ratcliff, see PA, Vol 77:18992) assume that frequency judgments reflect the total similarity of a test item to stimuli that have been studied. In 4 experiments, Ss estimated the frequencies of target words that had been presented in the context of varying numbers of semantically similar words. In a 5th experiment, Ss made forced-choice relative frequency judgments. The results of these experiments supported 1 prediction of total similarity models: Presenting similar words will increase rather than decrease frequency judgments of target words. However, a 2nd prediction of these models was not supported. In particular, similar-word presentations had no effect on the judged frequencies of target words that had not been shown. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit stereotyping in person judgment.

Three experiments demonstrated implicit gender stereotyping. A target's social category determined the use of previously primed stereotyped information, without Ss' awareness of such influence. After unscrambling sentences describing neutral or stereotyped behaviors about dependence or aggression, Ss evaluated a female or male target. Although ratings of female and male targets did not differ after exposure to neutral primes, Ss exposed to dependence primes rated a female target as more dependent than a male target who performed identical behaviors (Exp 1A). Likewise, Ss rated a male, but not a female, target as more aggressive after exposure to aggression primes compared with neutral primes (Exp 1B). Exp 2 replicated the implicit stereotyping effect and additionally showed no relationship between explicit memory for primes and judgment of target's dependence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Person categories and social perception: Testing some boundaries of the processing effect of prior knowledge.

Investigated whether stereotypic knowledge would influence social perception in a more realistic setting. In Exp I, 96 undergraduates watched a videotape of a target woman identified either as a waitress or a librarian; Ss more accurately remembered features of the woman that were consistent with their prototype of a waitress (librarian) than features that were inconsistent. The prototype-consistency effect did not interact with the delay time before recognition memory was assessed. In Exp III, 56 Ss learned the occupational information either before or after watching the tape. The prototype-consistency effect from Exp I was replicated. In addition, knowing the target's occupation while watching her led to increased accuracy for both consistent and inconsistent information. The probable role of both encoding and retrieval processes in contributing to this effect is noted. Perceivers' stereotypic prior knowledge influenced their memory of a target person's behavior even in a realistic person-perception situation. Conditions that favor the memorability of consistent vs inconsistent information are discussed. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Happiness and reminiscing: The role of time perspective, affect, and mode of thinking.

Conducted 3 experiments to determine the affect of reminiscing on reported well-being. 51 students at a professional school for translators and interpreters in Exp I and 36 undergraduates in Exp II recounted events that they had experienced as positive and pleasant or as negative and unpleasant. In Exp III, 64 undergraduates wrote down a particularly positive or negative event and then asked to explain either why or how this event occurred. Ss in all 3 experiments were then asked to rate their happiness and life satisfaction. Overall results indicate that Ss' ratings of general life satisfaction depended not only on the hedonic quality of the life experiences they happened to recall but also on the way in which they thought about them. Specifically, the hedonic quality of present life events influenced Ss' judgments of well-being in the same direction. The hedonic quality of past events, however, had a congruent impact on well-being judgments only when thinking about them elicited affect in the present but otherwise had a contrast effect on these judgments. Two factors were found to determine if thinking about the past elicits affect: whether Ss describe the events vividly and in detail or only mention them briefly, and whether Ss describe how the events occurred rather than why they occurred. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assimilation and contrast as a function of people's willingness and ability to expend effort in forming an impression.

Set/reset (L. L. Martin; see record 1987-01092-001) hypothesis that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation was examined. In Exp. 1, the impressions of distracted Ss showed assimilation toward blatantly primed concepts, whereas the impressions of nondistracted Ss showed contrast. In Exp. 2, Ss told that their ratings would be lumped into a group average showed assimilation, whereas Ss told that their ratings would be examined individually showed contrast. In Exp. 3, the impressions of Ss low in need for cognition showed assimilation, whereas the impressions of Ss high in need for cognition showed contrast. Exp. 1 also showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the target information, and Exp. 3 showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the priming stimuli. Together, the results suggest that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential memory changes with age: Exact retrieval versus plausible inference.

Conducted 2 experiments on the use of direct retrieval and plausibility memory strategies in elderly and college-age adults. In Exp I, which used an episodic memory task, data were obtained from 49 65–80 yr old college alumni and from 58 college students who had served in a previous study by the 1st author (see record 1983-02731-001). Findings indicate that older Ss effectively used the plausibility strategy but performed more poorly than younger Ss when the direct retrieval strategy was required. Results of Exp II, using 18 college alumni (8 Ss aged 20–31 yrs, 10 Ss aged 64–75 yrs) with a semantic memory task, show that older Ss' accuracy was essentially undistinguishable from that of younger Ss as long as a plausibility judgment process produced the correct response. It is argued that careful inspection is a much more costly process for older adults than it is for young adults but that plausibility judgments and feature overlap processes are equally easy for both age groups. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contamination of facial memory through exposure to misleading composite pictures.

In Exp I, 46 male and 51 female undergraduates witnessed a filmed incident and later described the target. Results show that Ss who observed a composite containing misleading information (either incorrect hair or an added moustache) were significantly more likely to misreport hairstyle and the presence of a moustache than those who did not. In Exp II, 210 17–65 yr old Ss observed a filmed incident and were tested for their recall and recognition of the target either immediately or after delays of 2 or 7 days. Significant bias, consistent with the content of the misleading composite, was present for both cued recall and choice of mug shot in a photo spread. The effect did not increase over delay but was greater when the composite was seen just prior to recall than immediately after the incident. Implications concerning interference with the memory of the witness who produced the composite and for other witnesses exposed to the misleading composite are discussed. (33 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The structure of word storage in the permanent memory of nonpsychotic schizophrenics.

Conducted 2 experiments to assess the storage structure of common English words in the memory of young nonpsychotic schizophrenics. 37 schizophrenic and 12 nonschizophrenic psychiatric patients and 36 normals were Ss in the 2 experiments. Ss in both experiments sorted words on the basis of the similarity of relatedness they perceived, but Ss in Exp II performed this task under time pressure. Assuming that the structure underlying these sortings reflects the storage structure of memory, a method of cluster analysis was applied to the data. The structural features extracted for all Ss were very similar to each other. A group difference was found in the S's sorting strategy, but its effect on the main findings was minimal. It is concluded that the storage structure of words in the memory of schizophrenics is probably intact. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lexical access for concrete and abstract words.

Three experiments with 48 undergraduates compared the speed and accuracy of lexical decisions for concrete and abstract nouns. Results of Exp I, in which separate groups of Ss judged each word type, and of Exp II, in which all Ss judged mixed blocks of both word types, indicate that there was a small speed advantage for concrete nouns in lexical decision. To observe transfer effects from one word type to the other, all Ss in Exp III made judgments within blocked presentations of each word type. Findings show that when blocks of abstract words followed blocks of concrete words, judgments for the abstract words were significantly longer than those for concrete words. When concrete blocks followed abstract blocks, however, there was no difference in response time for the 2 word types. It is concluded that the effect of concreteness in lexical decision appears to be critically sensitive to order of presentation. Implications for models of common vs dual representation in lexical memory are discussed. (56 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spatial memory in pigeons on the radial maze.

A series of 7 experiments with 10 pigeons showed, contrary to recent suggestions that pigeons show little or no spatial memory on the radial maze, highly accurate performance by Ss on an 8-arm radial maze. In Exp I, Ss were trained on successive phases that raised the number of alleys to be remembered from 1 to 4. In Exp II, Ss were allowed to search the maze for food with all 8 arms open. Measures of spatial memory showed that Ss performed at a level equivalent to that found with rats in previous research by A. B. Bond et al (see record 1982-25052-001). In Exp III, testing with massed trials revealed proactive interference. Ss were able to form reference memory for subsets of baited and unbaited alleys in Exp VI. In Exp VII, Ss learned about quantities of food associated with 4 different alleys and ordered their alley choices from the largest to the smallest reward. Contrary to the previous findings with rats, Ss in Exp IV showed forgetting over retention intervals of 0–360 sec between forced and free choices. It is concluded that spatial memory in pigeons generally shows the same properties as that in rats. (49 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)