A new Walrasian mechanism design for optimal pricing and resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless access networks

In this paper, we address joint spectrum allocation and pricing problem in heterogeneous wireless access networks. In contrast to traditional static spectrum allocation approach, we model the spectrum as a market commodity, dynamically arbitrated by a regulatory agent with the aim of maximizing the social welfare. This is of particular importance with the dominance of wireless technologies in access networks and the sharp increase in the number of overlapping wireless technologies and networks. We designed a novel Walrasian mechanism called economic resource allocation and pricing based on a three-stage game model capable of considering multiple networks and clients with individual attributes and preferences. In the first stage, competition among networks for spectrum allocation is handled where the regulatory evaluates the social welfare and takes corrective action. In the bottom two stages, the complex interactions between clients and networks result in bitrate allocations and service pricings. The equilibrium condition is analyzed using the Walrasian market model which is argued to be the Nash equilibrium of the proposed game. The system behavior is analyzed through extensive simulations. The results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms in moving the system towards maximal social welfare.

     

Task allocation based on profit maximization for mobile crowdsourcing

In recent years, with the development of smart devices, mobile users can use them to sense the environment. In order to improve the data quality and achieve maximum profits, incentive mechanism is needed to motivate users to participate. In this paper, reputation mechanism, participant selection, task allocation and joint pricing in mobile crowdsourcing system are studied. A user reputation evaluation method is proposed, and a participant selection algorithm (PSA) based on user reputation is proposed. Besides, a social welfare maximization algorithm (SWMA) is proposed, which achieves task pricing with maximizing the interests of all parties, including both task publishers and mobile users. The social welfare maximization problem is divided into local optimization sub-problems which can be solved by double decomposition. It is proved that the algorithm converges to the optimal solution. Results of simulations verify that algorithms PSA and SWMA are effective.     

基于在线拍卖的网络切片资源分配算法

为满足未来移动通信网络中多样化的业务需求,为用户提供定制化服务的同时提升网络经济效益,该文提出一种基于在线拍卖的网络切片资源分配算法。根据业务类型将用户的服务请求转化为相应投标信息,以最大化拍卖参与者的社会福利为目标,将切片资源分配问题建模为基于多业务的在线赢家确定问题。结合资源分配与价格更新策略,实现基于在线拍卖的资源优化配置。仿真结果表明,该算法能够在满足用户业务需求的同时,提升网络经济效益。     

A blockchain-based trustworthy collaborative power trading scheme for 5G-enabled social internet of vehicles

Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoV) falls under the umbrella of social Internet of Things (IoT), where vehicles are socially connected to other vehicles and roadside units that can reliably share information and services with other social entities by leveraging the capabilities of 5G technology, which brings new opportunities and challenges, e.g., collaborative power trading can address the mileage anxiety of electric vehicles. However, it relies on a trusted central party for scheduling, which introduces performance bottlenecks and cannot be set up in a distributed network, in addition, the lack of transparency in state-of-the-art Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) power trading schemes can introduce further trust issues. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based trustworthy collaborative power trading scheme for 5G-enabled social vehicular networks that uses a distributed market mechanism to introduce trusted power trading and avoids the dependence on a centralized dispatch center. Based on the game theory, we design the pricing and trading matching mechanism for V2V power trading to obtain maximum social welfare. We use blockchain to record power trading data for trusted pricing and use smart contracts for transaction matching. The simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in improving social welfare and reducing the load on the grid.     

Simultaneous routing and resource allocation via dual decomposition

In wireless data networks, the optimal routing of data depends on the link capacities which, in turn, are determined by the allocation of communications resources (such as transmit powers and bandwidths) to the links. The optimal performance of the network can only be achieved by simultaneous optimization of routing and resource allocation. In this paper, we formulate the simultaneous routing and resource allocation (SRRA) problem, and exploit problem structure to derive efficient solution methods. We use a capacitated multicommodity flow model to describe the data flows in the network. We assume that the capacity of a wireless link is a concave and increasing function of the communications resources allocated to the link, and the communications resources for groups of links are limited. These assumptions allow us to formulate the SRRA problem as a convex optimization problem over the network flow variables and the communications variables. These two sets of variables are coupled only through the link capacity constraints. We exploit this separable structure by dual decomposition. The resulting solution method attains the optimal coordination of data routing in the network layer and resource allocation in the radio control layer via pricing on the link capacities.     

基于监督学习的可信云计算资源拍卖机制研究

使用拍卖方式来进行资源分配可以使得资源提供商获得更大的收益,是云计算领域近年来研究的重点之一。但资源分配问题是NP难的,无法在多项式时间内求解,现有研究主要通过近似算法或启发式算法来实现资源分配,但存在算法耗时长,与最优解相比准确度低的缺点。监督学习中分类及回归思想可对多维云资源分配问题进行建模和分析,针对不同问题规模,该文提出基于线性回归、逻辑回归、支持向量机的3种资源分配算法,并且基于临界值理论设计了支付价格算法,从而确保拍卖机制的可信性。在社会福利、分配准确率、算法执行时间、资源利用率等多个方面进行测试分析,取得了很好的效果。     

基于社会福利最大化的柔性业务资源分配研究

对经济学方法在无线资源管理中的应用进行了研究,考虑业务、用户、资源等多个域,将无线资源分配看作生产–消费模型,兼顾用户公平性原则,针对不同业务的QoS（quality of service）要求采用不同的资源分配方法,建立了基于社会福利最大化的资源分配模型。采用基于用户柔性业务的调度算法优化所提模型,综合考虑用户效用、网络效益以及运营商收益,实现了基于社会福利最大化的柔性业务资源分配。仿真结果验证了所提算法的优越性。     

Double auction mechanisms for resource allocation in autonomous networks

Auction mechanisms are used for allocating a resource among multiple agents with the objective to maximize social welfare. What makes auctions attractive is that they are agnostic to utility functions of agents. Auctions involve a bidding method by agents-buyers, which is then mapped by a central controller to an allocation and a payment for each agent. In autonomic networks comprising self-interested nodes with different needs and utility functions, each entity possesses some resource and can engage in transactions with others to achieve its needs. In fact, efficient network operation relies on node synergy and multi-lateral resource trading. Nodes face the dilemma of devoting their limited resource to their own benefit versus acting altruistically and anticipating to be aided in the future. Wireless ad-hoc networks, peer-to-peer networks and disruption-tolerant networks are instances of autonomic networks where the challenges above arise and the traded resource is energy, bandwidth and storage space respectively. Clearly, the decentralized complex node interactions and the double node role as resource provider and consumer amidst resource constraints cannot be addressed by single-sided auctions and even more by mechanisms with a central controller. We introduce a double-sided auction market framework to address the challenges above. Each node announces one bid for buying and one for selling the resource.We prove that there exist bidding and charging strategies that maximize social welfare and we explicitly compute them. We generalize our result to a generic network objective. Nodes are induced to follow these strategies, otherwise they are isolated by the network. Furthermore, we propose a decentralized realization of the double-sided auction with lightweight network feedback. Finally, we introduce a pricing method which does not need a charging infrastructure. Simulation results verify the desirable properties of our approach.     

Combinatorial auctions for exchanging resources over a grid network

In grid systems, users compete for different types of resources such that they may execute their applications. Traditional grid systems are formed of organisations that join together for the purpose of collaborative projects. Resources of each of the participating organisation are pooled such that members of individual organisations may access the shared infrastructure. In general, each participant is both a provider and a consumer of resources. Whilst such systems address large organisations, in this paper we address democratic grid systems to satisfy needs of small organisations and even individuals, where on-demand grids may be formed by drawing idling resources available on the Internet. Whilst traditional grid systems resort to allocations that satisfy system specific objectives such as maximization of the resource utilisation, market mechanisms try to obtain allocations that are efficient economically. Economic mechanisms permit to achieve equilibrium between supply and demand and furthermore provide incentives for providers. Combinatorial auction has been argued as an effective mechanism to address the problem of resource allocation within grid systems. Auctions within which multiple types of resources in varying quantities may be traded eliminate the exposure problem by addressing co-allocation. In this paper, we describe a combinatorial exchange where multiple providers and multiple consumers may participate. We describe the winner determination problem that incorporates the time dimension, i.e. resource bundles may be requested for different time ranges, and describe a set of heuristics that have been designed to be fast. We show that these achieve a high level of efficiency as compared to exact solutions. The second part focusses on the pricing problem. The objective is to compute prices that represent the state of the market and bring trustworthy feedback to participants. Drawing on the approach taken by Kwasnica et al. (Manage Sci 51(3):419–434, 2005), we propose a pricing model that computes per-item pricing. Per-item pricing allows users to deduce the price of bundles that they require by linear summation. Furthermore, we propose a model that computes prices as a function of time, thus permitting users, in particular consumers to adjust their demand trading off price and time of execution.     

Pricing for QoS-enabled networks: A survey

A complete solution to the problem of providing adequate quality of service (QoS) to heterogeneous users must take into account the issue of pricing. By adopting an appropriate pricing policy and by setting prices carefully, a service provider will be able to offer the necessary incentives for each user to choose the service that best matches his⁄her needs, thereby discouraging over-allocation of resources and maximizing revenue and⁄or social welfare. In this article, we survey some of the recent research in the literature dealing with service pricing in multi-service networks. All of the work surveyed here addresses the relationship between prices and traffic management functions such as congestion control, resource provisioning, and call admission control. We summarize proposed pricing policies for the Internet and for ATM networks, as well as some studies of pricing for general QoS-enabled networks.     

适用于宽带网络波形的基于定价策略的时隙选择

针对宽带网络波形（Wideband Networking Waveform，WNW）的多信道二维时频资源，以减小网络资源浪费为优化目标，提出了一种基于定价策略的时隙选择方法（Pricing Strategy Based Slot Selection，PSSS）。该方法通过接纳控制保障资源分配的公平性，采用对偶优化建模与椭圆搜索法实现最优的时隙选择。理论分析证明该方法能够在多项式级别时间复杂度内搜索到时隙选择的最优解。仿真结果表明，提出的PSSS算法通过较低资源浪费获得了较低的容量冗余度，能够有效地解决WNW多信道网络的时隙选择问题。     

System utility based resource allocation for D2D multicast communication in software-defined cellular networks

Device-to-device (D2D) multicast communication is a useful way to improve the communication efficiency of local services. This study considers a scenario of D2D multicast communication in software defined cellular network and investigates the frequency resource allocation problem. Firstly, we build the system model and formulate the optimization problem. Secondly, a hierarchical scheme to achieve a suboptimal solution is proposed. To select appropriate user equipments (UEs) as potential D2D transmitters (PDTs), a social aware PDT selection method is proposed. Then, a resource allocation algorithm considering users’ priorities is proposed. Furthermore, to study the resource allocation for general system that UEs without priorities, a non-priority considered allocation algorithm is proposed also. Numerical simulation results show that the proposed schemes are effective in improving the system utility and reducing the resource consuming for D2D communications.     

基于非合作博弈的OFDMA无线多跳中继网络上行链路资源分配算法

研究了基于OFDMA多址技术的无线多跳中继网络上行链路资源分配问题。首先,在最大发射功率等约束条件下,建立了多小区OFDMA无线多跳中继网络上行链路的资源分配优化模型。将非合作博弈论和定价机制引入后,该优化问题可转化为在每个子信道上独立地进行功率分配。基于非合作博弈的功率分配模型中的纳什均衡点的存在性和唯一性得到了证明,并给出了具体的分布式求解算法。仿真结果表明,所提算法能在大幅减少系统总发射功率的情况下,有效地提升系统吞吐量,达到较高的能效比。     

Pricing in combinatorial double auction-based grid allocation model

This article proposes a novel grid resource allocation model, in which the users and the grid service providers participate in the combinatorial double auction for the resource allocation. To obtain the detailed resource allocation status and the price information, a novel pricing algorithm is designed for the allocation model. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm completes the resource allocation and pricing efficiently, and exhibits incentive compatible characteristic. Moreover,users with the higher average price and providers with the lower average price get compensation during the pricing process.     

基于组合双向拍卖的网格资源分配

 针对网格环境中资源分配的特点,提出新的基于组合双向拍卖的网格资源分配模型,通过网格用户和业务提供者的组合双向拍卖来实现资源的分配,并提出了网格资源定价算法,用以解决资源分配基础之上的计费问题.仿真结果表明,所提出的方案可以高效的完成资源的分配及定价,并且可以对平均报价较高的竞买方以及平均报价较低的竞卖方给予价格补偿.     

一种支持云计算虚拟资源分配的可信多需求拍卖机制

使用拍卖方式来进行资源分配可以使得资源提供商获得更大的收益,是云计算领域近年来研究的重点。但现有研究多是基于非可信、单资源、单需求的前提。该文提出一种基于拍卖方式的云计算虚拟资源分配和定价机制(VRAP)。这种机制的特点在于,用户在一次拍卖中可以提出多个资源需求。证明了在这种机制下,资源提供商可以获得较以往拍卖机制更大的收益,同时能够保证用户出价是可信的。进而在具体资源分配问题上,提出一种单调的启发式算法能够在很短时间内计算出分配结果,通过资源稀有度概念设计了再分配策略,可以保证云资源提供商的收益极大化;在支付价格计算算法设计中,基于临界值理论计算支付价格,从而保证机制的公平可信。在社会福利、执行时间、资源利用率等多个方面对VRAP进行了测试分析,取得了很好的效果。     

Proportional fairness: more secrets revealed

In this paper, the resource allocation problem in a general network configuration is addressed. In particular, we will present a distributed solution algorithm in one the hand, followed by the exact set of equations that solves for (p,1)‐proportionally fair allocation in an attempt to express the network optimal rates in a closed form on the other hand. First, the problem is presented as an optimization model that maximizes the social utility of the network. A duality approach is used to solve the network model in a timely synchronized iterative manner. Next, the exact analytical variant of the model is presented showing its equivalence to the numerical solution. The analytical model relies on the pattern of bottlenecks inside the network, which can be found using a weighted progressive filling. Such a pattern will help in finding the exact analytical set of equations that solves for proportionally fair rates for any network configuration. Closed‐form solutions are now computed for different networks including well‐known configurations such as linear, grid, and cyclic networks. Different simulation experiments are conducted along with the solution of standard optimization solvers. The results of the simulation, the solvers, and the analytical solutions coincide and present the same allocation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

用于资源动态预留的航天测控资源配置优化算法

针对航天测控资源配置优化问题这类约束条件繁杂且数量众多的组合优化问题,提出了可用于资源动态预留的航天测控资源配置优化算法。具体来讲,考虑测控设备和航天器执行任务的唯一性约束以及时间窗口冲突约束,建立了基于原子型任务调度的0-1整数规划模型;设计了能将实际需求和求解算法进行解耦的求解框架,并基于最大化利用测控资源的思想获得了可回溯的并行最佳优先搜索算法。仿真结果表明,所提算法达到了能在国内东部、西部、南部和北部四大测控区域中更加均衡地动态预留出更多、更重要测控设备的资源配置优化效果。     

Responsive pricing modeled with Stackelberg game for next-generation networks

In this paper, we study the problem of resource allocation between users in next-generation networks. The starting assumption is that the service provider tries to come up with convincing offers of service level to subscribers, based on demand responsive pricing scheme, while trying to maximize its profit. We developed two algorithms with different usage-based pricing strategies. Both algorithms solve pricing optimization problem using Stackelberg game with service provider acting as a leader and users behaving as followers. We developed the bandwidth management server to perform automatic optimal bandwidth allocation to each user's session and maximize its expected utility while maximizing the overall service provider's revenue. For both algorithms, we also performed the procedure for optimization of the capacity offered to users.     

基于非合作竞价博弈的网络资源分配算法的应用研究

本文运用博弈理论对资源分配技术进行了深入研究,提出了能够反映供求关系的基于竞价的网络资源定价机制,并设计了端系统的效用函数,论证了资源分配博弈中Nash均衡点的存在性和唯一性以及Nash均衡解.基于所提资源分配博弈模型,设计了一种网络资源分配算法(RANG).仿真实验表明,RANG算法能够为端系统的资源数量提供参考,规范端系统竞价,从而使得整个资源的分配趋于合理.