Remembering what you feel: Effects of emotion on memory.

In Exp I, 60 undergraduates' mood responses to manipulated expressions were assessed. Ss then read 2 passages of the same emotional content, either anger-provoking editorials or humorous selections by Woody Allen. Later, one selection was recalled while frowning and the other while smiling. In the self-produced cue group (i.e., those whose mood was affected in the original assessment), recall was significantly better for the editorials when frowning and for the Woody Allen stories when smiling. In the nonself cue group, expressions did not affect recall. In Exp II, 20 undergraduates heard and recalled 3 kinds of sentences—angry, sad, or fearful—in the same 3 expressions. Again, only in the self-produced cue group was recall significantly better when sentence and expression were consistent. Findings indicate that these effects are due to mood rather than expression and to the match between expression and content at the time of recall. (31 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The self-comparison process and self-discrepant feedback: Consequences of learning you are what you thought you were not.

In 4 experiments, college students received bogus personality-test feedback that they possessed an actual-self, ideal-self (desired but unpossessed), or rejected-self (unwanted and unpossessed) trait. When the test had low credibility, rejected-self feedback produced positive mood (PM), whereas ideal-self feedback produced negative mood (NM). Self-comparison of the feedback with self-representations apparently revealed the falsity of the feedback, making salient Ss' virtues or shortcomings. The pattern reversed when test credibility was high: Rejected-self feedback led to NM and ideal-self feedback to PM. These effects were not evident, however, when the feedback trait had high personal importance or when Ss generated counterexamples before feedback about an unimportant trait. This suggests that reactions to self-discrepant feedback depend on whether convincing counterexamples are readily accessed during self-comparison. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Getting what you want by revising what you had.

Previous research has demonstrated that people recall their past in ways that exaggerate its consistency with their current condition. It is argued that whether people perceive stability or change in themselves depends, in part, on the theory they invoke to reconstruct their past. Two studies, with 106 undergraduates, addressed the impact of a potentially invalid theory of change on the recall of personal histories. Some Ss participated in a study-skills improvement program that promised more than it delivered. Ss initially evaluated their study skills and then were randomly assigned either to a waiting list control condition or to the study skills program. Three weeks later, all Ss were asked to recall as accurately as possible their initial skills evaluation. Program participants recalled their evaluations as being worse than they had actually reported; waiting list Ss exhibited no systematic bias in recall. Program participants also reported greater improvement in study skills and expected better final exam grades than did waiting list Ss. Actual grades did not differ in either study. Nonetheless, 6 mo later program participants overestimated their academic performance for the term during which the program was conducted. Results support the hypothesis that people can claim support for invalid theories of change by reconstructing their pasts. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metamemory cues and monitoring accuracy: Judging what you know and what you will know.

Three experiments examined metamemory for categorized lists of items. Judgments of learning (JOLs) were obtained from college students either immediately after study or following a brief (at least 30-s) delay. In contrast to past findings (e.g., T. O. Nelson & J. Dunlosky, 1991), no advantage was found for delayed JOLs in Experiment 1, using a standard, prediction-based metamemory cue. In Experiment 2, knowledge-based judgments were elicited, and delayed JOL accuracy improved significantly. The relative efficacy of 4 different metamemory cues was examined in Experiment 3. An interaction between the timing and phrasing of JOL cues was detected: Delayed JOLs were more accurate than immediate JOLs only when knowledge-based cues were used. These results are interpreted in A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework for JOL accuracy, and they show that the phrasing of metamemory cues can have a substantial impact on monitoring accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Visual memory: what do you know about what you saw?

Recent studies of visual perception are bringing us closer to an understanding of what we remember - and what we forget - when we recall a scene.     

What you feel is how you compare: How comparisons influence the social induction of affect.

Concordant and discordant affective reactions can occur after the mere perception of another person's affective expression. Most previous theorizing has been concerned with the explanation of affective concordance, typically referred to as emotional contagion, although discordant affect has received little attention. The authors propose an integrative account for the explanation of both outcomes based on a social comparison framework. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that two distinct types of comparison processes can trigger concordant or discordant affective reactions. Study 3 extends these findings by demonstrating that the influence of comparison processes on affect in an established mood contagion paradigm. The authors attempt to integrate previous research into the present account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Believing another likes or dislikes you: Behaviors making the beliefs come true.

Tested the idea that when target persons believe that a perceiver has a general negative evaluation of them, especially after a personal encounter, the targets would be unlikely to believe that the perceiver's behavior can be modified easily, resulting in an expectancy confirmation. This expectancy confirmation should occur regardless of the target's self-perceptions. 60 undergraduates participated in a 2 (expectancy [like or dislike])?×?2 (role [perceiver or target])?×?2 (self-likability [high or low]) factorial study. Results show that falsely leading Ss to believe that another liked or disliked them led Ss to be actually liked or disliked. Ss who believed they were liked after a personal encounter self-disclosed more, disagreed less, expressed dissimilarity less, and had a more positive tone of voice and general attitude than Ss who believed they were disliked. These behaviors led to reciprocal behaviors on the part of the other. No differences were obtained in number of conversations initiated, compliments, eye gaze, forward leaning, or placement of the chair. Being liked was also correlated with self-disclosure, expressions of similarity and dissimilarity, voice tone, and general attitude. Perceived self-likability was correlated with the belief that one was liked and tended to be correlated with actually being liked. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociable coordinate frames of unilateral spatial neglect: "viewer-centered" neglect

Detailed analyses of reading and nonlexical tasks by three patients with unilateral spatial neglect (USN) secondary to stroke indicate that the USN in each of these patients affects the left side (contralateral to brain damage) of the viewer, with respect to the viewer's head, mid-sagittal plane of the body, or line of sight. In one case, the neglect was further specified as concerning the left side of the viewer's line of sight (the left half of her residual visual field). Thus, the frame of reference of USN in these three cases appears to have viewer-centered (in at least one case, specifically retinotopic) coordinates. The performance of these patients is contrasted to that of other patients in the literature whose USN appears to have a frame of reference with stimulus-centered or object-centered coordinates. These results are interpreted within a model of visual processing (adapted from Marr, 1980 and others) with at least three coordinate frames. It is argued that USN can affect one or more of these coordinate frames independently.     

See what you want to see: Motivational influences on visual perception.

People's motivational states--their wishes and preferences--influence their processing of visual stimuli. In 5 studies, participants shown an ambiguous figure (e.g., one that could be seen either as the letter B or the number 13) tended to report seeing the interpretation that assigned them to outcomes they favored. This finding was affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception (e.g., eye tracking, lexical decision tasks) and by experimental procedures demonstrating that participants were aware only of the single (usually favored) interpretation they saw at the time they viewed the stimulus. These studies suggest that the impact of motivation on information processing extends down into preconscious processing of stimuli in the visual environment and thus guides what the visual system presents to conscious awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is there any proprioceptive feedback? Comments on Schmidt.

Discusses R. A. Schmidt's (see record 1972-08143-001) contention that his experiments support the theory that the timing of skilled movements is based upon proprioceptive feedback. It is argued that Schmidt's account of timing is too narrow to describe skilled performance. An attempt is made to show that Schmidt's experiments do not rule out an alternative theory of timing in terms of central monitoring of efferent signals to the muscles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Group decision making: How you frame the question determines what you find.

Though not arguing against the practical value of group decision making per se, R. S. Tindale and J. R. Larson (see record 1992-19783-001) used data from computer simulations and an 8-group replication study as a basis for questioning the validity of the findings reported by the present authors (see record 1990-04483-001). The authors show that Tindale and Larson's application of computer simulations is suspect, that the replication-study data is so limited that its significance is questionable, that its operational definition of an assembly bonus effect is restrictive to the point that it has little meaning in real-world settings, and that claims with respect to the performance of ad hoc laboratory groups are inflated and misleading. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological distance and emotional experience: What you see is what you get.

Recent research suggests that perceiving negative emotion-eliciting scenes approaching intensifies the associated felt emotion, while perceiving emotion-eliciting scenes receding weakens the associated felt emotion (Muhlberger, Neumann, Wieser, & Pauli, 2008). In the present studies, we sought to extend these findings by examining the effects of imagining rather than perceiving such changes to negative emotion-eliciting scenes. Across three studies, we found that negative scenes generally elicited less negative responses and lower levels of arousal when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking, and more negative responses and higher levels of arousal when imagined moving toward participants and growing, as compared to the responses elicited by negative scenes when imagined unchanged. Patterns in responses to neutral scenes undergoing the same imagined transformations were similar on ratings of emotional arousal, but differed on valence—generally eliciting greater positivity when imagined moving toward participants and growing, and less positivity when imagined moving away from participants and shrinking. Moreover, for these effects to emerge, participants reported it necessary to explicitly imagine scenes moving closer or farther. These findings have implications for emotion regulation, and suggest that imagined spatial distance plays a role in mental representations of emotionally salient events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Putting off tomorrow to do what you want today: Planning for retirement.

In this article we note that in the coming years, a larger number of people will be experiencing retirement for a longer period of time than ever before and that despite this fact, many will find themselves unprepared for this stage of their lives. We review the literature on retirement preparation, structuring our review around the key questions that need to be addressed when planning for retirement: (a) What will I do? (b) How will I afford it? (c) Where will I live? and (d) Who will I share it with? We make a number of suggestions for research and practice. We conclude that although psychology has begun to play a role in understanding and addressing retirement preparation, there are considerable opportunities for psychologists to engage with this issue in their research and applied work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

You can’t always forget what you want, but if you try sometimes you just might find you’ll forget what you need.

Reviews the book, Intentional forgetting: Interdisciplinary approaches by J. Golding and C. MacLeod (see record 1997-36412-000). I was left with three impressions when I finished reading this volume. The first impression concerns the degree to which research in the cognitive and social/legal traditions has been largely independent. Given differences in historical antecedents, perspectives, methodologies, and results, it is easy to appreciate why the cognitive and social/legal approaches have developed separately. However, both literatures have much to contribute and gain from one another, as their juxtaposition in this volume illustrate. The second impression was the amount of consensus in terms of both data and theory. In the cognitive and in the social/legal domain, researchers are largely in agreement with regards to important issues, principal findings, and interpretations. Indeed, the most controversial debate in this volume is provided by Grant and Zentall, Roper, Kaiser, and Sherburne who argue the question of whether animals can develop control over memory processes. Finally, despite their differences, I was struck by the similarities and common themes in the cognitive, social/legal, and clinical literatures. The main goal of the editors of this volume was to bring together the various forms of research on intentional forgetting in one place to highlight the "commonalities that link these seemingly disparate areas of research" (p. ix). Golding and MacLeod have been remarkably successful in this endeavour. I thoroughly enjoyed, and greatly benefited from reading this volume. It brings together a wealth of findings, ideas, and directions for future research. Bjork concluded his perspective by reiterating that intentional forgetting "is inextricably intertwined with intentional remembering. If our goal is to understand how information is selected, encoded, learned, and remembered, we also need to understand how information is ignored, inhibited, discounted, and forgotten" (p. 478). This volume represents the considerable progress that has made toward the second half of this goal. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Noninvasive pacing: what you should know

Noninvasive pacing is a valuable therapy in emergency cardiac care. The more experience clinicians have with the noninvasive pacing procedure, the greater their confidence and the easier the job becomes. Effective troubleshooting during pacing becomes less problematic with increased experience with the therapy. Noninvasive pacing allows rapid initiation of emergency pacing and "buys time" to stabilize the patient and plan further care.