Correction to Rushton and Jensen (2005).

Reports an error in the original article by J. Philippe Rushton and Arthur R. Jensen (Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2005[Jun], Vol 11[2], pp. 235-294). An equation on p. 271 was incorrect. In the note to Table 5 on p. 273, a similar equation was incorrect. Finally, on p. 274, the last line of the first paragraph was incorrect. Corrections are published here. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2005-03637-001.) The culture-only (0% genetic-100% environmental) and the hereditarian (50% genetic-50% environmental) models of the causes of mean Black-White differences in cognitive ability are compared and contrasted across 10 categories of evidence: the worldwide distribution of test scores, g factor of mental ability, heritability, brain size and cognitive ability, transracial adoption, racial admixture, regression, related life-history traits, human origins research, and hypothesized environmental variables. The new evidence reviewed here points to some genetic component in Black-White differences in mean IQ. The implication for public policy is that the discrimination model (i.e., Black-White differences in socially valued outcomes will be equal barring discrimination) must be tempered by a distributional model (i.e., Black-White outcomes reflect underlying group characteristics). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Heredity, environment, and race differences in IQ: A commentary on Rushton and Jensen (2005).

J. P. Rushton and A. R. Jensen (see record 2005-03637-001) ignore or misinterpret most of the evidence of greatest relevance to the question of heritability of the Black-White IQ gap. A dispassionate reading of the evidence on the association of IQ with degree of European ancestry for members of Black populations, convergence of Black and White IQ in recent years, alterability of Black IQ by intervention programs, and adoption studies lend no support to a hereditarian interpretation of the Black-White IQ gap. On the contrary, the evidence most relevant to the question indicates that the genetic contribution to the Black-White IQ gap is nil. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thirty years of research on race differences in cognitive ability.

The culture-only (0% genetic-100% environmental) and the hereditarian (50% genetic-50% environmental) models of the causes of mean Black-White differences in cognitive ability are compared and contrasted across 10 categories of evidence: the worldwide distribution of test scores, g factor of mental ability, heritability, brain size and cognitive ability, transracial adoption, racial admixture, regression, related life-history traits, human origins research, and hypothesized environmental variables. The new evidence reviewed here points to some genetic component in Black-White differences in mean IQ. The implication for public policy is that the discrimination model (i.e., Black-White differences in socially valued outcomes will be equal barring discrimination) must be tempered by a distributional model (i.e., Black-White outcomes reflect underlying group characteristics). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What if the hereditarian hypothesis is true?

J. P. Rushton and A. R. Jensen (see record 2005-03637-001) review 10 bodies of evidence to support their argument that the long-standing, worldwide Black-White average differences in cognitive ability are more plausibly explained by their hereditarian (50% genetic causation) theory than by culture-only (0% genetic causation) theory. This commentary evaluates the relevance of their evidence, the overall strength of their case, the implications they draw for public policy, and the suggestion by some scholars that the nation is best served by telling benevolent lies about race and intelligence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The cultural malleability of intelligence and its impact on the racial/ethnic hierarchy.

This commentary highlights previous literature (see record 2005-03637-001) focusing on cultural and environmental explanations for the racial/ethnic group hierarchy of intelligence. Assumptions underlying definitions of intelligence, heritability/genetics, culture, and race are noted. Historical, contextual, and testing issues are clarified. Specific attention is given to studies supporting stereotype threat, effects of mediated learning experiences, and relative functionalism. Current test development practices are critiqued with respect to methods of validation and item development. Implications of the genetic vs. culture-only arguments are discussed with respect to the malleability of IQ. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: A meta-analytic reply to Heine (2005).

C. Sedikides, L. Gaertner, and Y. Toguchi (2003; see record 2002-08440-007) reported findings favoring the universality of self-enhancement. S. J. Heine (2005; see record 2005-13803-005) challenged the authors' research on evidential and logical grounds. In response, the authors carried out 2 meta-analytic investigations. The results backed the C. Sedikides et al. (2003) theory and findings. Both Westerners and Easterners self-enhanced tactically. Westerners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of individualism, whereas Easterners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of collectivism (in both cases, because of the personal importance of the ideal). Self-enhancement motivation is universal, although its manifestations are strategically sensitive to cultural context. The authors respond to other aspects of Heine's critique by discussing why researchers should empirically validate the comparison dimension (individualistic vs. collectivistic) and defending why the better-than-average effect is a valid measure of self-enhancement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biased estimators, biased experts, and the ivory tower: A reply to Grove (2001).

This reply responds to W. M. Grove's (2001) critique of H. O. F. Veiel and R. F. Koopman's (2001) article on bias in widely used methods of estimating premorbid IQ. In this reply, the authors show that Grove is misrepresenting part of Veiel and Koopman's arguments, extending them to show that the proposed adjustment to regression estimates of IQ not only is unbiased but also is the maximum-likelihood estimate of the true IQ, and argue that Grove's notion of the acceptability of biased methods in judicial proceedings reflects a fundamental misapprehension of their nature and purpose. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assertions of therapeutic excess: A reply to Mills (2005).

Mills (see record 2005-04819-001) suggests that the tradition of relational psychoanalysis may hold an inherent risk of "therapeutic excess" which leads to unprofessional behavior. In his critique, Mills constructs an argument based upon a series of unsubstantiated claims which wrongly conclude that a particular theory in psychoanalysis can lead to a particular type of behavior, in this case, of the unethical type. This discussion attempts to clarify the errors in reasoning which this critique contains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relation between source memory and episodic memory: Comment on Siedlecki et al. (2005).

On the basis of an interesting structural equation analysis, K. L. Siedlecki, T. A. Salthouse, and D. E. Berish (see record 2005-02476-002) argued that "it may not be meaningful to refer to source memory as a construct distinct from episodic memory" (p. 31). This commentary highlights that this same point could also be made on conceptual grounds. To suggest that source and episodic memory are distinct concepts would confound tasks with theoretical constructs. All episodic tasks involve making attributions about the origin of mental experiences (source monitoring). Conversely, source memory tasks are designed to investigate episodic memory. No task is special, but each may be useful, depending on the focus of interest. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: A reply to Barrett et al. (2006).

This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban (see record 2006-10940-009), wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's (see record 2002-18731-006) use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Illusory conjunctions are alive and well: A reply to Donk (1999).

When presented with a red T and a green O, observers occasionally make conjunction responses and indicate that they saw a green T. These errors have been interpreted as reflecting separable processing stages of feature detection and integration with the illusory conjunctions arising from a failure at the integration stage. Recently, M. Donk (see record 1999-11444-003) asserted that the phenomenon of illusory conjunctions is an artifact. Conjunction reports are actually the result of confusing a nontarget item (O in the example above) for a target item (the letter T) and (correctly) reporting the color associated with the (incorrectly) selected target. The authors demonstrate that although target–nontarget confusion errors are a potential source of conjunction reports, there is a plethora of findings that cannot be accounted for by this confusion model. A review of the literature indicates that in many studies, illusory conjunctions do result from a failure to properly integrate features. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Introduction to the Special Section on Cognitive Abilities: 100 Years After Spearman's (1904) "'General Intelligence,' Objectively Determined and Measured".

The study of individual differences in cognitive abilities is one of the few branches of psychological science to amass a coherent body of empirical knowledge withstanding the test of time. There is wide consensus that cognitive abilities are organized hierarchically, and C. Spearman's (1904) general intelligence occupies the vertex of this hierarchy. In addition, specific abilities beyond general intelligence refine longitudinal forecasts of important social phenomena and paint a rich portrait of this important domain of psychological diversity. This opening article identifies and then reviews 5 major areas concerning the personological significance of cognitive abilities and the methods used to study them. In models of human behavior and important life outcomes, cognitive abilities are critical in more ways than social scientists realize. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Race and genetics: Controversies in biomedical, behavioral, and forensic sciences": Correction to Ossorio and Duster (2005).

Reports an error in "Race and Genetics: Controversies in Biomedical, Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences" by Pilar Ossorio and Troy Duster (American Psychologist, 2005[Jan], Vol 60[1], 115-128). In this article, Table 1 contains several errors due to an editorial mistake. In the Population and Incarceration columns, the data for Blacks and Whites were transposed. In addition, decimal points were omitted from the data in the Rate (%) of Incarceration per Population columns. The correct version of Table 1 appears in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2005-00117-011.) Among biomedical scientists, there is a great deal of controversy over the nature of race, the relevance of racial categories for research, and the proper methods of using racial variables. This article argues that researchers and scholars should avoid a binary-type argument, in which the question is whether to use race always or never. Researchers should instead focus on developing standards for when and how to use racial variables. The article then discusses 1 context, criminology, in which the use of racial variables in behavioral genetics research could be particularly problematic. If genetic studies of criminalized behavior use forensic DNA databanks or forensic genetic profiles, they will be confounded by the many racial biases of the law enforcement and penal system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional dog does learn new tricks: A reply to Pizarro and Bloom (2003).

D. A. Pizarro and P. Bloom (see record 2002-08416-009) argued against the social intuitionist model of moral judgment in the current author's article (see record 2001-18918-008) and for a modified rationalist model. This reply responds to their 2 main arguments by demonstrating that an intuitionist model allows for malleability and flexibility in judgment, and it allows for cases of moral deliberation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bayesian eggs and Bayesian omelettes: Reply to Stern (2005).

In this response to Stern's (2005) (see reocord 2005-16136-010) discussion of Klugkist, Laudy, and Hoijtink (2005), model inference based on posterior probabilities on the parameter space is discussed. Furthermore, the authors respond to Stern's example in which all possible orderings are included via a short discussion of exploratory versus theory-based modeling. Finally, the authors show that the Bayesian approach is flexible and can deal with many types of constraints. This is illustrated using a model with constraints on the differences between means. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ego re-revisited: A reply to Frank (2007).

G. Frank (see record 2007-16468-011), in response to the current author's original paper (see record 2005-08806-004), maintained that if psychoanalysts are to renew their interest in an archaic concept like the ego, 3 criticisms must be addressed: reification of the ego, the problem of impersonality, and the problem of the ego's evolution from the id. The author addresses these criticisms directly and from within the context of an updated view of the ego as rooted in contemporary biological and psychological science. He also comments on the place of the psychoanalytic ego in the postmodern era. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working memory and connectionist models of parsing: A reply to MacDonald and Christiansen (2002).

The authors take issue with 3 claims made by M. C. MacDonald and M. H. Christiansen (2002): (a) tha connectionist models of syntactic processing do not have components that function in the sarne way as limitations on working memory (WM) in production system models of psychological processes; (b) that individual differences in WM are related to the efficiency of syntactic processing because both are affected by reading experience; and (c) that individual differences in the nature of phonologica representations affect the efficiency of syntactic processing. The authors argue that the concept of WM cannot be eliminated from models of language processing and that the literature supports the view that syntactic processing involves a specialized WM system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The IQ paradox is still resolved: Reply to Loehlin (2002) and Rowe and Rodgers (2002).

In their original article (W. T. Dickens & J. R. Flynn, 2001), the authors formalized the consensus model of reciprocal effects between IQ and environment and showed that it can resolve the apparent paradox between high heritability and large environmental effects. Commentators suggested that the model has undesirable properties that call its usefulness into question. J. L. Loehlin (2002) argued that incorporating persistence of IQ into the model causes problematic behavior. D. C. Rowe and J. L. Rodgers (2002) argued that an increasing correlation of IQ and environment should have caused growing variance of IQ. Empirical evidence suggests that IQ is not sufficiently persistent to cause the problems Loehlin found and that the correlation of IQ and environment has not grown much over time so that the reciprocal effects model need not imply increasing variance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The essential role of behavioral genetics in developmental psychology: Reply to Partridge (2005) and Greenberg (2005).

The authors address the methodological, theoretical, and ideological criticisms of their article on adolescent perceptions of parenting behavior (see record 2005-14938-011) made by G. Greenberg (see record 2005-14938-013) and T. Partridge (see record 2005-14938-012). Behavioral genetic methods have provided unique insights on the origins of individual differences in behavior and, when applied to parenting and other putative psychosocial influences, challenge conventional developmental theory. McGue et al.'s goal was not, as Greenberg and Partridge appeared to believe, to establish the heritability of parenting--that was already known; rather, McGue et al. showed how the relationship between inherited factors and an individual's environment changes during a critical developmental transition. There is a great need for developmental researchers to explore the combined influence of genetic and environmental factors using a range of approaches, including that of McGue et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intrapsychic intersubjective conflict and defense in modern Freudian theory: A response to Stolorow (2005).

Stolorow (see record 2005-01622-017) objected to my stating in my discussion of signal anxiety--the modern Freudian notion of conflict--(Shill, see record 2004-11107-008) that intersubjective psychoanalysis does not address conflict "at all." Instead of addressing the issue of intrapsychic conflict, which is the actual focus of my article and the context of my comment, Stolorow counters with his own "vocabulary" of conflict that is confusing and vague. Stolorow rejects the notion of intrapsychically generated conflict and "the intrapsychic" because he focuses exclusively on the intersubjective aspects of conflict and does not consider that, in the last instance, psychological conflict is always internal and intrinsic to the manner in which the mind functions. By contrast, contemporary Freudian conflict theory--signal anxiety theory--is an intrapsychic, intersubjective theory in which the ego rehearses the feared scenario unconsciously in fantasy--intersubjective in nature--and triggers a defensive response aimed at quelling or at least mitigating the signal anxiety being experienced. Signal anxiety is a hypothetical construct and its operation refers to subjectively experienced affect states in an intrapsychic intersubjective conflict. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)