Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs. Implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.     

Young children's understanding of different mental states.

There is considerable evidence in the recent literature on children's understanding of the mind that young children have difficulty understanding false beliefs. Even when presented very strong evidence that a person's belief conflicts with the reality to which it refers, they tend to assume that it coincides with reality. Two studies tested the extent to which 3-yr-olds make this same mistake with other mental states. Results show that children of this age understand that desires can differ from reality before they understand that beliefs can, even when the exact same tasks are used to assess each understanding. Findings also indicate that young children understand pretense in this regard somewhat later than desire but earlier than belief and dream, particularly when the pretense is supported by actions. Three explanations for the results are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

I fear your envy, I rejoice in your coveting: On the ambivalent experience of being envied by others.

We present 2 studies on being envied. Study 1 used an emotional narrative methodology. We asked 44 Spanish (23 women, 21 men) and 48 European American (36 women, 12 men) participants to tell us about a recent experience in which others envied them. We classified the antecedents, relationship context, markers of envy, coping strategies, and positive and negative implications of being envied. In Study 2, 174 Spanish (88 women, 86 men) and 205 European American (106 women, 99 men) participants responded to a situation in which they had something someone else wanted. We manipulated the object of desire (academic achievement or having “a better life”). We measured individual differences in orientation to achievement (i.e., vertical individualism), cooperation and interpersonal harmony (i.e., horizontal collectivism), a zero-sum view of success, beliefs that success begets hostile coveting, fear of success, and dispositional envy. We also measured participants' appraisals, positive and negative emotions, and coping strategies. The findings from both studies indicate that being envied has both positive (e.g., increased self-confidence) and negative consequences (e.g., fear of ill will from others). Being envied had more positive and more negative psychological and relational consequences among those participants who were achievement oriented (European Americans) than among participants who were oriented to cooperation and interpersonal harmony (Spanish). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ability to perceive duration: Its relation to the development of the logical concept of time.

Seventy-two children, ages 34 to 73 months, were presented with one of six different relative duration problems that involved judging which of two lights was on longer. In addition to the traditional 4- versus 7-s duration condition, each child was tested on a long (4- vs. 28-s) and a short (1- vs. 7-s) condition. Two of the problems were logically impossible to solve on the basis of nontemporal cues. Results showed that, contrary to predictions based on standard models of the logical time concept, long and short conditions were easier for children to solve than the traditional 4- versus 7-s condition. Furthermore, children were able to solve problems that are logically impossible to solve on the basis of nontemporal information. These results indicate that children have a perceptual experience of duration separate from one derived inferentially from nontemporal knowledge (e.g., start/stop relationships, speed, distance, and brightness) and that they can use this perceptual knowledge to solve relative duration problems. This suggests that the logical time concept involves the capacity to experience duration perceptually and that models of the time concept that do not acknowledge such a capacity (e.g., Piaget's) must be reassessed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers can attribute second-order beliefs.

The ability to attribute 2nd-order mental states was investigated in 87 children drawn from preschool, kindergarten, 1st-grade, and 2nd-grade classes. Ss received 4 stories, 2 standard and 2 new, designed to test their understanding of 2nd-order mental states. The standard stories were modified versions of J. Perner and H. Wimmer's (see record 1985-25133-001) 2nd-order task. The new stories were made significantly simpler by reducing the number of characters, episodes, and scenes and by including a deception context. The main findings were that performance on the new stories was significantly better than on the standard stories and that nearly half of the preschoolers and almost all of the kindergartners were able to attribute 2nd-order beliefs. These findings contrast with those of earlier research (e.g., G. J. Hogrefe et al; see PA, Vol 73:26831 and Perner and Wimmer). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relationships between the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality and health outcomes for a heterogeneous rehabilitation population.

Purpose: To determine relationships between the Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS; i.e., positive/negative spirituality, forgiveness, religious practices, positive/negative congregational support) and physical and mental health (Medical Outcomes Scale-Short Form 36; SF-36) for individuals with chronic disabilities. Research Method: A cross-sectional analysis of 118 individuals evaluated in outpatient settings, including 61 with traumatic brain injury (TBI), 32 with cerebral vascular accidents (CVA), and 25 with spinal cord injury (SCI). Results: Three of 6 BMMRS factor scores (i.e., positive spiritual experience, forgiveness, negative spiritual experience) were significantly correlated with the SF-36 General Health Perception (GHP) scale, and only 1 of 6 BMMRS factor scores (i.e., negative spiritual experience) was significantly and negatively correlated with the SF-36 General Mental Health (GMH) scale. BMMRS scales did not significantly predict either physical or mental health in hierarchical multiple regressions. Conclusions: Positive spiritual experiences and willingness to forgive are related to better physical health, while negative spiritual experiences are related to worse physical and mental health for individuals with chronic disabilities. Future research using the BMMRS will benefit from using a 6-factor model that evaluates positive/negative spiritual experiences, religious practices, and positive/negative congregational support. Interventions to accentuate positive spiritual beliefs (e.g., forgiveness protocols, etc.) and reduce negative spiritual beliefs for individuals with chronic disabilities are suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

True or false: Do 5-year-olds understand belief?

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The development of bases for trait attribution: Children's understanding of traits as causal mechanisms based on desire.

Two studies investigated 4- to 7-year-old children's understanding that traits can be causal mechanisms based on desires, as well as mere summaries of behavioral regularities. In Experiment 1, children made predictions given trait information. Children from 5 years made different emotion predictions about the same situation for actors with different traits, thus appreciating traits as psychological causes. For behavior prediction, children over age 4 generalized across situations. In Experiment 2, accurate emotion prediction by 3- to 7-year-olds was linked to understanding desire as a subjective mental property. The results suggest that children change from viewing traits as behavioral regularities to understanding them as internal mediators, and that advances in understanding desire underlie this change. These changes in understanding traits extend research on theory of mind beyond the basic concepts of desire and belief. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Visceral fit: While in a visceral state, associated states of the world seem more likely.

We propose that visceral states can influence beliefs through “visceral fit”: People will judge states of the world associated with their current visceral experience as more likely. We found that warmth influenced belief in global warming (Studies 1–3) and that thirst impacted forecasts of drought and desertification (Study 5). These effects emerged in a naturalistic setting (Study 1) and in experimental lab settings (Studies 2, 3, and 5). Studies 2–6 distinguished between 3 mechanistic accounts: temperature as information (Studies 2 and 3), conceptual accessibility (Studies 4 and 5), and fluency of simulation (Studies 6a and 6b). Studies 2 and 3 ruled out the temperature as information account. Feeling warm enhanced belief in global warming even when temperature was manipulated in an uninformative indoor setting, when participants' attention was first directed to the indoor temperature, and when participants' belief about the current outdoor temperature was statistically controlled. Studies 4 and 5 ruled out conceptual accessibility as the key mediator: Priming the corresponding concepts did not produce analogous effects on judgment. Studies 6a and 6b used a causal chain design and found support for a “simulational fluency” account. Participants experiencing the visceral state of warmth constructed more fluent mental representations of hot (vs. cold) outdoor images, and those who were led to construe the same hot outdoor images more fluently believed more in global warming. Together, the results suggest that visceral states can influence one's beliefs by making matching states of the world easier to simulate and therefore seem more likely. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's use of mental state information in selecting persuasive arguments.

Whether and when children use information about others' mental states to invent or select persuasive strategies were examined. In Study 1, preschoolers, 3rd-graders, and 6th-graders (ns?=?11, 12, and 16, respectively; 17 girls) were told about story characters' persuading parents to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story parents' beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Older children, but not preschoolers, used belief information to select arguments. Results were replicated in Study 2 (16 kindergartners, 16 3rd-graders; 19 girls). In Study 3, kindergartners and 1st-graders (N?=?16; 6 girls) reasoned well on false-belief tasks but not on persuasion tasks, suggesting that failure to consider mental states in persuasion was not due to lack of a belief concept. Findings suggest that mental state understanding may continue to develop after the preschool years; methodological qualifications are also considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' understanding of others' desires: Fulfilling mine enhances my understanding of yours.

We developed a gift-giving task requiring children to identify their mother's desire, when her desire differed from theirs. We found a developmental change: 3- and 4-year-olds performed more poorly than 5-year-olds (Experiment 1). A modified version of this task (Experiment 2) revealed that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds whose desires had been fulfilled chose an appropriate gift for their mothers significantly more often than children whose desires were unfulfilled. Children who merely anticipated desire fulfillment also outperformed children whose desires were unfulfilled. Analysis of children's verbal explanations provides converging evidence that desire fulfillment enhanced children's tendency to adopt the perspective of their mother and justify their choices by referencing her desires. Discussion focuses on why desire fulfillment enhances children's ability to consider the desires of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Early reasoning about desires: Evidence from 14- and 18-month-olds.

Although there is substantial evidence that 30-mo-old children can reason about other people's desires, little is known about the developmental antecedents of this ability. A food-request procedure was devised to explore this understanding in 14- and 18-mo-olds. Children observed an experimenter expressing disgust as she tasted 1 type of food and happiness as she tasted another type of food. They were then required to predict which food the experimenter would subsequently desire. The 14-mo-olds responded egocentrically, offering whichever food they themselves preferred. However, 18-mo-olds correctly inferred that the experimenter wanted the food associated with her prior positive affect. They were able to make this inference even when the experimenter's desires differed from their own. These data constitute the first empirical evidence that 18-mo-olds are able to engage in some form of desire reasoning. Children not only inferred that another person held a desire, but also recognized how desires are related to emotions and understood something about the subjectivity of these desires. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's use of triadic eye gaze information for "mind reading."

Five experiments examined children's use of eye gaze information for "mind-reading" purposes, specifically, for inferring another person's desire. When presented with static displays in the first 3 experiments, only by 4 years of age did children use another person's eye direction to infer desires, although younger children could identify the person's focus of attention. Further, 3-year-olds were capable of inferring desire from other nonverbal cues, such as pointing (Experiment 3). When eye gaze was presented dynamically with several other scaffolding cues (Experiment 4), 2- and 3-year-olds successfully used eye gaze for desire inference. Scaffolding cues were removed in Experiment 5, and 2- and 3-year-olds still performed above chance in using eye gaze. Results suggest that 2-year-olds are capable of using eye gaze alone to infer about another's desire. The authors propose that the acquisition of the ability to use attentional cues to infer another's mental state may involve both an association process and a differentiation process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adaptation in very old age: Exploring the role of resources, beliefs, and attitudes for centenarians' happiness.

When individuals reach very old age, accumulating negative conditions represent a serious challenge to their capacity to adapt and are likely to reduce the quality of life. By examining happiness and its determinants in centenarians, this study investigated the proposal that psychological resilience may come to an end in extremely old age. Data from the population-based Heidelberg Centenarian Study indicated high levels of happiness. Basic resources (i.e., job training, cognition, health, social network, extraversion) explained a substantial proportion of variance in happiness, but some resource effects were mediated through self-referent beliefs (e.g., self-efficacy) and attitudes toward life (e.g., optimistic outlook). Results challenge the view that psychological resilience reaches a critical limit or that the self-regulatory adaptation system loses its efficiency in very advanced age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice.

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sensory-specific satiety: comparison of taste and texture effects

The respective contributions of taste (saltiness and sweetness) and texture (the hardness dimension) to sensory-specific satiety (SSS) were compared. Sixteen male and 16 female, young, normal-weight adults rated the pleasantness of taste, pleasantness of texture and desire to eat on visual analog scales for eight test foods, were then given one of the foods to eat ad libitum for lunch, and re-rated the same parameters for the eight foods 2 and 20 min after the end of the meal. The experimental sets of eight test foods and four lunch foods were balanced for taste quality (salty vs. sweet) and texture quality (hard vs. soft). Lunch foods were the hard and soft versions of a salty food (ham and cheese sandwich on baguette vs. white bread) or of a sweet food (apples vs. applesauce). Sensory-specific satiety was observed for both saltiness and sweetness (e.g. pleasantness of the taste of, and desire to eat sweet test foods decreased significantly after eating a sweet lunch food and similarly for salty foods), and to a lesser extent for texture (e.g. pleasantness of the texture of, and desire to eat hard test foods decreased after eating a hard lunch food and similarly for one of the soft foods). The authors conclude texture-specific satiety may be a significant component of satiety.     

The instability of health cognitions: Visceral states influence self-efficacy and related health beliefs.

Objective: To determine how visceral impulses, such as hunger and drug craving, influence health beliefs. Design: The authors assessed smokers' self-efficacy and intentions to quit while in a randomly assigned state of cigarette craving or noncraving (Study 1), and assessed dieters weight-loss beliefs while hungry or satiated (Study 2). Main outcome measures: Self-efficacy, smoking cessation, weight-loss goals. Results: The authors found, in both the context of smoking and weight-loss, that participants in a cold (e.g., satiated) state had different health beliefs than participants in a hot state (e.g., hungry). Specifically, in Study 1, the authors found that smokers who experienced cigarette craving had lower self-efficacy than did satiated smokers. Consequently, smokers who craved a cigarette had less intention to quit smoking in the future compared with satiated smokers. In Study 2, the authors found that hungry dieters had less self-efficacy than did satiated dieters. This difference led hungry dieters to form less ambitious future weight-loss goals and view prior weight-loss attempts with more satisfaction. Conclusion: These findings contribute to our understanding of the nature of health beliefs and reveal that health beliefs are more dynamic than previously assumed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interpreting nullity: The Fort Bragg experiment—A comparative success or failure?

The Fort Bragg Demonstration Project (L. Bickman, see record 83-31861; L. Bickman et al, 1995) evaluated a model of children's mental health services known as the continuum of care. The study found no support for the continuum of care theory, as it failed to find better mental health outcomes in the demonstration site vs the comparison sites. If the only finding from Fort Bragg was the absence of significant clinical improvement to children, this would be consistent with the studies that have thus far been conducted on service effectiveness in real-world settings (e.g., J. R. Weisz et al, 1995). However, the children in Fort Bragg did improve as did the children in the comparison sites. The failure in Fort Bragg was the failure to find differentially better outcomes for those who received services through its model vs the comparison model. Two possible conclusions can be drawn: 1) a continuum of care does not improve clinical outcomes beyond a standard, simplified model or 2) interventions were effective in both sites because both offered a continuum of services that was effective. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effectiveness of psychotherapy with children and adolescents: A meta-analysis for clinicians.

How effective is psychotherapy with children and adolescents? The question was addressed by meta-analysis of 108 well-designed outcome studies with 4–18-year-old participants. Across various outcome measures, the average treated youngster was better adjusted after treatment than 79% of those not treated. Therapy proved more effective for children than for adolescents, particularly when the therapists were paraprofessionals (e.g., parents, teachers) or graduate students. Professionals (with doctor"s or master"s degrees) were especially effective in treating overcontrolled problems (e.g., phobias, shyness) but were not more effective than other therapists in treating undercontrolled problems (e.g., aggression, impulsivity). Behavioral treatments proved more effective than nonbehavioral treatments regardless of client age, therapist experience, or treated problem. Overall, the findings revealed significant, durable effects of treatment that differed somewhat with client age and treatment method but were reliably greater than zero for most groups, most problems, and most methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)