项目业主应对“不平衡报价”方法探讨

不平衡报价是指在工程项目的投标报价中,保持总价不变,通过调整各分项的单价,达到既不影响中标,又能在结算时获得比较理想的经济收入。不平衡报价对投标人是一种策略,对项目业主则意味着风险。文章探讨了项目业主应对不平衡报价的主要策略。     

工程量清单投标报价中措施项目费竞争力分析研究

工程量清单报价中的措施项目费的确定，是建设工程项目投标报价的竞争内容。本文作者通过工程实例中措施项目费的报价，对不同投标人的投标报价做出分析研究，提出了掌握工程造价中各项费用组成的内在联系，熟悉建筑工程内容、施工技术措施和施工方法，建立施工企业定额，完善投标报价的方法与技巧，以确定合理的措施项目费用，提高投标人的竞争能力。     

工程招标交易之标底设计研究

通过对我国招标工作中存在问题的分析,得出其根本原因在于标底功能的错位,缺少对报价有效范围的确定,因此有必要设计一个具有上下限的控制性标底。引入拍卖机制设计中保留价格的概念作为投标报价的上限值,可以有效地防止投标人之间共谋抬高报价的行为;同时研究了工程成本的确定问题,并把其作为判断投标报价是否有效的下限值,防止投标人的恶意中标行为。具有上下限的标底设置比较成功地解决了招标工作中存在的问题,有效地完善了招投标机制,为业主方的招标工作提供了理论依据。     

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.     

Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review

In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.     

现有工程招标评标的不规范现象及对策

工程项目评标是招标工作的主要环节,评标决策方法的科学、客观与否,直接关系到招标工作的成功,保证公开、公平、公正地选择中标人,是建筑市场环境的综合反映。现有工程招标评标的不规范现象,其根源就是标底的存在。随着市场经济的发展,采用“最低价中标”的方法是大势所趋。但“最低价中标”原则却遭到了许多人的反对。投标人为了不使总报价过高,对在施工过程中无望增加工程量或可能减少工程量的项目压低报价。同时,有些投标人不惜一切手段了解专家名单,长期拉拢某些专家,影响评标的科学性和公正性。规范招投标行为,提高招投标透明度,实质是通过公开、公平、公正的招投标活动,将建立高效、规范的管理体系的过程法律化。     

价值管理在设计评标中的应用

在招标投标中,评标是一个非常重要的环节。目前我国招标法规定一般采用合理最低价中标,评标也是采用经评审的最低价中标。通过这样的招标,业主只能从参与投标的单位中择优选择设计(或施工)单位,但无法评定项目的价值。在面对实力相当的投标单位时,业主应该如何评价和选择合适的设计(或施工)单位,以实现“降低成本,提高功能”的最终目标,本文应用价值管理的原理和方法,很好地解决了这个问题。     

Impact of crude oil market behaviour on unit bid prices: the evidence from the highway construction sector

It is well known that the cost of highway construction is affected by the cost of crude oil. While this relationship is highly visible for construction items such as asphalt cement (a by‐product in the process of refining oil), the effects of the crude oil prices on the cost of other construction items, such as concrete cement or construction operations are less direct, but equally important. For unit‐based contracts without price adjustment clauses, this relationship is of a particular significance. In fact, an increase in price of fuel could result in substantial losses, as contractors are not protected. Hence, to hedge against this risk, contractors are likely to incorporate a premium in bid prices to manage project risks. The objective of this paper is to investigate the evidence of this behaviour. New evidence shows that the expected change in oil prices (the difference between future and spot price) and the implied volatility in the oil market affect the price of bid items for contracts without price adjustment clauses. Such results allow for more effective implementation of risk management on project‐ and programme‐level basis.     

Real estate development as real options

Researchers have attempted to develop methods that detect collusive bidding. But no method can detect collusion with certainty unless it is based on legal evidence. A method is proposed to detect collusive bidding behaviour that improves the performance of previous methods. It analyses the historical bidding data provided by a construction owner in a two-step approach which is mainly based on a multiple regression model. The first step involves identifying the potential cartel bidders using the residual test and the cost structure stability test developed in earlier work. The second step is the focus of this paper and involves comparing the behaviour of the potential cartel bidders and non-cartel bidders by analysing bid distributions, their cost dispersion, and the differences in their cost structures. After conducting the second step of the study, it was found that the suspected cartel bidders identified in Step 1 behaved in ways to confirm collusion. Also, in an unrelated search, it was found that two of the six potential cartel bidders who were identified in this study had been audited by the public agency for bid fraud, and that another potential cartel bidder had been found guilty by the courts and forbidden from doing business with the public agency.     

The risks of unbalanced bidding

Unbalanced bidding models have largely ignored the risk aspect of item pricing. Many researchers have acknowledged that there are considerable risks associated with unbalancing a bid but little has been done to describe these risks, let alone model them. A new framework is proposed by which all of these risks can be assessed. It identifies that these risks comprise the risk of rejection, the risk of reaction, and the risk of being wrong. It is further proposed that the value‐at‐risk (‘VaR’) method of measuring risk is a convenient way by which to combine all of these risks into one composite assessment. This quantified assessment serves to describe the extent of risk generated by each level of each item’s price. Previous related research has proposed an unbalanced bidding model that has likewise provided a measurement of the expected reward generated by each level of each item’s price. By doing a summation of these, keeping in mind that the prices applied to all of a project’s component items must add up to the overall bid price, the contractor is able to assess both the risks as well as the rewards of all possible item price combinations.     

浅议建设单位如何应对工程量清单不平衡报价

阐述了不平衡报价的内涵与要义,从建设单位的角度分析不平衡报价的表现与实质,指出不平衡报价是施工单位的一种低价中标、高价结算投标策略。最后就建设单位如何识别、防范不平衡报价提出建议。     

监理工程师如何确定公路工程变更项目的单价

就监理工程师如何确定公路工程变更项目的单价做一探讨,根据FIDIC合同条款,介绍了变更项目单价确定的原则,并对变更项目单价确定原则的实际运用进行了阐述,从而避免由于单价确定引起的争论和费用索赔问题。     

Integration of Simulation-Based Cost Model and Multi-Criteria Evaluation Model for Bid Price Decisions

Abstract:   Several criteria affect bidding decisions. Current bidding models determine a markup based on a fixed project construction cost. This work presents a novel bid price determination procedure that is built by integrating a simulation-based cost model and a multi-criteria evaluation model. The cost model is used to consider cost uncertainties and generate a bid price cumulative distribution, whereas the multi-criteria evaluation model applies pairwise comparisons and fuzzy integrals to reflect bidder preferences regarding decision criteria. The relationship between the two models is based on a practical phenomenon in that a bidder has a high probability of winning when criteria evaluations favor his bid, and, consequently, the bidder would bid a low price, and vice versa. The merits of the proposed procedure are demonstrated by its application to two construction projects in Taiwan .     

建设工程招投标机制现状与市场主体不规范行为的分析及对策

针对建设工程招投标市场招标人、招标代理机构、投标人以及评标专家等主体行为的不规范现象,在现有招投标运行机制基础上提出了加强对业主行为的监管、健全企业信用管理制度、加强对评标专家管理、加快招投标信息化建设等解决措施。     

建筑工程施工评标常用方法存在问题研究

对建筑工程施工评标中,评标单位采用合理低价法评商务标时存在"过多重视投标总价,忽视价格构成"的不合理现象,提出商务标评审也划分为两阶段评标;在综合评估法中对评标指标权重的确定忽视了潜在的多种不确定性,笔者运用集对分析法的同异反理论对这一问题进行了探讨,并且从本质上将评委专家对各指标相对重要性的认识量化为同一度和差异度两部分,探讨了指标权重的确切值以及合理区间范围,从而可考虑到招标方的招标意图和客户的购买需求。     

复合标底下建筑施工企业投标报价量化分析

通过对复合标底投标报价的分析,建立了投标报价模型,并基于一元线性回归模型,对业主的标底和竞争对手的报价进行了预测,为投标人投标报价的量化分析提供了一种方法,以减少盲目性。     

Estimating the number of new and repeated bidders in construction auctions

The number of new bidders – bidders from whom there is no previous registered participation – is an important variable in most bid tender forecasting models, since the unknown competitive profile of the former strongly limits the predictive accuracy of the latter. Analogously, when a bidder considers entering a bid or when an auctioneer is handling a procurement auction, assessing the likely proportion of experienced bidders is considered an important aspect, as some strategic decisions or even the awarding criteria might differ. However, estimating the number of bidders in a future auction that have not submitted a single bid yet is difficult, since there is no data at all linking their potential participation, an essential requirement for the implementation of any forecasting or estimation method. A practical approach is derived for determining the expected proportion of new bidders to frequent bidders as a function of the population of potential bidders. A multinomial model useful for selective and Open tendering is proposed and its performance is validated with a dataset of actual construction auctions. Final remarks concern the valuable information provided by the model to an enduring unsolved bidding problem and the prospects for new research continuations.     

项目管理单位中标项目的投资控制与风险管理

项目实施阶段实行代建单位招标的管理模式,是一种全新的项目建设管理模式,项目管理单位以最低价中标并实行中标价包干。根据招标文件要求,中标项目在实施阶段的投资额原则上不认可变更,这对项目的投资管理提出了更高的要求,也给投资控制提出了新的课题。本文着重介绍代建单位的中标项目如何有效控制投资及如何加强风险管理,旨在为代建单位的投资管理提供参考。     

工程量清单项目单价的评审方法

本文针对目前招授标工作中只评授标总报价而忽视工程量清单项目单价的问题，介绍了一种评审工程量清单主要项目单价的方法和标准，为评标中选择最佳承包商提供决策依据。     

非政府的建设单位在工程施工招标中应注意的问题

本文从建设单位的角度,对如何处理好工程施工招标工作进行探讨,列举了发布招标公告、选择总分包形式、选择合同价形式、工程担保应用、选择计价办法、选择主要材料设备等方面的具体问题以及需要采取的策略和技巧。