The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Views from the inside and outside.

Replies to comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" (see record 2005-05480-003). Four (see records 2006-03947-010; 2006-03947-011; 2006-03947-012; and 2006-03947-013) of the five comments on my article were critical of my treatment of psychology and phenomenology. I will try to identify the sources of these disputes, but not with the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one discipline over the other. In an attempt to compare and contrast psychology and phenomenology, I analyze three concepts: objectivity, values, and falsifiability. Reber's comments (see record 2006-03947-014) were agreeable to read because of the common methodological orientation we share. Reber's optimism about humanity sharing common moral commitments appears to be contradicted by history and current events. Cloonan's (see record 2006-03947-010) plea for a "methodological pluralism" (p. 255) in psychology sounds appealing but is basically destructive for psychology and society. You can't play chess and checkers on the same board at the same time! (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A personal encounter with psychology (1937-2002).

An undergraduate assistantship with Maslow, research with S. Asch, and an indirect exposure to E. Nagel's philosophy of science encouraged H. H. Kendler to become involved with methodological issues in psychology. Graduate training with K. Spence led to an active research career that was initially immersed in the latent learning controversy and later, with the collaboration of his wife T. Kendler, in the extension of the Hull-Spence model of cognitive development. Methodological concerns from a variety of sources encouraged Kendler to express his ideas on the methodology and history of psychology as well as its role in ethical and social policy issues. A productive symbiotic relationship is created from the interaction of democracy, natural-science psychology, and moral pluralism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by R. J. Smith (Journal of Philosophical and Theoretical Psychology, 2001[Fall], 21[2], 153-172). On pages 160, 161, 166, and 167 the subject to object relationship was reported at "S/O". The corrected representation is "S?O". (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2002-10964-004.) The value-fact or subject-object split (S-O) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/O) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?O) Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?O is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and the naturalistic ethics of social policy.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is challenged with reference to the behaviorist position of ethical naturalism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dewey's integrated logic of science, ethics, and practice.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. J. Dewey's (1929 [1958], 1938) instrumentalism and logic of inquiry are presented as solutions to the trifurcation of theoretical science, ethics, and practical science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why psychologists don't think like philosophers.

H. H. Kendler (see record 1994-09190-001), in his article on psychology and the ethics of social policy, argues in part that ethical imperatives cannot be inferred from empirical data. This argument is cited in opposition to what is purported to be the position of the American Psychological Association on the abortion issue. It is suggested that PhD candidates in psychology be well versed in the philosophical issues and debates that are the foundation for the formation of ethical principles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond the naturalistic fallacy.

Comments on H. H. Kendler's (see record 1999-11644-004) article on the role of value in the world of psychology. Kendler maintained that the American Psychological Association has made unwarranted moves from neutral facts to support for morally loaded policies (e.g., regarding abortion) and cautioned that this kind of behavior could undermine public trust in psychologists as scientist. However, Kendler failed to acknowledge the extent to which his overall position rests on a denial of the possibility of ethical knowledge—not just for psychologists, but for scientists and ethicists alike. In turn, this failure contributed to a distorted presentation of W. K?hler's (1938) work on values and its relation to Nazism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

E pluribus unum.

Replies to comments on the original article by R. J. Sternberg and E. L. Grigorenko (see record 2001-10045-001), which described an approach to psychology ("unified psychology") which is a multiparadigmatic, multidisciplinary, and integrated study of psychological phenomena through converging operations. Sternberg and Grigorenko reply to comments by H. H. Kendler (see record 2003-03406-005), M. Y. Lau (see record 2003-03406-006), J. I. Kassinove (see record 2003-03406-007), W. Chovan (see record 2003-03406-008) and R. Chao (see record 2003-03406-009). Sternberg and Grigorenko note that the aforementioned authors disagree at least as much among themselves as they do with Sternberg and Grigorenko's proposals. Sternberg and Grigorenko provide brief replies to each published comment here. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Tracy Seedman Kendler (1918-2001): Obituary.

Reports the death of Tracy Seedman Kendler (1918-2001). The author describes her educational background as well as her contributions to the field of psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The place of facts in a world of values: Subject and object in a postmodern world.

The value-fact or subject-object split (S-0) recently defended by H. H. Kendler (1999) as necessary for a scientific psychology to establish facts, was rejected by Gestalt psychology as reducing the person to object status. The Gestalt solution correlating principles of perceptual organization with corresponding features of the object world (S/0) has however answered poorly to the vast cultural differences found in values. Communal/dialectical psychology in agreement with a postmodern worldview, treats facts as intrinsically value-laden social constructions mediated by a society's particular social relations (S?0). Examples of fact ambiguity are illustrated, and S?0 is recommended as ontologically preferable for psychology as social science and for turn-of-the-millenium psycho-ecology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Values and Science: Reply.

Responds to Kendler (2004), Johnson (2004), and Zuriff (2004) who directed a number of criticisms against the authors' original article (see record 2003-03405-003) examining the psychological data and policy debates surrounding affirmative action. Kendler and Zuriff both chided the authors for interjecting values into the realm of science. The authors, however, state that both seriously misread the argument, imagining that they talked about "morality" when they did not. The authors claim to hold the same view as Kendler and Zuriff about the dichotomy between data and values and revisit portions of their argument further questioned. To Johnson, they state that the issues are not as clear cut as he has suggested. The authors do, however, reevaluate their original article in light of his criticisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond Husserl.

In his article "Husserl Revisited," Jennings (see record 1987-05956-001) did a noteworthy job of introducing the complex work of Edmund Husserl and the relation of that work to psychology. However, to have a broad conception of phenomenology, one must see that Husserl's work is not all there is, or has been, to the praxis of the discipline. It could be asserted that the phenomenological psychology practiced by at least some today stands totally independent of Husserl, drawing instead on Brentano, Stumpf, James, and the gestaltists. In saying this, it is not my point to defame Husserl, merely to keep him in perspective. There can be no doubt of Husserl's influence on many current phenomenological psychologists (e.g. Giorgi, 1970). Still, articles like Jennings's promote a confusion between the work of one individual and the discipline as a whole. It was my intention in this comment to suggest sources for review and consideration, believing that from them readers will find a more complex and less distinct relationship between phenomenology and psychology than that presented by comparing only Husserl's views with psychology. Beyond this point, I share the views of Jennings completely and embrace the aim of his original article, which was to stimulate "a more fruitful dialogue between the disciplines" (p. 1240). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Examining Redding's (2001) claims about lesbian and gay parenting.

Comments on the article by R. E. Redding (see record 2001-00465-001) which discusses pluralism and sociopolitical diversity in psychology and argues that conservatives and their views are "vastly underrepresented in psychology". As an example of research that has been tainted by liberal biases, Redding points to various methodological issues occurring in research supporting gay and lesbian parenting. The current author addresses these issues, stating that Redding's arguments regarding gay and lesbian parenting as an example of research fraught with liberal biases are weak. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Facts, values, and policies: A comment on Howard H. Kendler (2002).

In a recent article, Howard H. Kendler (2002) criticized Kenneth B. Clark and the other social scientists who worked in Brown v. Board of Education for polluting their science with value judgments. This article argues that Kendler's critique is misguided because it conflates a policy judgment with a value judgment. In addition, Kendler inconsistently applied his own standard of objectivity when he examined the social science used in Brown. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Philosophical foundations of psychological theories: The issue of synthesis.

Examines 3 prototypical psychological perspectives represented by psychoanalysis, humanistic psychology, and behaviorism in light of their parallel philosophical world views (idealism, interactionism, and empiricism). It is suggested that both strengths and limitations are inherent in these philosophical bases. At present, incompatibility in these methodological commitments prevents true synthesis in either philosophy or psychology. The strength of psychological pluralism is stressed: Endorsing pluralism permits retention of all major content areas commonly viewed as part of psychology and appears to be the most intellectually responsible course. Four essential characteristics of pluralistic psychology are outlined. (38 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)