Construct validity, censorship, and the genetics of race.

Responds to the critique by A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) of J. P. Rushton's (see PA, Vols 78:20578 and 80:40406) work on the biological differences among human races. Because of the failure of anthropologists and geneticists to define the term race, Yee et al imply that Rushton's work is at best unreliable. Rushton asserts that official regulation of the scientific concept of race, as recommended by Yee et al, would threaten free inquiry. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why psychologists should learn some anthropology.

Comments that the article by A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) delineating psychology's problems with race fails to address questions having to do with the variation in human physical appearance that preoccupies society. Yee et al suggest nothing with which to replace scientifically inaccurate stereotypes such as race. Fish discusses anthropological contributions to the issue of race. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The definition of race.

Comments that the analysis by A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) of the conceptual disarray concerning the role of race in psychology raises 3 issues that merit further consideration. These issues focus on (1) the validity of the race concept used in social psychological research, (2) the need to designate both conceptual and operational definitions of research variables, and (3) contradictions between the Yee et al call to define race scientifically and their criticism of previous research on race. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Readdressing psychology's problems with race.

Responds to 7 comments on the article in which A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) addressed the troublesome use of race in psychology. The appeal affirmed in this reply is not to "regulate" the use of the race concept but to bring science and clarity to research and theory involving group differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does race matter?

Comments on the analysis by A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) concerning psychology's problems with race and asserts that race is easily operationalized and that generalizations about race have clear meanings. Levin addresses the difficulty of publishing work that attempts to explain between-races variance in any but environmental terms and discusses the hereditarian point of view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Race and Political Correctness.

Comments on A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) discussion of psychology's problems with race and the nature and uncritical use of this ill-defined concept. Brace contends that the entire system of hierarchically arranged races, with their assumed differences in cognitive capacity, is the product of a long-continued tradition of political correctness. Psychology can benefit from the concept of race by demonstrating how social circumstances have operated to maintain the correlated differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Race--Social, Biological, or Lemonade?

Comments on an article by R. L. Sternberg, E. L. Grigorenko, and K. K. Kidd (see record 2005-00117-006) and another article by H. Tang, T. Quertermous, B. Rodriguez, S. L. Kardia, X. Zhu, X., A. Brown, et al. (2005). On the day that I read Sternberg, Grigorenko, and Kidd's (January 2005) article on race, an article from the American Journal of Human Genetics (Tang et al., 2005) also crossed my desk. As part of their research, the latter authors compared the results of a cluster analysis of people using many genetic markers with the respondent's self-identified race/ethnicity: "Of 3,636 subjects of varying race/ethnicity, only 5 (0.14%) showed genetic cluster membership different from their self-identified race/ethnicity" (Tang et al., 2005, p. 268). I would very much like to hear a response to this finding from Sternberg et al. (2005), who maintained that "race is a socially constructed concept, not a biological one" (p. 49), that reifies those physical correlates of ancient population dispersions "as deriving from some imagined natural grouping of people that does not in fact exist, except in our heads" (p. 51). My take is that if we psychologists could use genetics (or any other biological variables) to distinguish those with schizophrenia from those with bipolar disorder with an error rate even a hundredfold greater than that of Tang et al. (2005), we would announce--and do it with no small fanfare--that there are valid, biological differences between the two disorders. I suspect that much of the difficulty in discussing this issue stems from a tendency to treat "social" and "biological" (or "genetic" and "environmental") phenomena as mutually exclusive. Placing a complicated construct like race into a discrete "social" or "biological" box makes as much sense as asking whether lemonade is (a) lemon juice, (b) water, or (c) sugar. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory and evidence in cognitive neuropsychology: A "radical" response to Robertson, Knight, Rafal, and Shimamura (1993).

L. C. Robertson et al (see record 1993-34225-001) have presented a variety of arguments in opposition to a view of cognitive neuropsychological research put forth by so-called "radical" cognitive neuropsychologists. It is suggested that Robertson et al failed to offer an effective response to "radical" criticisms of group-study methods, because the rationale they propose for patient-group studies rests on untenable assumptions. It is further suggested that Robertson et al object to single-patient studies without foundation, reflecting an impoverished view of cognitive neuropsychology. Finally, it is argued that single patient studies are necessary in research aimed at exploring brain-cognition relationships as well as in research concerned with characterizing normal cognitive mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Racial groups and test fairness, considering history and construct validity.

According to Helms (see record 2006-21079-024), "test fairness" is defined as "removal from test scores of systematic variance attributable to experiences of racial or cultural socialization." Some of Helms's reasoning is based on earlier work, which recommended that racial group or category variables be replaced entirely with individual-level constructs, to reflect racial socialization experiences that vary within racial groups. Treatment of the test fairness issue--a social and political issue--will benefit from explicitly considering historical events that contributed to group-level race differences. In light of this history, D. A. Newman et al suggest (a) retaining a group-level conceptualization of race/racial socialization and also (b) focusing on criterion-irrelevant variance in test scores that is attributable to race. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological research on race differences.

Responds to the discussion by A. H. Yee et al (see record 1994-09250-001) of A. R. Jensen's (e.g., see record 1986-18910-001) research on racial differences in abilities and states that the references to Jensen's work are dated. Jensen notes more recent research (Jensen and P. A. Whang; see PA, Vol 81:1181 and 20927) and provides an explanation for his research focus on Black–White differences in cognitive abilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting distress-induced eating with self-reports: Mission impossible or a piece of cake?

Comments on the original article, "Assessing yourself as an emotional eater: Mission impossible?" by C. Evers, D. T. D. de Ridder, and M. A. Adriaanse (see record 2009-20990-009). Results of a functional MRI study (Bohon, Stice, & Spoor, 2009) contradict the assertion that it is "impossible" to self-assess emotional eating because the self-report emotional eating scale of the Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire (DEBQ-em) predicted important individual differences in reward response during negative moods. Evers et al advance their argument in the context of results of four experiments where self-reported “emotional eaters” (DEBQ-em) did not eat more food during emotional encounters as compared to control conditions or “no emotional eaters.” However, the core characteristic of emotional eaters is not that they eat so much during distress (though binge eaters may do), but that they do not show the typical stress response of eating less (the typical stress response being loss of appetite because of physiological effects that mimic satiety) (Gold & Chrousos, 2002). Accordingly, the moderator effect of emotional eating during distress would be that. “No emotional eaters” eat less and “emotional eaters” eat the same or more compared to control conditions. Close inspection of the results of Evers et al reveals that their “no emotional eaters” did not show the typical stress response of eating less. This opens the possibility that the null findings of Evers et al may be simply explained by misclassification of “no emotional eaters” versus “emotional eaters” because of their use of median splits (a procedure notorious for possible misclassification of subjects into distinct groups). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Internet–depression link?

Comments on the article by R. Kraut et al (see record 1998-10886-001) regarding links between Internet use and depression. Rierdan expresses conceptual and analytic concerns about whether Kraut et al actually assessed depression in their study or whether they found a relationship between Internet use and "depression" as they assessed it. The author expresses concern regarding the range of scores for Kraut et al study participants on the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale and argues that the most valid interpretation of the scores is that the Ss in this study had low levels of distress. As a group, they were not depressed before or after the study. The author raises a second analytic issue regarding analytic techniques, arguing that effect sizes for the group were actually very small. The author suggests that the finding of an association between Internet use and distress has few implications for public policy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are adaptations necessarily genetic?

States that D. M. Buss et al erred in their article "Adaptations, Exaptations, and Spandrels" (see record 1998-01669-001) when they wrote that "there must be genes for an adaptation because such genes are required for the passage of the adaptation from parents to offspring". The present author opines that genes are not the only way behavioral or psychological features can be passed from parents to children. He takes issue with the definition of adaptation stated in the article, and argues that it is not valuable to omit viable mechanisms for the development of psychological features from study by definition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anxiety or pain: What does the scale measure?

E. R. Katz et al (see record 1980-22464-001) report the development of an observational scale to measure distress behavior in children with cancer. They discuss this scale as if it measured anxiety, but the present authors suggest that the scale probably reflects both anxiety and pain. The terms are difficult to distinguish because they refer to constructs. Therefore, future research should build upon the work of Katz et al by elaborating the theoretical definition of anxiety and pain and by using a somewhat altered rating methodology. (4 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Second thoughts about documenting the psychological consultation.

Comments on the article by R. A. Rivas-Vazquez et al (see record 2001-00200-012), which outlined components of what they consider to be a comprehensive consultation write-up. According to the present author, the purpose of their article appears to be to recommend covering all possible bases in order to (1) minimize the liability risk for psychologists and (2) maximize the potential of providing the essential information that will benefit patient care. The implied universality of the recommendations offered by Rivas-Vazquez et al are called into question here, with particular emphasis on the wide variety of consultations required of psychologists today. The use of the term "consultation" in the article by Rivas-Vazquez et al opens the door to potential confusion regarding the need for such extensive documentation in situations in which it might be unnecessary or even contraindicated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adequately predicting emotional eating with self-reports: Not as easy as pie.

Responds to the comments by T. van Strien (see record 2010-14873-003) on the current authors' original article, "Assessing yourself as an emotional eater: Mission impossible?" (see record 2009-20990-009). In her commentary, van Strien suggests that it may not be "impossible" to self assess for emotional eating, as a close inspection of the results of Evers et al reveals that their “no emotional eaters” did not show the typical stress response of eating less. This opens the possibility that the null findings of Evers et al may be simply explained by misclassification of “no emotional eaters” versus “emotional eaters” because of their use of median splits (a procedure notorious for possible misclassification of subjects into distinct groups). In this reply Evers et al address this criticism and other critiques of their study, and conclude that their results are in line with studies that have indicated that self-assessed emotional eating may reflect beliefs about emotional eating rather than one’s actual eating behavior when being emotional. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Racing toward the finish line.

Replies to published comments on our original article (R. L. Sternberg, E. L. Grigorenko, and K. K. Kidd, see record 2005-00117-006). G. Carey (see record 2006-01690-008) cited in his response to our article a study by Tang et al. (2005) showing that "of 3,636 subjects of varying race/ethnicity, only 5 (0.14%) showed genetic cluster membership different from their self-identified race/ethnicity" (p. 268). At Carey's invitation, we are glad to provide a counterresponse. Correspondence between self-identification and biological characteristics does not form a suitable basis for assigning people to "races." Moreover, it appears that Carey's (2006) response to our article can be explained, at least partially, by his incomplete understanding of the data, analyses, and results presented in Tang et al. (2005). With regard to D. I. Templer's (see record 2006-01690-009) response, we do not give much credence to the M. Snyderman and S. Rothman (1988) survey. If the survey were done in 1908, probably there would have been even more emphasis on genes. If scientists in earlier times were surveyed on the causes of fire, they might well all have agreed that phlogiston was responsible. In another era, they would have agreed that the Sun revolves around the Earth. Implicit theories are useful ways of ascertaining popular folk beliefs, including those of scientists, but they are not scientifically definitive. As to Rushton's (1995) findings, we are not clear on what conclusion is to be drawn from the correlations--that people with larger cranial capacities are more likely to move away from the equator, that moving away from the equator produces greater cranial capacity, or that both larger cranial capacity and distance from the equator are dependent on some unknown third variable. Finally, in response to C. L. McLafferty (see record 2006-01690-010), we agree that the dichotomization of nature and nurture is a somewhat artificial analytical division that has been at times misused. Whereas we might not fully accept the revised classification proposed by McLafferty, we agree that the nature-nurture division has outlived its value. Nor is there a simple continuum between fully nature and fully nurture--the relevance of variation in nurture depends on the mean and range of variation in nature, and vice versa (Lewontin, 1974). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stereotype Threat Might Explain the Black-White Test-Score Difference.

Comments on an article by Paul Sackett, Chaitra Hardison and Michael Cullen entitled On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for African American-White Differences on Cognitive Tests (see record 2004-10043-001). In their correction of the ostensibly widespread misinterpretation of Steele and Aronson's (see record 2000-16592-021) seminal study of the effects of stereotype threat on intellectual test scores, Sackett, Hardison, and Cullen expressed dismay and puzzlement that so many erudite people consistently have gone so far astray in their understanding of this matter. The gist of Sackett et al.'s correction was that interpreters of Steele and Aronson's results have ignored the researchers' statistical adjustment of their dependent measure for SAT scores and, consequently, have wrongly concluded that racial-group (i.e., Black-White) differences in test scores disappear when stereotype threat is removed. In their justification for this much needed clarification, Sackett et al. (2004) implied that the interpretation that stereotype threat explains the Black-White test score disparity is not plausible. Yet whether or not the construct of stereotype threat generally can account for the Black-White test-score disparity was not the question that was directly addressed by either Steele and Aronson's (1995) original study or Sackett et al.'s (2004) critique of it. It appears that Sackett et al. (2004), as well as the many people responsible for the allegedly faulty interpretation, essentially want an answer to the question, What causes or explains racial-group difference(s) in Black-White test scores? This question logically flows from (a) reviews demonstrating the chronic resistance of these differences to psychoeducational interventions, (b) general recognition that racial-group membership cannot cause behavior (e.g., differences in test scores), as well as (c) acknowledgment that use of test scores for high-stakes decision making under prevailing circumstances amounts to "racial profiling" condoned by society and the law. Therefore, if stereotype threat or analogous race or culture-related psychological constructs could be shown to account for the Black-White testscore disparity, then society would be relieved of the burden of unfair testing practices, and Sackett et al. would be relieved of the burden of "heading off future interpretive errors" (p. 11) regarding Steele and Aronson's results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Publication Productivity of Clinical Psychologists: A Correction Factor for Faculty Size.

Comments on the original article "Productivity ratings of psychology programs based on publications in clinical journals," by C. J. Golden, S. Kuperman, and D. Osmon (see record #198128771-001), which sought to identify the relative standing of clinical psychology programs by evaluating their frequency of publication in the major clinical journals. While the current authors feel Golden et al provide impressive and useful data on the relative productivity of different academic and nonacademic psychology programs with respect to their contributions to the clinical psychology literature, they also maintain that one point Golden et al failed to address is that faculties tend to vary greatly in size across institutions. Thus, the rankings of programs provided by Golden et al probably reflect different size programs, with larger programs contributing more to the clinical literature simply because there are more bodies available to engage in such activities than is true of smaller programs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)