Weak central coherence, poor joint attention, and low verbal ability: Independent deficits in early autism.

C. Jarrold, W. Butler, E. M. Cottington, and F. Jiminez (2000) proposed that weak central coherence is a primary cognitive deficit in autism and speculated that it may even account for theory of mind impairments. The current study investigated whether weak central coherence could account for deficits in 2 behaviors purported to tap capabilities fundamental to a theory of mind: joint attention and pretend play. Twenty-one children (ages 3-5 years) with autism spectrum disorders were matched to 21 control children on chronological age, nonverbal ability, and gender. Pretend play did not differentiate the groups. Weak central coherence, poor joint attention, and low verbal ability contributed significantly and independently to the prediction of autism group membership, a finding consistent with 3 independent cognitive deficits underlying autism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory-of-mind development influences suggestibility and source monitoring.

According to the mental-state reasoning model of suggestibility, 2 components of theory of mind mediate reductions in suggestibility across the preschool years. The authors examined whether theory-of-mind performance may be legitimately separated into 2 components and explored the memory processes underlying the associations between theory of mind and suggestibility, independent of verbal ability. Children 3 to 6 years old completed 6 theory-of-mind tasks and a postevent misinformation procedure. Contrary to the model's prediction, a single latent theory-of-mind factor emerged, suggesting a single-component rather than a dual-component conceptualization of theory-of-mind performance. This factor provided statistical justification for computing a single composite theory-of-mind score. Improvements in theory of mind predicted reductions in suggestibility, independent of verbal ability (Study 1, n = 72). Furthermore, once attribution biases were controlled (Study 2, n = 45), there was also a positive relationship between theory of mind and source memory, but not recognition performance. The findings suggest a substantial, and possibly causal, association between theory-of-mind development and resistance to suggestion, driven specifically by improvements in source monitoring. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Understanding mind and emotion: Longitudinal associations with mental-state talk between young friends.

Developmental changes in children's understanding of mind and emotion and their mental-state talk in conversations with friends were examined in a longitudinal study of 50 children (M age at each time point = 3 years 11 months, 4 years 6 months, 5 years 0 months). Significant and related improvements over time were found for both theory-of-mind task performance and affective perspective taking. Associated with these cognitive developments were quantitative and qualitative changes in children's references to mental states in their conversations with friends. Individual differences in theory of mind, emotion understanding, and mental-state talk were strikingly stable over the 13 month period. Although there were no gender differences in children's task performances, girls showed more frequent and more developed mental-state talk than boys. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory of mind development in Chinese children: A meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages.

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Links between theory of mind and executive function in young children with autism: Clues to developmental primacy.

There has been much theoretical discussion of a functional link between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) in autism. This study sought to establish the relationship between ToM and EF in young children with autism (M = 5 years, 6 months) and to examine issues of developmental primacy. Thirty children with autism and 40 typically developing children, matched on age and ability, were assessed on a battery of tasks measuring ToM (1st- and 2nd-order false belief) and components of EF (planning, set shifting, inhibition). A significant correlation emerged between ToM and EF variables in the autism group, independent of age and ability, while ToM and higher order planning ability remained significantly related in the comparison group. Examination of the pattern of ToM-EF impairments in the autism group revealed dissociations in 1 direction only: impaired ToM with intact EF. These findings support the view that EF may be 1 important factor in the advancement of ToM understanding in autism. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory-of-mind development.

Fifty-nine 3-year-olds were tested 3 times over a period of 7 months in order to assess the contribution of theory of mind to language development and of language to theory-of-mind development (including the independent contributions of syntax and semantics). Language competence was assessed with a standardized measure of reception and production of syntax and semantics (the Test of Early Language Development). Theory of mind was assessed with false-belief tasks and appearance–reality tasks. Earlier language abilities predicted later theory-of-mind test performance (controlling for earlier theory of mind), but earlier theory of mind did not predict later language test performance (controlling for earlier language). These findings are consistent with the argument that language is fundamental to theory-of mind development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relation between individual differences in fantasy and theory of mind

The relation between early fantasy/pretense and children's knowledge about mental life was examined in a study of 152 3- and 4-year-old boys and girls. Children were interviewed about their fantasy lives (e.g., imaginary companions, impersonation of imagined characters) and were given tasks assessing their level of pretend play and verbal intelligence. In a second session 1 week later, children were given a series of theory of mind tasks, including measures of appearance-reality, false belief, representational change, and perspective taking. The theory of mind tasks were significantly intercorrelated with the effects of verbal intelligence and age statistically controlled. Individual differences in fantasy/pretense were assessed by (1) identifying children who created imaginary characters, and (2) extracting factor scores from a combination of interview and behavioral measures. Each of these fantasy assessments was significantly related to the theory of mind performance of the 4-year-old children, independent of verbal intelligence.     

Conditional reasoning in autism: Activation and integration of knowledge and belief.

Everyday conditional reasoning is typically influenced by prior knowledge and belief in the form of specific exceptions known as counterexamples. This study explored whether adolescents with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; N = 26) were less influenced by background knowledge than typically developing adolescents (N = 38) when engaged in conditional reasoning. Participants were presented with pretested valid and invalid conditional inferences with varying available counterexamples. The group with ASD showed significantly less influence of prior knowledge on valid inferences (p = .01) and invalid inferences (p = .01) compared with the typical group. In a secondary probability judgment task, no significant group differences were found in probabilistic judgments of the believability of the premises. Further experiments found that results could not be explained by differences between the groups in the ability to generate counterexamples or any tendency among adolescents with ASD to exhibit a “yes” response pattern. It was concluded that adolescents with ASD tend not to spontaneously contextualize presented material when engaged in everyday reasoning. These findings are discussed with reference to weak central coherence theory and the conditional reasoning literature. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making Sense of Self-Conscious Emotion: Linking Theory of Mind and Emotion in Children With Autism.

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment and shame are associated with 2 aspects of theory of mind (ToM): (a) the ability to understand that behavior has social consequences in the eyes of others and (b) an understanding of social norms violations. The present study aimed to link ToM with the recognition of self-conscious emotion. Children with and without autism identified facial expressions conscious of self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions from photographs. ToM was also measured. Children with autism performed more poorly than comparison children at identifying self-conscious emotions, though they did not differ in the recognition of non-self-conscious emotions. When ToM ability was statistically controlled, group differences in the recognition of self-conscious emotion disappeared. Discussion focused on the links between ToM and self-conscious emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Acquisition of mental state language in Mandarin- and Cantonese-speaking children.

Children's theory of mind appears to develop from a focus on desire to a focus on belief. However, it is not clear (a) whether this pattern is universal and (b) whether it could also be explained by linguistic and sociocultural factors. This study examined mental state language in 10 Mandarin-speaking (21–27 months) and 8 Cantonese-speaking (18–44 months) toddlers. The results suggest a pattern of theory-of-mind development similar to that in English, with early use of desire terms followed by other mental state references. However, the Chinese-speaking children used desire terms much earlier, and the use of terms for thinking was very infrequent, even for Mandarin-speaking adults. This finding suggests a consistency in the overall sequence, but variation in the timing of beginning and end points, in children's theory-of-mind development across cultures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In the mood to get over yourself: Mood affects theory-of-mind use.

Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Meta-analyses comparing theory of mind abilities of individuals with autism, individuals with mental retardation, and normally developing individuals

A deficit in theory of mind (ToM) abilities has been described as the core deficit in autism. The authors performed 3 meta-analyses, comparing ToM abilities of individuals with autism, individuals with mental retardation (MR), and normally developing individuals. Results indicated that individuals with autism and MR have impaired ToM abilities. The etiology associated with MR (i.e., Down syndrome, undifferentiated etiology) was found to be an important moderator variable. Chronological age (CA) and verbal mental age (VMA) of the normally developing children and CA, VMA, and performance mental age of individuals with MR, and type of matching between the groups were also found to be moderator variables. Discussion focuses on the implication of the findings and emphasizes the need to consider the specific etiology of comparison groups when studying abilities and impairments of individuals with autism and MR.     

Choosing the most appropriate treatment for stable angina. Safety considerations

Using a play-based methodology and a symptom checklist, this study investigated idiom comprehension in 26 children aged between 6-11 who were considered to have semantic-pragmatic difficulties. This group was compared with two groups of mainstream children and a group of children with (other) language disorders not primarily of a semantic or pragmatic nature. The results indicate that the children with semantic-pragmatic difficulties did, as a group, demonstrate significantly fewer appropriate idiomatic interpretations and significantly more inappropriate interpretations than did any of the other three groups. However, the higher level of inappropriate scores in the semantic-pragmatic difficulties group reflected a large number of 'fuzzy' actions rather than significantly higher rates of literality. This may indicate an awareness among these children that the literal meaning is inappropriate in the absence of adequate idiom vocabulary. It may also reflect difficulty in retrieving known idioms from memory and/or in selecting the most appropriate meaning from several possibilities in context. Despite relative weakness, the children with semantic-pragmatic difficulties displayed appropriate interpretations considerably more often than they evidenced inappropriate ones. Within-group analysis reveals that the children diagnosed with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism performed less well than did those diagnosed with 'semantic-pragmatic disorder'. Nevertheless, both of these subgroups encompassed a considerable range of comprehension ability with regard to the 12 common idioms tested. Analysis of the play task performance and symptom checklist suggests that this variation probably reflects differences in the critical semantic and pragmatic skills underpinning idiom comprehension. These include flexibility of thought, theory of mind, attention to context, prosody and overall coherence, as well as the ability to integrate world knowledge and current contextual information to guide inferencing. In combination with definition task data and broader knowledge of symptomatology, the play task may be used to identify the sites and sources of idiom comprehension breakdown in individual children. It is probable that idiom comprehension in this group of children with semantic-pragmatic difficulties was facilitated by the inclusion of only concrete idioms and by the visual support provided by the play set. Nevertheless, the moderate to age-appropriate ability displayed by this group in this context suggests that the characterization of children with semantic-pragmatic difficulties as predominantly literal needs to be revised. Rather than seeking a blanket characterization of an essentially heterogeneous group, it may be more useful to consider idiom comprehension a secondary manifestation of semantic and/or pragmatic difficulties. Since the children who exhibit these difficulties vary in symptomatology and, probably, in aetiology, it follows that they will also vary with respect to idiom comprehension and the reasons for its breakdown.     

Theory of Mind and Motion Perception in Schizophrenia.

This study investigated the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) deficits and visual perception in patients with schizophrenia (N=52; 17 remitted and unmedicated) compared with healthy controls (N=30). ToM was assessed with the Eyes Test, which asked participants to choose which of 4 words best described the mental state of a person whose eyes were depicted in a photograph. Visual perception was evaluated with form and motion coherence threshold measurements. Results revealed that patients with schizophrenia (both remitted and nonremitted) showed deficits on the Eyes Test and the motion coherence task. ToM dysfunctions were associated with higher motion coherence thresholds and more severe negative symptoms. This suggests that ToM deficits are related to motion perception dysfunctions, which indicates a possible role of motion-sensitive areas in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory of mind associations with other cognitive functions and brain imaging in normal aging.

The study investigated age-related differences in theory of mind and explored the relationship between this ability, other cognitive abilities, and structural brain measures. A cohort of 106 adults (ages 50–90 years) was recruited. Participants completed tests of theory of mind, verbal and performance intelligence, executive function, and information processing speed and underwent structural magnetic resonance imaging (measurement of whole brain volume, volume of white matter hyperintensities, and diffusion tensor imaging of white matter integrity). Theory of mind ability declined with increasing age, and the relationship between theory of mind and age was fully mediated by performance intelligence, executive function, and information processing speed and was partially mediated by verbal intelligence. Theory of mind performance correlated significantly with diffusion tensor imaging measures of white matter integrity but not with volume of white matter hyperintensities or whole-brain volume. Theory of mind age-related decline may not be independent of other cognitive functions; it may also be particularly susceptible to changes in white matter integrity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Finding your marbles: does preschoolers' strategic behavior predict later understanding of mind?

The aim of this longitudinal study was to assess (a) stability of individual differences in preschoolers' executive function performance, (b) the external validity of 4 new simple executive function tasks, and (c) whether individual differences in early executive function performance could be used to predict later differences in theory of mind, or vice versa. Fifty children involved in an earlier study of relations between preschoolers' theory of mind, verbal ability, and executive function (C. Hughes, 1998) were followed up and tested 1 year later, using 1st- and 2nd-order false-belief tasks, a set of 4 simple executive function tasks, and a well-established executive test of planning: the Tower of London (T. Shallice, 1982). The results of the study support recent proposals (C. Hughes, 1996; J. Russell, 1996) that young children's understanding of mind is grounded in their growing competence in strategic planning and mental flexibility.     

Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs. Implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.     

Molecular and genetic features of fragile X syndrome

This study explored the claim that superior disembedding performance in autism reflects "less capture by meaning" and/or reduced "central coherence" [Shah & Frith, Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 24, 613-620 (1983); Shah & Frith, Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 34, 1351-1364 (1993)]. Meaningless as well as meaningful disembedding contexts were used, and memory for contextual information was examined. Neither qualitative (search strategy) nor quantitative (RT or accuracy) data indicated that high-functioning individuals with autism/PDD were superior to younger, developmentally matched controls. For both groups, disembedding was slowest from meaningful contexts, which generally were remembered best. No evidence was provided for "less capture by meaning" or reduced "central coherence" in autism/PDD, raising the possibility that earlier findings reflect a developmental, rather than a stable autism-specific, phenomenon.