考虑盗版的双渠道供应链制造商定价及质量信息披露策略

研究了存在盗版制造商的双渠道供应链中,只有正版制造商具有质量信息披露能力,且盗版产品可以"搭便车"时,正版制造商的定价及质量信息披露决策。建模描述了消费者购买正版、盗版产品的效用权衡,得出正版产品的渠道需求及终端定价,以及不同产品质量条件下制造商的批发价定价策略,进一步得到披露成本约束下的质量信息披露策略,分析了盗版水平对制造商定价及信息披露决策的影响。研究发现:盗版产品的存在导致零售商和制造商采取分段定价策略;盗版程度越高,制造商的议价能力越低,可以制定的批发价越低,且制造商会在更低的产品质量水平下决策;制造商只有在产品质量、披露成本同时满足一定条件时,才愿意披露信息。     

不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。     

考虑信息获取影响的双渠道供应链制造商信息披露策略北大核心CSSCI

研究了存在一个外部性非品牌制造商的双渠道供应链中,只有品牌制造商具有质量信息披露能力,且可以选择采取信息获取预测消费者质量偏好时,品牌制造商的批发价定价及质量信息披露决策。建模描述了存在不同质量偏好消费者的市场中品牌产品和非品牌产品的需求,得出终端定价,以及有无信息获取条件下品牌制造商的批发价定价策略,进一步得到其质量信息披露策略,分析了信息获取对品牌制造商定价及信息披露决策的影响。研究发现：相比低类型消费者,品牌制造商更愿意向高类型消费者披露信息;品牌制造商信息披露的意愿随着零售商获取非品牌产品成本的增加而降低;信息获取对零售商不利,对品牌制造商的影响与市场容量有关;采取信息获取行动后,品牌制造商会对高类型消费者的披露意愿增大,但对低类型消费者的披露意愿变化与市场容量有关。     

考虑信息获取影响的双渠道供应链制造商信息披露策略

研究了存在一个外部性非品牌制造商的双渠道供应链中,只有品牌制造商具有质量信息披露能力,且可以选择采取信息获取预测消费者质量偏好时,品牌制造商的批发价定价及质量信息披露决策。建模描述了存在不同质量偏好消费者的市场中品牌产品和非品牌产品的需求,得出终端定价,以及有无信息获取条件下品牌制造商的批发价定价策略,进一步得到其质量信息披露策略,分析了信息获取对品牌制造商定价及信息披露决策的影响。研究发现:相比低类型消费者,品牌制造商更愿意向高类型消费者披露信息;品牌制造商信息披露的意愿随着零售商获取非品牌产品成本的增加而降低;信息获取对零售商不利,对品牌制造商的影响与市场容量有关;采取信息获取行动后,品牌制造商会对高类型消费者的披露意愿增大,但对低类型消费者的披露意愿变化与市场容量有关。     

考虑收取搭便车消费者产品体验费的双渠道供应链定价

为研究实体零售商收取搭便车消费者产品体验费时消费者搭便车行为对厂商的影响,并探讨实体零售商收取产品体验费的条件,文章考虑一个制造商和一个实体零售商组成的双渠道供应链,基于消费者效用理论,利用K-T条件,分别在收取产品体验费和不收取产品体验费两种情形下,分析对比了消费者搭便车行为对厂商决策的影响。研究表明,收取的搭便车消费者产品体验费与实体零售商的产品销售价格正相关,当消费者旅行成本较低时,网络渠道产品销售价格与收取的产品体验费负相关。当消费者旅行成本较低且销售的产品估值较高时,实体零售商收取产品体验费才能使自身受益。研究进一步显示,实体零售商收取搭便车消费者产品体验费会损害制造商的利润,加剧了制造商和零售商之间的竞争。     

BOPS零售模式下考虑信息共享的电子优惠券投放策略

针对制造商通过线下零售商开通BOPS分销渠道并在BOPS渠道投放电子优惠券的全渠道零售系统,构建制造商不共享优惠券信息、共享优惠券信息以及基于信息共享的合作定价三种博弈模型,剖析优惠券投放和信息共享行为对制造商和零售商定价策略的影响。研究发现:制造商定价和优惠券面值呈正相关关系,但投放大面值优惠券并不总能使制造商受益;优惠券信息共享策略不影响制造商定价及优惠券面值,零售商则可由此定高价;当制造商市场预测能力较强时,制造商应不披露优惠券信息,当其市场预测能力较弱时,应采取合作定价策略;零售商应努力争取获得制造商的优惠券信息,并判断信息的有用性以决定是否展开合作。     

考虑再制造成本的闭环供应链回收渠道决策

当前考虑再制造产品成本对其回收渠道选择影响的研究相对缺乏。将再造品成本作为内生变量,分别讨论了制造商回收、零售商回收和回收商回收三种模式下新产品与再造品的产量以及废旧产品的回收量决策,并分别基于企业收益、消费者剩余和回收率视角展开回收渠道偏好分析。研究表明:从企业收益角度考虑,制造商的回收渠道偏好与再制品成本有关,而零售商始终偏好零售商回收渠道;从消费者剩余角度考虑,为满足消费者剩余最大化,不同的再制品成本会导致不同的回收渠道偏好;从回收率角度考虑,制造商回收渠道下的废旧产品回收率始终高于另外两种渠道。研究结论对再制造闭环供应链各方的定价决策以及回收渠道选择具有一定的参考价值。     

新产品分销下再制造产品直销与分销渠道研究

基于消费者对再制造产品和新产品具有不同接受度,首次研究了制造商通过电子直销渠道销售再制造产品,通过零售商分销渠道销售新产品的渠道模式,构建了再制造产品直销与分销渠道模型,分别求得了两种渠道下制造商与零售商的最优定价策略,并对两种定价策略进行了比较分析.通过数值仿真,分析了消费者对再制造产品接受度对两种销售渠道下的销售价...     

不同融资模式下考虑消费者偏好的双渠道供应链订货与定价策略

考虑品牌偏好型与实体忠诚型两类消费者偏好,构建了零售商内部、混合、外部三种融资模式下双渠道供应链订货与定价策略模型,采用博弈论与两阶段优化技术得到三种融资模式下最优订货与定价策略,并分析了消费者偏好与不同融资模式对供应链订货与定价策略的影响。研究发现:品牌偏好型消费者对网络渠道的偏好会影响供应链成员决策与现金流收益,品牌制造商与零售商集中决策时供应链总现金流大于分散决策时供应链的总现金流,零售商混合融资模式可以提高渠道的订货量,降低渠道价格,减少双渠道供应链双重边际化效应,实现供应链成员与消费者共赢,并且品牌制造商有动机通过银行贷款来满足零售商的融资需要。     

考虑促销行为和消费者偏好的医药供应链协调研究

探究了由医药制造商和医药零售商组成的两级双渠道医药供应链,其中医药零售商负责传统销售渠道,医药制造商通过网络平台负责网络销售渠道,医药制造商既是医药零售商的上游供货商又是其竞争者。结合医药产品的特性,构建了市场需求受医药制造商提供的促销努力和消费者渠道偏好影响的双渠道模型,分析促销努力和消费者渠道偏好对医药供应链利润的影响。算例分析发现,当促销努力满足约束条件时,采取双渠道对医药制造商是有利的。当消费者渠道偏好程度较低时,采用"收益共享+回购+促销成本分担"组合契约对医药制造商和医药零售商都是有利的,同时组合契约可以调动医药制造商提高促销努力水平的积极性,有效地消除存在的双重边际效应问题。     

Influence of logistic service level on multichannel decision of a two-echelon supply chain

This paper investigates the channel structure and pricing problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. There are four common channel structures: (1) traditional retail channel, (2) the retailer’s traditional and online channel, (3) traditional retail channel and the manufacturer’s online channel, (4) traditional retail channel and online channel of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four Models (Model R, Model RD, Model MR, and Model MRD) are established and analysed based on four channel structures. Considering the influence of logistic services on consumers’ channel choice, this paper uses Stackelberg game and consumer utility function to analyse the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain, and obtains the optimal channel strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer in the four models. In addition, our study also finds that First, the manufacturer’s online channel opening can indirectly stimulate consumers to buy products in the traditional retail channel, which increases the demand for traditional retail channel. Second, the manufacturer’s online channel is more conducive to improving the profit of the whole supply chain than the retailer’s online channel under the dual channel structure. Third, multiple channels consisting of traditional retail channel and online channel of the manufacturer and the retailer can provide consumers with the lowest retail price, which is most beneficial to the retailer.     

Pricing and warranty decisions in a two-period closed-loop supply chain

For a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, Stackelberg game analyses are conducted to examine pricing and warranty decisions under two warranty models depending on who offers warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark models with a warranty for new products only. Next, we identify the conditions under which warranty for remanufactured products is offered and investigate how this warranty affects the CLSC operations. Subsequently, comparative studies are carried out to examine equilibrium decisions, profitability and consumer surplus of the CLSC between the two warranty models. Analytical results show that offering warranty for remanufactured products does not affect new product pricing in period 2, but influences the pricing of new products in period 1 and remanufactured products in period 2, thereby enhancing remanufacturing, individual and channel profitability, and consumer surplus. Compared to the retailer warranty for remanufactured products, the manufacturer warranty can attain a more equitable profit distribution. If the warranty cost advantage of the manufacturer (retailer) is significant relative to that of the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) arises as a natural choice to offer warranty for remanufactured products as this decision enhances both profitability and consumer surplus.     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

线上线下渠道的消费者风险感知及信任传递研究

如何将多年努力积累的线下消费者信任转移为对在线产品的良好感知是推动线下企业拓展线上渠道的关键问题。基于线上线下消费者感知风险不同，研究了渠道间信任传递及其定价问题。以渠道拓展的线上消费者信任为对象，构造了感知风险、线上信任程度影响下的消费者效用函数，建立了Stackelberg博弈模型，讨论了渠道定价与线上信任程度的关系以及渠道间信任传递的主要决定因素。研究结果表明，线上信任程度增加导致线下定价降低，线下需求减少且线上需求增加，制造商利润增加而零售商利润下降。此外，制造商对线上渠道信任传递的努力随线下产品绩效波动的增加而减少，随信任传递成本系数的增加而减少，随线下线上成本差的增加而增加。     

Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

考虑消费者绿色偏好的竞争性闭环供应链生产决策研究

在消费者对绿色产品存在偏好的背景下,针对由1个绿色产品制造商、1个普通产品制造商以及1个零售商构成的竞争性闭环供应链系统,分别确定了在合作博弈和非合作博弈情形下的最优定价和绿色度决策,并分析了消费者绿色偏好、绿色投资系数和制造商竞争强度对供应链产品选择和各节点企业利润的影响。研究表明,产品零售价、绿色度、供应链企业的利润均与消费者绿色偏好呈正相关而与绿色投资系数呈负相关。制造商的利润随竞争强度增大而减小,零售商的利润却随之增大,并且非合作博弈下绿色产品制造商的利润要高于普通产品制造商。此外,通过数值算例验证了结论。     

Myopic vs. far-sighted behaviours in a revenue-sharing supply chain with reference quality effects

In this paper, we consider a dynamic supply chain where a manufacturer produces and distributes a featured product through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. The manufacturer decides the product quality and wholesale price, while the retailer sets the retail price in the presence of a revenue-sharing contract and consumers’ reference quality effects. The objective of this study is to investigate the impacts of myopic behaviour regarding the reference quality on the product quality and pricing strategies and profits of both members. Our results suggest that the manufacturer’s myopia leads to a higher quality, higher price strategy and a higher quality–price ratio which benefits consumers. Meanwhile, relative to the far-sighted behaviour, myopia results in a more quality-sensitive but less price-sensitive market demand. What’s more, we find that the manufacturer is apt to act in a far-sighted way, but the retailer isn’t always willing to cooperate with a far-sighted manufacturer. Taking myopic strategies for both members is likely to gain a high profit of the whole supply chain for a relatively high marginal contribution of product quality on demand and a relatively low revenue-sharing proportion.     

双方不完全信息下政府引导的逆向供应链协调研究

讨论双方不完全信息下政府引导一个制造商和两个零售商组成的逆向供应链的协调问题。运用信号甄别和委托代理理论,分别从政府不参与、政府奖励零售商和政府奖励制造商三个方面得到零售商和制造商的协调策略。研究表明:定价合同可有效避免逆向选择,实现逆向供应链协调;高市场需求状态下低成本零售商获得收益较高;政府对企业的合理奖励,尤其是对零售商的奖励,可以促进逆向供应链协调,提高收益。     

Consumer search,transshipment, and bargaining power in a supply chain

We study a decentralised supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers who could transship their excess inventory between each other. Without transshipment, the retailer’s unsatisfied customers search and buy the product at the other retailer with some probability. With transshipment, the retailer can transship the other retailer’s excess inventory to fulfil its own unmet demand. However, a transshipment price is often charged by one retailer for transshipping goods to another. We show the retailer’s profit is unimodal in the transshipment price, and the manufacturer’s profit increases in the customer search probability. Although the retailer’s preference over transshipment depends on the magnitude of search probability and transshipment price, the retailer may always prefer the transshipment no matter their magnitude. We then study the effect of bargaining power over the transshipment decision (whether to transship between retailers and at what transshipment price). Our analysis suggests that the manufacturer always prefers to control the transshipment price rather than to control whether to transship, while the retailer can prefer both. We also find that increasing bargaining power always benefits the manufacturer but could hurt the retailer. We finally check the robustness of our results by investigating the case with asymmetric retailers