异构无线网络中基于Stackelberg博弈的分布式定价和资源分配算法

针对异构无线网络资源管理问题,结合多主多从Stackelberg博弈模型,提出了一种同时满足网络运营商和用户效用最大的异构无线网络定价和资源分配方案。首先设计了一种基于收益和花费的移动用户效用函数,并证明在运营商的价格确定后,效用函数满足凹函数的条件,保证了移动用户间非合作博弈的纳什均衡点存在。为了获取移动用户的最优带宽策略和运营商的最优价格策略,提出了一种分布式迭代算法。最后通过仿真实验取得了参与者的最优策略和子博弈完美纳什均衡。     

认知无线网中一种基于博弈论的低复杂度联合资源共享机制

在一类典型的认知无线网络中,多个次级用户通过支付费用竞争租用主用户授权频带的子带来传输信息。该文针对此类系统通过博弈论方法联合优化次级用户的发射功率和子带分配,及主用户的定价系数,同时最大化主用户和次级用户的收益。具体而言,该文基于逆向归纳法,将博弈问题分解为功率控制、子带分配和价格调整等3个耦合的子问题,并逐一求解,从而得到整个博弈的子博弈精炼纳什均衡。最后,该文基于理论分析结果,提出一种博弈均衡求解算法。仿真结果验证了该文的理论推导结果和该算法的有效性。     

多主多从Stackelberg博弈下的边缘缓存资源分配算法

为鼓励视频服务提供商参与到缓存过程中,本文提出一种基于Stackelberg博弈的激励缓存资源分配算法。与传统激励缓存资源分配方案不同,本文考虑同时存在多个网络运营商和多个视频服务提供商,视频服务提供商从网络运营商处购买存储空间以缓存热门视频。针对该场景,本文将该激励缓存模型建模为多主多从Stackelberg博弈问题,分别构建主方和从方的效用函数,证明了在网络运营商价格确定的情况下,视频服务提供商之间的非合作博弈存在纳什均衡。文章利用分布式迭代算法对该博弈模型进行求解,获得了视频服务提供商的最优缓存策略和网络运营商的最优价格策略。仿真结果表明,本文提出的激励缓存机制可使视频服务提供商获得比其他缓存分配算法更高的单位成本收益。      

认知无线多跳网中保证信干噪比的频谱分配算法

为解决无线多跳网络在固定频谱分配方式下所固有的信道冲突等问题,利用认知无线电的动态频谱分配技术,提出了一种适用于次用户组成的无线多跳网络的、underlay方式下的全分布式频谱分配算法。该算法将频谱分配问题建模成静态非合作博弈,证明了纳什均衡点的存在,并给出了一种求解纳什均衡点的迭代算法。大量仿真实验证明,该算法能实现信道与功率的联合分配,在满足主用户干扰功率限制的同时,保证次用户接收信干噪比要求。     

一种动态频谱分配的多层博弈模型构建分析

采用随机几何和博弈论相结合的方法,研究了蜂窝网络中用户对于移动网络运营商(Wireless Service Provider, WSP)的选择与WSP频谱分配方案的制定之间的联系;构建了一个层次化的博弈框架来模拟用户和WSP之间的复杂交互,采用演化博弈模型来描述用户之间的竞争,用非合作博弈模型来描述WSP之间的竞争,用多领导者多跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型来描述用户和运营商之间的循环依赖问题;分析了演化博弈模型中演化均衡的存在及其渐近稳定性,并在此基础上证明了非合作博弈模型中纳什均衡的存在。     

基于Bertrand博弈论的动态频谱分配算法

研究了在多主用户参与的完全竞争模式下的频谱价格问题,建立基于博弈理论的经济模型,分析主用户的频谱利润和频谱价格与认知用户的频谱需求之间的关系。考虑了主用户数、频谱替代因子和学习速率对频谱价格、纳什均衡、收敛性及稳定性的影响。仿真结果表明,合理的频谱价格及传输参数,可以使主用户获得的利润最大化,合理的学习速率可以使主用户的频谱价格快速收敛,通过有偿频谱共享,充分调动了主用户的积极性,从而有效的缓解了认知用户频谱资源紧张的局面。     

双层分级蜂窝网最优频谱分配与定价

针对异频组网的双层分级蜂窝网,提出了一种基于纳什谈判解法的最优频谱分配与定价策略,该策略能激励家庭基站采用开放用户组模式,最大化频谱效益。通过Stackelberg博弈建模,分析了频谱定价与用户需求的关系。通过纳什谈判解法,获得了最佳的频谱分配与定价策略,按需地为宏基站与家庭基站分配了带宽资源,定量地分析了家庭基站所提高的频谱效益。仿真结果表明,该策略相比非合作博弈方法,可有效提高运营商以及家庭基站拥有者所能获得的频谱效益,部署家庭基站将提高蜂窝网络的总效益。      

认知小蜂窝网络中基于干扰温度限制的下行能效资源分配算法

为最大化认知小蜂窝基站的能量效率,本文基于博弈论模型分析了下行联合频谱资源块和功率分配行为.在干扰受限环境下,多个基站采用分布式结构共享空闲频谱资源.为避免累加干扰损害主用户的通信,算法中引入了功率和干扰温度限制.由于具有耦合限制的分数形式的能量效用函数是非凸最优的,通过将其转化为等价的减数形式进行迭代求解.给定频谱资源块分配策略后,主博弈模型可被重新建模为便于求解发射功率的等价子博弈模型,并通过代价的形势解除耦合限制.仿真结果表明,本文所提算法能够收敛到纳什均衡,并有效提高了系统资源利用率和能量效率.     

基于对局迭代的无人机空战博弈研究

基于对局迭代对多无人机协同空战博弈决策问题进行了研究.首先,根据敌我双方作战态势和效能参数信息,利用矩阵对策法建立敌我双方对抗支付博弈模型,得到支付矩阵;然后,根据混合策略纳什均衡的定义及其推导过程给出了使用对局迭代求解空战博弈混合策略纳什均衡的方法与求解步骤;最后,通过仿真实例验证了该方法的可行性及有效性,为解决多无...     

空间复用认知无线电系统信道选择优化

在异构认知网络中,认知用户相对于主用户空间位置的不同可能提供空间复用的频谱接入机会,且空间复用的机会受限于干扰容限。首先引入用户空间位置干扰图,度量干扰和评估空间复用机会,在此基础上讨论了基于空间复用的系统吞吐量优化问题,并借助博弈论求解一组最优信道选择集合,主要工作是证明了该博弈问题是至少具有一个纯策略纳什均衡的精确势能博弈,且纳什均衡点是上述优化问题的最优解。最后,数值仿真验证了理论分析的正确性,同时证明考虑认知用户位置带来的空间复用后,系统吞吐量显著增加,有效提高了频谱利用率。     

Hybrid model of inter-stage spectrum trading in multistage game-theoretic framework

Dynamic spectrum access(DSA),consisting of spectrum sharing and spectrum trading stage,becomes a promising approach to increase the efficiency of spectrum usage and system performance.In this paper,from the perspective of individual interest optimization,we focus on strategy adaptation of network users and their interaction in spectrum trading process.Considering adverse effects on decision-making accuracy and the fairness among network users via local information acquirement,a hybrid game model based on global information of relevant spectrum is proposed to formulate intelligent behaviors of both primary and secondary users.Specifically,by using the evolutionary game theory,a spectrum-selection approach for the evolution process of secondary users is designed to converge to the evolutionary equilibrium gradually.Moreover,competition among primary users is modeled as a non-cooperative game and an iterative algorithm is employed to achieve the Nash equilibrium.The simulation results show that the proposed hybrid game model investigates network dynamics under different network parameter settings.     

Competitive Pricing for Spectrum Sharing in Cognitive Radio Networks: Dynamic Game, Inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium, and Collusion

We address the problem of spectrum pricing in a cognitive radio network where multiple primary service providers compete with each other to offer spectrum access opportunities to the secondary users. By using an equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the primary service providers aims to maximize its profit under quality of service (QoS) constraint for primary users. We formulate this situation as an oligopoly market consisting of a few firms and a consumer. The QoS degradation of the primary services is considered as the cost in offering spectrum access to the secondary users. For the secondary users, we adopt a utility function to obtain the demand function. With a Bertrand game model, we analyze the impacts of several system parameters such as spectrum substitutability and channel quality on the Nash equilibrium (i.e., equilibrium pricing adopted by the primary services). We present distributed algorithms to obtain the solution for this dynamic game. The stability of the proposed dynamic game algorithms in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is studied. However, the Nash equilibrium is not efficient in the sense that the total profit of the primary service providers is not maximized. An optimal solution to gain the highest total profit can be obtained. A collusion can be established among the primary services so that they gain higher profit than that for the Nash equilibrium. However, since one or more of the primary service providers may deviate from the optimal solution, a punishment mechanism may be applied to the deviating primary service provider. A repeated game among primary service providers is formulated to show that the collusion can be maintained if all of the primary service providers are aware of this punishment mechanism, and therefore, properly weight their profits to be obtained in the future.     

Dynamics of Multiple-Seller and Multiple-Buyer Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Game-Theoretic Modeling Approach

We consider the problem of spectrum trading with multiple licensed users (i.e., primary users) selling spectrum opportunities to multiple unlicensed users (i.e., secondary users). The secondary users can adapt the spectrum buying behavior (i.e., evolve) by observing the variations in price and quality of spectrum offered by the different primary users or primary service providers. The primary users or primary service providers can adjust their behavior in selling the spectrum opportunities to secondary users to achieve the highest utility. In this paper, we model the evolution and the dynamic behavior of secondary users using the theory of evolutionary game. An algorithm for the implementation of the evolution process of a secondary user is also presented. To model the competition among the primary users, a noncooperative game is formulated where the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution (in terms of size of offered spectrum to the secondary users and spectrum price). For a primary user, an iterative algorithm for strategy adaptation to achieve the solution is presented. The proposed game-theoretic framework for modeling the interactions among multiple primary users (or service providers) and multiple secondary users is used to investigate network dynamics under different system parameter settings and under system perturbation.     

基于Stackelberg博弈的多任务协作频谱感知算法

随着移动设备的增多,认知无线电技术诞生,而频谱感知是认知无线电技术中的重要一环。本文将群智感知和频谱感知结合,提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的多任务协作频谱感知算法。该算法将融合中心(平台)与次用户分别建模为Stackelberg博弈领导者和从属者。在领导者博弈中,平台给次用户发布最优的报酬值以获得最佳的效用;在从属者博弈中,本文着重考虑了剩余能量对次用户的影响,次用户在平台给的报酬下改变感知时间以获得最优的效用。仿真结果表明,该算法可以提高融合中心对频谱的检测概率。      

认知无线电中基于Stackelberg博弈的分布式功率分配算法

在underlay认知无线电场景中,为了让认知用户能随机地接入主用户正在使用的授权频段,且对主用户产生的干扰不高于主用户能够容忍的干扰温度门限,该文采用Stackelberg博弈机制进行认知用户的发射功率分配。将主用户作为模型中的leader,认知用户作为follower,认知用户使用主用户的授权频段时需以干扰功率为单位支付给主用户相应的费用,而主用户则可以通过调整价格,限制认知用户产生的总干扰功率不高于其所能容忍的干扰温度门限,以便获得最大收益。同时,不同认知用户间根据主用户制定的价格,进行非协作博弈。仿真结果表明,与集中式的最优功率分配算法相比,该文可通过简单的分布式功率分配算法获得与其相近的系统性能,且主用户与认知用户间只需进行少量的信息交互,这与需进行大量信息交互的集中式最优算法相比,具有较大的优势。     

Cooperative Relay‐Aware Spectrum leasing based on Nash bargaining solution in cognitive radio networks

This paper proposes a spectrum leasing strategy based on cooperative relaying for cognitive radio networks. The basic idea is to make the primary user lease a fraction of the licensed spectrum to the secondary user, which acts as a relay for the primary user in return. We formulate the spectrum leasing problem as a Nash bargaining game to avoid the ineffective solution obtained by Stackelberg game. The cooperative condition and the optimal time allocation can be obtained by solving the game. Numerical results demonstrate that both the primary user and the secondary user can obtain larger profits from the spectrum leasing based on Nash bargaining solution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A game theoretic approach for energy‐efficient communications in multi‐hop cognitive radio networks

In multi‐hop cognitive radio networks, it is a challenge to improve the energy efficiency of the radio nodes. To address this challenge, in this paper, we propose a two‐level Stackelberg game model, where the primary users and the secondary users act as the leaders and the followers, respectively. Based on the game model, our proposed scheme not only considers the power allocation problem for secondary users but also takes into account the price of spectrum. First, we give the cognitive radio network model, and show how to set up the game theoretic model in multi‐hop cognitive radio networks. We then analyze this problem and show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium point for the game. We also study the impact of the spectrum price of the primary users in the cognitive radio network and study how to select the best price for the primary users to maximize their own profit. Finally, we implement simulations to show the performance of our schemes. Our work gives an insight on how to improve the energy efficiency and allocate spectrum resources in multi‐hop cognitive radio networks. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.