Individual differences in rational thought.

Much research in the last 2 decades has demonstrated that humans deviate from normative models of decision making and rational judgment. In 4 studies involving 954 participants, the authors explored the extent to which measures of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions can predict discrepancies from normative responding on a variety of tasks from the heuristics and biases literature including the selection task, belief bias in the syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, base-rate use, covariation detection, hypothesis testing, outcome bias, if-only thinking, knowledge calibration, hindsight bias, and on false consensus paradigm. Significant relationships involving cognitive ability were interpreted as indicating algorithmic level limitations on the computation of the normative response. Relationships with thinking dispositions were interpreted as indicating that styles of epistemic regulation can predict individual differences in performance of these tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of print exposure quality and inference construction on syllogistic reasoning.

This study extended the work of S. Siddiqui, R. F. West, and K. E. Stanovich (1998), who studied the link between general print exposure and syllogistic reasoning. It was hypothesized that exposure to certain text structures that contain well-delineated logical forms, such as popularized scientific texts, would be a better predictor of deductive reasoning skill than general print exposure, which is not sensitive to the quality of an individual's reading activity. Furthermore, it was predicted that the ability to generate explanatory bridging inferences while reading would also be predictive of syllogistic reasoning. Undergraduate students (N = 112) were tested for vocabulary, nonverbal cognitive ability, exposure to general print, exposure to popularized scientific literature, and the ability to comprehend texts distinguished by the number of inferences that must be generated to support comprehension. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that a combined measure of exposure to general and scientific literature was a significant predictor of syllogistic reasoning ability. Additionally, the ability to comprehend high-inference-load texts was related to solving syllogisms that were inconsistent with world knowledge, indicating an overlap in deductive reasoning skill and text comprehension processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can any ostrich fly?: some new data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

According to one version of the mental models theory (Oakhill, J.V., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Garnham, A., 1989. Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition 31, 117-140) beliefs exert their influence on reasoning in three ways. First they can affect the interpretation of the premises, for example by conversion. Second, they can curtail the search for alternative models of the premises, if an initial model supports a believable conclusion. Third, they can act as a filter on any conclusion that is eventually generated. This last influence is important in explaining the effects of belief bias in one-model syllogisms with no convertible premises, since such syllogisms, by definition, have no alternative models. However, the most natural interpretation of such a filter is that it filters out conclusions and leads to the response 'no valid conclusion'. The present study, which was conducted with groups of both British and Italian subjects, looked at the effect of prior knowledge on syllogistic reasoning, and showed that: (1) invalid conclusions for such one model syllogisms, either thematic or abstract, are typically not of the type 'no valid conclusion', but state invalid relations between the end terms; (2) belief-bias is completely suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises, and therefore the premises themselves are always considered. The results are compatible with a version of the mental models theory in which a representation of prior knowledge precedes modelling of the premises, which are then incorporated into the representation of this knowledge. The relation between this theory and other accounts of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and the implications of these findings for reasoning more generally, are considered.     

The domain specificity and generality of disjunctive reasoning: Searching for a generalizable critical thinking skill.

The domain specificity and generality of an important critical thinking skill was examined by administering 9 reasoning and decision-making tasks to 125 adults. Optimal performance on all of the tasks required that disjunctive processing strategies--strategies requiring the exhaustive consideration of all of the possible states of the world--be adopted. Performance across these disjunctive reasoning tasks displayed considerable domain specificity, but 5 of the tasks displayed moderate convergence. Cognitive ability was associated with performance on only 3 of 9 tasks. Six of the 9 tasks displayed associations with 1 of 2 cognitive styles that were examined in the multivariate task battery (need for cognition and reflectivity). Performance on the 5 tasks that displayed some domain generality was also more associated with thinking styles than with cognitive ability in several regression analyses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning in autism: Activation and integration of knowledge and belief.

Everyday conditional reasoning is typically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 26) were less influenced by background knowledge than typically developing adolescents (N = 38) when engaged in conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences (p = .01) and invalid inferences (p = .01) compared with the typical group. In a secondary probability judgment task, no significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in the ability to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to exhibit a “yes” response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everyday reasoning. These findings are discussed with reference to weak central coherence theory and the conditional reasoning literature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working memory and bias in reasoning across the life span.

Age differences in syllogistic reasoning in relation to crystallized and fluid ability were studied in 278 adults from 19 to 96 yrs of age. Two reasoning tasks, the evaluation and the construction of conclusions for syllogisms of varying complexity and believability, a vocabulary test, and 3 tasks of working memory were administered. The magnitude of age-related variance on selected reasoning tasks was only partially reduced by statistically controlling measures of both working memory and vocabulary. Additional age-related effects on reasoning were found to be significantly associated with number of mental models and bias produced by conflict between belief and logic. A significant bias was also found toward acceptance of invalid syllogisms as valid, even when contents were abstract. These sources of error in logic are discussed in relation to P. N. Johnson-Laird's (1983) theory of mental models and J. St. B. T. Evans's (1989) account of bias in human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge growth and maintenance across the life span: The role of print exposure.

One hundred thirty-three college students (mean age?=?19.1 years) and 49 older individuals (mean age?=?79.9 years) completed 2 general knowledge tasks, a vocabulary task, a working memory task, a syllogistic reasoning task, and several measures of exposure to print. A series of hierarchical regression analyses indicated that when measures of exposure to print were used as control variables, the positive relationships between age and vocabulary, and age and declarative knowledge, were eliminated. Within each of the age groups, exposure to print was a significant predictor of vocabulary and declarative knowledge even after differences in working memory, general ability, and educational level were controlled. These results support the theory of fluid-crystallized intelligence and suggest a more prominent role for exposure to print in theories of individual differences in knowledge acquisition and maintenance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does a general monitoring skill exist?

Two experiments investigated whether monitoring is better characterized as a domain-specific or a domain-general phenomenon. In Exp 1, college students' performance and discrimination accuracy were not correlated across 8 different domains, whereas confidence and judgment bias were. With tests matched on all salient dimensions except content, in Exp 2, students' performance, confidence, discrimination, and bias were correlated across all or most domains. In addition, confidence was correlated even after the effect of performance was removed. These findings lend qualified support to the domain-general hypothesis, which states that monitoring within a specific domain is governed by general metacognitive processes in addition to domain-specific knowledge. Theoretical and educational implications are discussed, with particular attention given to the origin and development of the general monitoring skill. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge structures and the acquisition of a complex skill.

The purpose of this study was to examine the viability of knowledge structures as an operationalization of learning in the context of a task that required a high degree of skill. Over the course of 3 days, 86 men participated in 9 training sessions and learned a complex video game. At the end of acquisition, participants' knowledge structures were assessed. After a 4-day nonpractice interval, trainees completed tests of skill retention and skill transfer. Findings indicated that the similarity of trainees' knowledge structures to an expert structure was correlated with skill acquisition and was predictive of skill retention and skill transfer. However, the magnitude of these effects was dependent on the method used to derive the expert referent structure. Moreover, knowledge structures mediated the relationship between general cognitive ability and skill-based performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010).

Comments on an article by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (see record 2010-14834-005). The authors argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary “valid” versus “invalid” responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting individual differences in complex skill acquisition: Dynamics of ability determinants.

Addresses the controvervesy about ability determinants of individual differences in performance during and subsequent to skill acquisition. An information-processing examination of ability–performance relations during complex task acquisition is described. Included are ability testing (including general, reasoning, spatial, perceptual speed, and perceptual/psychomotor abilities) and skill acquisition over practice on the terminal radar approach controller simulation. Results validate and extend P. L. Ackerman's (1988) theory of cognitive ability determinants of individual differences in skill acquisition. Benefits of ability component and task component analyses over global analyses of ability–skill relations are demonstrated. Implications are discussed for selection instruments to predict air traffic controller success and for other tasks with inconsistent information-processing demands. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Familiarity effects in visual comparison tasks and their implications for studying human intelligence.

Two experiments were carried out to study the effect of prior knowledge on cognitive processes related to human intelligence by examining its role in defining task novelty. In Exp 1, Ss performed a letter-matching task involving same–different judgments based on 4 rules of sameness; physical identity, form, system, and name. When the stimuli were unfamiliar, performance on the name classification task was correlated with measures of fluid abilities, whereas when the stimuli were familiar, performance on this task was not correlated with measures of fluid abilities. In Exp 2, Ss performed 3 different forms of a mental rotation task. When the stimuli were unfamiliar, the slope of the rotation function was correlated with a test of fluid ability, whereas when the stimuli were familiar, the slope of the rotation function was not correlated with a test of fluid ability. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for understanding the nature of task complexity and the way knowledge and processing interact in the development of skilled performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of explanation and counterexplanation on the development and use of social theories.

Social theories—beliefs about relations between variables in the social environment—are often used in making judgments, predictions, or decisions. Three experiments, with 146 undergraduates, examined the role of explanation in the development and use of social theories. It was found that explaining how or why 2 variables might be related led to an increased belief in and use of the explained theory. A counterexplanation task was effective in eliminating this initial explanation bias. These explanation and counterexplanation effects occurred with simple belief measures and with complex social judgments involving multiple predictor variables. New, explanation-induced beliefs did not lead to biased evaluation of new data. However, exposure to new data indicating a zero relation between the social variables in question moderated but did not eliminate the explanation-induced theories. Implications for decision making in real-world contexts and for understanding the cognitive underlying explanation effects in the present and in related judgment domains were also examined. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability.

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of response instructions on situational judgment test performance and validity in a high-stakes context.

This study fills a key gap in research on response instructions in situational judgment tests (SJTs). The authors examined whether the assumptions behind the differential effects of knowledge and behavioral tendency SJT response instructions hold in a large-scale high-stakes selection context (i.e., admission to medical college). Candidates (N = 2,184) were randomly assigned to a knowledge or behavioral tendency response instruction SJT, while SJT content was kept constant. Contrary to prior research in low-stakes settings, no meaningfully important differences were found between mean scores for the response instruction sets. Consistent with prior research, the SJT with knowledge instructions correlated more highly with cognitive ability than did the SJT with behavioral tendency instructions. Finally, no difference was found between the criterion-related validity of the SJTs under the two response instruction sets. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty.

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An aptitude–treatment interaction approach to transfer within training.

The issues of skill specificity and transfer of training were examined from an aptitude–treatment interaction approach. The current investigations extended A. M. Sullivan's (1964) approach by using a procedural transfer task and training conditions that differed in amount of training task practice and the degree of training task similarity to the transfer task. Two experiments were conducted with 232 college students. Experiment 1 examined the effects of a length-of-training manipulation on reasoning ability and transfer task performance relationships, and on the amount of transfer. Experiment 2 evaluated the effects of 2 training tasks that differed in terms of similarity to the transfer task on ability-performance relationships and the amount of transfer. Results suggest that Sullivan's approach partially generalizes to the acquisition of procedural knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning to interpret conditional sentences: A developmental study.

Evaluated the capacity of 71 3rd, 70 6th, and 64 9th graders to learn 3 interpretations of abstract conditional sentences. With appropriate feedback on responses in the syllogistic, conditional sentence reasoning task, Ss were able to learn conjunctive and biconditional interpretations but not conditional. Indeed, only one-third of the 9th graders mastered the conditional interpretation. The patterns of errors across the 8 forms of the argument varied both developmentally and with the required interpretation. Results indicate significant developmental constraints on reasoning required by formal, inferential tasks using language connectives. Learning the more difficult conditional interpretation requires an understanding of asymmetry between propositions, an ability which most preadolescent children do not seem to have. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Universal versus personal helplessness in depression: Belief in uncontrollability or incompetence?

The learned helplessness model of depression predicts that depressed individuals believe outcomes are more response independent than do nondepressed individuals in a skill situation. The present study assessed whether depressives' cognitive distortions are specific to their belief about their own skilled action or are a result of a general belief in uncontrollability in the world. Changes in expectancies following success and failure in skill and chance tasks were examined in 32 depressed and 32 nondepressed college students who either performed themselves or observed a confederate perform a pair of tasks. In the skill task, depressed Ss showed significantly smaller changes in expectancy than nondepressed Ss when estimating the probability of their own success. In contrast, depressed and nondepressed Ss did not differ when estimating the probability of another person's success on the identical skill task. It is inferred that depressed individuals view themselves as helpless in a skilled situation but do not view the situation itself as uncontrollable. Results are discussed in terms of the reformulated learned helplessness model. (52 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perceived contingency of skill and chance events: A developmental analysis.

60 kindergartners, 4th graders, and 8th graders and 32 college students took part in a game of chance and a game of skill. After each game, Ss predicted the winnings of other players who differed in certain attributes (e.g., IQ) and behavior (e.g., effort) that would influence only skill outcomes. On both chance and skill tasks, older Ss expected the variations in attributes and behavior to have less impact on task outcomes than did younger Ss. Older Ss were more adept at making predictions that reflected the contingency of skill and the noncontingency of chance. Kindergartners showed no ability to make the skill–chance distinction. Fourth graders were aware of the distinction at a gross qualitative level, but they were unaware of some of the most important logical implications of that distinction. Eighth graders and college students were aware of the skill–chance distinction and most of its logical implications, yet their predictions revealed a lingering belief that chance outcomes could be influenced slightly by variations in people's attributes and behavior. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)