Great apes' (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, Pongo pygmaeus) understanding of tool functional properties after limited experience.

Primates' understanding of tool functionality has been investigated extensively using a paradigm in which subjects are presented with a tool that they must use to obtain an out-of-reach reward. After being given experience on an initial problem, monkeys can transfer their skill to tools of different shapes while ignoring irrelevant tool changes (e.g., color). In contrast, monkeys without initial training perform poorly on the same tasks. Compared to most monkeys, great apes show a clear propensity for tool using and may not require as much experience to succeed on tool functionality tasks. We investigated this question by presenting 171 apes (Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla, and Pongo pygmaeus) with several tool-use problems without giving them initial training or familiarizing them with the test materials. Apes succeeded without experience, but only on problems based on basic properties such as the reward being supported by an object. However, only minimal experience was sufficient to allow them to quickly improve their performance on more complex problems in which the reward was not in contact with the tool. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Orangutans (Pongo spp.) may prefer tools with rigid properties to flimsy tools.

Preference for tools with either rigid or flexible properties was explored in orangutans (Pongo spp.) through an extension of D. J. Povinelli, J. E. Reaux, and L. A. Theall's (2000) flimsy-tool problem. Three captive orangutans were presented with three unfamiliar pairs of tools to solve a novel problem. Although each orangutan has spontaneously used tools in the past, the tools presented in this study were novel to the apes. Each pair of tools contained one tool with rigid properties (functional) and one tool with flimsy properties (nonfunctional). Solving the problem required selection of a rigid tool to retrieve a food reward. The functional tool was selected in nearly all trials. Moreover, two of the orangutans demonstrated this within the first test trials with each of the three tool types. Although further research is required to test this statistically, it suggests either a preexisting preference for rigid tools or comprehension of the relevant features required in a tool to solve the task. The results of this study demonstrate that orangutans can recognize, or learn to recognize, relevant tool properties and can choose an appropriate tool to solve a problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Capuchins (Cebus apella) can solve a means-end problem.

Three capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested on a 2-choice discrimination task designed to examine their knowledge of support, modeled after Hauser, Kralik, and Botto-Mahan's (1999) experiments with tamarins. This task involved a choice between 2 pieces of cloth, including 1 with a food reward placed on its surface, and a second cloth with the food reward next to its surface. After reliably solving the basic problem, the capuchins were tested with various alternations of the original food reward and cloth. The capuchins were able to solve the initial task quickly, and generalize their knowledge to additional functional and nonfunctional variations of the problem. In comparison to the tamarins previously tested on this problem (Hauser et al., 1999), the capuchins were able to reach criterion faster during the training and food size conditions and showed a greater ability to inhibit reaching toward larger food rewards that were unavailable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The magic cup: Great apes and domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) individuate objects according to their properties.

Despite current interest in dog (Canis familiaris) cognition, very little is known about how dogs represent objects and how they compare with other species, such as the great apes. Therefore, we investigated how dogs and great apes (chimpanzees [Pan troglodytes], bonobos [Pan paniscus], orangutans [Pongo pygmaeus], gorillas [Gorilla gorilla]) individuate objects in a classical violation of expectation paradigm. We used a container (magic cup) with a double bottom that allowed us to change the type of food that subjects had seen being placed in the container. Using a 2 × 2 design, we varied whether subjects received a generally preferred food and whether the food was substituted (surprise trials) or not (baseline trials). Apes showed increased begging and looking behaviors and dogs showed increased smelling behavior. Both species stayed near the experimenter more frequently in the surprise trials compared with baseline trials. Both species reacted to positive (i.e., good food substituted for bad food) and negative (i.e., bad food substituted for good food) surprises. These results suggest that apes and dogs were able to individuate objects according to their properties or type in comparable ways. In addition, we looked for frustration and elation effects, but subjects' behaviors were not influenced by the food they saw and which they received in previous trials. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning about tools in infancy.

These experiments explored the role of prior experience in 12- to 18-month-old infants' tool-directed actions. In Experiment 1, infants' use of a familiar tool (spoon) to accomplish a novel task (turning on lights inside a box) was examined. Infants tended to grasp the spoon by its handle even when doing so made solving the task impossible (the bowl did not fit through the hole in the box, but the handle did) and even though the experimenter demonstrated a bowl-grasp. In contrast, infants used a novel tool flexibly and grasped both sides equally often. In Experiment 2, infants received training using the novel tool for a particular function; 3 groups of infants were trained to use the tool differently. Later, infants' performance was facilitated on tasks that required infants to grasp the part of the tool they were trained to grasp. The results suggest that (a) infants' prior experiences with tools are important to understanding subsequent tool use, and (b) rather than learning about tool function (e.g., hammering), infants learn about which part of the tool is meant to be held, at least early in their exposure to a novel tool. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Flexibility and rigidity in a variety of problem situations.

The results point to the conclusion that a person who displays behavior defined as flexible in one situation does not necessarily do so in another. "It may be that some other way of defining behavior might lead to the formulation of a general variable of problem-solving behavior, but the criteria adopted here do not." 23 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of effort on behavioral rigidity in a Luchins water jar task.

The experiment consisted of a paper-and-pencil problem solving task to test if the effort required to obtain 1 solution influences the S's ability to solve similar problems. The conclusions are that the greater the effort required to develop a solution procedure: (a) the slower the change to another more appropriate solution procedure, (b) the greater the propensity of change during extinction to an alternative decision procedure that is similar to the learned procedure, and (c) the less the propensity to recognize and use a trivial decision procedure that is also feasible. The results were significant at the .05 level. The Ss were 46 male undergraduate students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of actual and paper-and-pencil versions of the water jar test of rigidity.

Rigidity, as measured by the paper-and-pencil water jar test and actual presence of the jars, were not found to be highly related. The paper-and-pencil version was found to elicit more behavior categorized as rigid. The results were interpreted as not favoring either measure as an adequate measure of rigidity, but of problem solving ability. From Psyc Abstracts 36:04:4CE91W. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) Encode Relevant Problem Features in a Tool-Using Task.

Two important elements in problem solving are the abilities to encode relevant task features and to combine multiple actions to achieve the goal. The authors investigated these 2 elements in a task in which gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) had to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach reward. Subjects were able to select tools of an appropriate length to reach the reward even when the position of the reward and tools were not simultaneously visible. When presented with tools that were too short to retrieve the reward, subjects were more likely to refuse to use them than when tools were the appropriate length. Subjects were proficient at using tools in sequence to retrieve the reward. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Task constraints mask great apes' ability to solve the trap-table task.

Researchers have investigated animals' causal knowledge with a task requiring subjects to use a tool to bring a reward within reach whilst avoiding a trap. Previous studies have suggested limitations in the ability of several species to avoid traps in tubes or tables. However, certain features may have inflated task difficulty. We tested 20 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 7 orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), 5 bonobos (Pan paniscus), and 5 gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) in the trap-table--a task in which subjects have to pull one of two rakes prepositioned behind two rewards on a flat surface. One of the rewards is in front of a trap into which it will fall. We investigated the effect of trap type, tool type, the number of available tools, and reinforcement regime on performance. We replicated previous findings showing that apes failed to choose the correct rake above chance. However, when they could instead choose where to insert a single tool, around 80% of the apes solved the trap-table task in the first trial, revealing an important effect of task constraints on their performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of stimulus class on the problem-solving behavior of schizophrenics and normals.

"The ability of normal and schizophrenic Ss to deal with information involving human and nonhuman stimuli was compared. When Ss were matched on the basis of ability to utilize information about nonhuman stimuli, it was found that the problem-solving behavior of schizophrenics was significantly disrupted by the presence of human stimuli in the test situation. When the same populations were matched for ability to solve problems involving human stimuli, no significant difference was found in their capacity to deal with information involving nonhuman stimuli." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How the brain responds to the destruction of money.

Is our attitude to money like that to any other tool even though its use is symbolic and is not implemented in its physical structure? Knowledge of the functional use of concrete tools, such as hammers or screwdrivers, has been associated with activation of a left hemisphere network including the posterior temporal cortex, supramarginal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, and lateral precuneus. Here we demonstrate that observing bank notes being cut up or torn, a critical violation of their function, elicits activation within the same temporo-parietal network. Moreover, this activation is the greater the higher the value of the banknote. This lends plausibility to a genuinely psychological interpretation of the explanation of money as a tool for parametrically symbolizing exchange. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

How the great apes (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) perform on the reversed contingency task: The effects of food quantity and food visibility.

S. T. Boysen and G. G. Berntson (1995) found that chimpanzees performed poorly on a reversed contingency task in which they had to point to the smaller of 2 food quantities to acquire the larger quantity. The authors compared the performance of 4 great ape species (Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus, Pan paniscus, and Gorilla gorilla) on the reversed contingency task while manipulating food quantity (0-4 or 1-4) and food visibility (visible pairs or covered pairs). Results showed no systematic species differences but large individual differences. Some individuals of each species were able to solve the reversed contingency task. Both quantity and visibility of the food items had a significant effect on performance. Subjects performed better when the disparity between quantities was smaller and the quantities were not directly visible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of different patterns on outcomes of problem-solving discussion.

Using an analysis of variance design, some effects of 3 patterns for problem-solving discussion were investigated experimentally. All 3 patterns began with an analysis of the problem, but differed thereafter: ideation-criteria (A), criteria-ideation (B), and solution (C). 135 students Ss were randomly assigned to 27 groups of 5 Ss and a trained leader. All groups discussed 3 problems, using each pattern once. Patterns A and B, incorporating deferred judgment, yielded significantly more ideas (p X2, p     

Multiple Causes of Difficulty in Insight: The Case of the Nine-Dot Problem.

Theories of insight problems are often tested by formulating hypotheses about the particular difficulties of individual insight problems. Such evaluations often implicitly assume that there is a single difficulty. We argue that the quantitatively small effects of many studies arise because the difficulty of many insight problems is determined by multiple factors, so the removal of 1 factor has limited effect on the solution rate. Difficulties can reside either in problem perception, in prior knowledge, or in the processing of the problem information. We support this multiple factors perspective through 3 experiments on the 9-dot problem (N.R.F. Maier, 1930). Our results lead to a significant reformulation of the classical hypothesis as to why this problem is difficult. The results have general implications for our understanding of insight problem solving and for the interpretation of data from studies that aim to evaluate hypotheses about the sources of difficulty of particular insight problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More on the Fragility of Performance: Choking Under Pressure in Mathematical Problem Solving.

In 3 experiments, the authors examined mathematical problem solving performance under pressure. In Experiment 1, pressure harmed performance on only unpracticed problems with heavy working memory demands. In Experiment 2, such high-demand problems were practiced until their answers were directly retrieved from memory. This eliminated choking under pressure. Experiment 3 dissociated practice on particular problems from practice on the solution algorithm by imposing a high-pressure test on problems practiced 1, 2, or 50 times each. Infrequently practiced high-demand problems were still performed poorly under pressure, whereas problems practiced 50 times each were not. These findings support distraction theories of choking in math, which contrasts with considerable evidence for explicit monitoring theories of choking in sensorimotor skills. This contrast suggests a skill taxonomy based on real-time control structures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Perspectives of probabilistic inferences: Reinforcement learning and an adaptive network compared.

The assumption that people possess a strategy repertoire for inferences has been raised repeatedly. The strategy selection learning theory specifies how people select strategies from this repertoire. The theory assumes that individuals select strategies proportional to their subjective expectations of how well the strategies solve particular problems; such expectations are assumed to be updated by reinforcement learning. The theory is compared with an adaptive network model that assumes people make inferences by integrating information according to a connectionist network. The network's weights are modified by error correction learning. The theories were tested against each other in 2 experimental studies. Study 1 showed that people substantially improved their inferences through feedback, which was appropriately predicted by the strategy selection learning theory. Study 2 examined a dynamic environment in which the strategies' performances changed. In this situation a quick adaptation to the new situation was not observed; rather, individuals got stuck on the strategy they had successfully applied previously. This "inertia effect" was most strongly predicted by the strategy selection learning theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential use of incidental stimuli in problem solving as a function of creativity.

108 undergraduate Ss of 3 levels of creativity, as assessed by Mednick's (1962) Remote Associates Test, were given 30 anagrams to solve. Prior to the anagram task, they memorized 25 words under interference conditions, another list of 25 words played on a tape recorder. Unknown to Ss, 10 of the anagram solutions had previously appeared in the memorized list (focal-incidental) and 10 in the interference list (peripheral-incidental). As predicted, high > middle > low creatives utilized both the focal and peripheral incidental cues (p     

Having the Memory of an Elephant: Long-Term Retrieval and the Use of Analogues in Problem Solving.

The authors report 4 experiments exploring long-term analogical transfer from problem solutions in folk tales participants heard during childhood, many years before encountering the target problems. Substantial culture-specific analogical transfer was found when American and Chinese participants' performance was compared on isomorphs of problems solved in European versus Chinese folk tales. There was evidence of transfer even among participants who did not report being reminded of the source tale while solving the target problem. Comparisons of different versions of a target problem indicated that similarity of solution tool affected accessing, mapping, and executing components of problem solving, whereas similarity of goal object had only a moderate effect on accessing. High school students also evidenced greater transfer than did middle school students. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of open goals on the acquisition of problem-relevant information.

There have been a number of recent findings indicating that unsolved problems, or open goals more generally, influence cognition even when the current task has no relation to the task in which the goal was originally set. It was hypothesized that open goals would influence what information entered the problem-solving process. Three studies were conducted to establish the effect of open goals on the acquisition of problem-relevant information. It was found that problem-relevant information, or hints, presented implicitly in a 2nd task in between attempts at solving problems aided problem solving. This effect cannot be attributed to strategic behavior after participants caught on to the manipulation, as most participants were not aware of the relationship. The implications of this research are discussed, including potential contributions to our understanding of insight, incubation, transfer, and creativity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)