A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification.

Controversies are rampant in contemporary psychology concerning the appropriate method for observing consciousness and the role inner experience should play in psychological theorizing. These conflicting orientations reflect, in part, methodological differences between natural science and human science interpretations of psychology. Humanistic psychology and philosophical phenomenology both employ a human science approach to psychology that seeks to explain behavior in terms of a person's subjective existence. Maslow's and Heidegger's formulations are both fulfillment theories in that they specify moral values that suggest how life ought to be lived. Natural science methodology rejects the possibility that moral imperatives can be validated, whereas human science methodology allows phenomenological convictions to justify recommendations about a fulfilled life and a good society. The social role of psychology is analyzed within the framework of phenomenological convictions and scientific truth. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Views from the inside and outside.

Replies to comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" (see record 2005-05480-003). Four (see records 2006-03947-010; 2006-03947-011; 2006-03947-012; and 2006-03947-013) of the five comments on my article were critical of my treatment of psychology and phenomenology. I will try to identify the sources of these disputes, but not with the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one discipline over the other. In an attempt to compare and contrast psychology and phenomenology, I analyze three concepts: objectivity, values, and falsifiability. Reber's comments (see record 2006-03947-014) were agreeable to read because of the common methodological orientation we share. Reber's optimism about humanity sharing common moral commitments appears to be contradicted by history and current events. Cloonan's (see record 2006-03947-010) plea for a "methodological pluralism" (p. 255) in psychology sounds appealing but is basically destructive for psychology and society. You can't play chess and checkers on the same board at the same time! (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology depends on human nature.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). Kendler contrasted objective phenomena going on in the mind with phenomenological convictions. He concluded, on the basis of a thoughtful analysis, that scientific psychology cannot validate moral principles, which have to be agreed upon by discussion among educated members of a democratic community. He recommended psychological research on the consequences of social policies that may facilitate humans' decisions. I argue that research on the nature of phenomenological convictions is useful as well, enabling human beings to amend their strategies when reasoning about moral values. Scientific psychology can contribute to moral reasoning not only by examining social consequences of certain policies but also by highlighting the very process, starting from phenomenological convictions and ending in moral values within a community. Thus, psychological research contributes to the reflection of how members of a community exert their freedom and may give them the opportunity to enhance their reasoning and negotiation procedures. Scholars have to be humble and admit that the limit to this enhancement lies in the limitations of human reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Logic and psychology": Erratum.

Reports an error in the article by Michael Polanyi (American Psychologist, 1968, 23[1], 27-43). The last sentence of the quotation from Whewell on page 28 should read as follows: "Before this, the facts are seen as detached, separate, lawless; afterwards, they are seen as connected, simple, regular; as parts of one general fact, and thereby possessing innumerable new relations before unseen." (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1990-55831-001). Surveys the nonstrict rules of inference, i.e., informal logic, on which science rests, and describes 3 nonstrict criteria: (1) all knowledge of reality is indeterminate, (2) knowledge of coherence is undefinable, and (3) many of the data on which knowledge rests are unspecifiable. This is termed tacit knowing or tacit inference. The latter is an integration which brings subsidiary elements to bear on the focus of our attention. Consciousness includes a tacit awareness of its subsidiaries. Tacit integration includes observation, discovery, and acquisition of skills. These are all irreducible to explicit processes of deduction. The knowledge of external objects, the body, and living beings are discussed in terms of tacit knowledge. It is felt that philosophy has been misguided by failing to recognize the process of tacit knowing. The process of visual perception and the pursuit of science are compared. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The unity of psychology.

An analysis of contemporary psychology reveals the existence of three distinct subject matters: behavior, neurophysiological events, and phenomenal experience. To unify psychology requires reducing two of the subject-matter areas to the theoretical principles of the third. Whether one subject matter can be reduced to another (e.g., behavior to neurophysiology) depends upon the formalization of the two theories involving the different subject matters and the demonstration that one formulation can explain the other. Explanation can be examined within two different frameworks, epistemological and psychological. Epistemologically, explanation occurs when a phenomenon is deduced from a set of theoretical principles. Psychologically an event is explained when it can be intuitively comprehended; made sensible in terms of one's own phenomenal experience. A unified psychology does not, and may never, exist. Whether a unity can potentially be achieved depends on the acceptance of a common criterion of explanation. Without a common conception psychology will inevitably be split into separate and distinct disciplines. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The place of observation in biological and psychological science.

Historical origins and mutual contributions of biology and psychology are considered. The author concludes that "… psychology students should, as a part of their training, have more emphasis placed on the technique of objective observation." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The transformation of psychology: Influences of 19th-century philosophy, technology, and natural science.

Reviews the book, The transformation of psychology: Influences of 19th-century philosophy, technology, and natural science edited by Christopher D. Green, Marlene Shore, and Thomas Teo (see record 2001-01476-000). In the following review, I have found it convenient to divide the 11 chapters of this volume into three groups, one devoted to the philosophy of psychological science, one devoted to theoretical and biological psychology, and one devoted to applied psychology. The first of these groups contains chapters by Andrew S. Winston on Ernst Mach, by Charles W. Tolman on G. W. F. Hegel, and by Thomas Teo on Karl Marx and Wilhelm Dilthey. The second grouping of chapters is concerned with theoretical/biological psychology and includes five contributions. The final group of chapters concerns applied psychology. What I liked most about this book was the genuinely innovative character of every chapter; there is no "old hat" stuff anywhere. The editors and contributors are to be congratulated on a fine and timely work of scholarship. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Entering the sacred: Prologue to a theory of transcendent consciousness.

The thesis of this paper is that the established profane knowledge of psychology is proving inadequate to contemporary human experience (Grof, 1985), and that psychology now has no choice but to "enter the sacred" by acknowledging and investigating integrative experiences associated with states of transcendent consciousness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The future of psychology practice and science.

This article reviews the 2009 APA President's initiatives and recommendations for the future of psychology practice and science. The future of psychology practice requires that we expand the focus of traditional practice; become health care providers, not just mental health providers; use evidence-based practice, assessment, and outcome measures; incorporate technology into our practices, including electronic health records; and change training and focus to meet the needs of our diverse society. The future of psychological science requires that we train and work in multidisciplinary teams, employ different methods and approaches, and shift our focus to translational science. The future of our profession requires substantial changes in graduate education to prepare our students for science and practice in the 21st century. In light of advances in science and practice that reveal the critical importance of psychosocial and behavioral factors in health and disease, I call for the creation of a department of behavioral health within the federal government. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Constructing knowledge: The role of graphs and tables in hard and soft psychology.

Because graphs provide a compact, rhetorically powerful way of representing research findings, recent theories of science have postulated their use as a distinguishing feature of science. Studies have shown that the use of graphs in journal articles correlates highly with the hardness of scientific fields, both across disciplines and across subfields of psychology. In contrast, the use of tables and inferential statistics in psychology is inversely related to subfield hardness, suggesting that the relationship between hardness and graph use is not attributable to differences in the use of quantitative data in subfields or their commitment to empiricism. Enhanced "graphicacy" among psychologists could contribute to the progress of psychological science by providing alternatives to significance testing and by facilitating communication across subfields. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Methodological advances and issues in rehabilitation psychology: Moving forward on the cutting edge.

Scientific research plays an important role in advancing the knowledge base of rehabilitation psychology. Research contributes to theory building and provides the foundation for empirically supported rehabilitation psychology practices, and model-based diversity-sensitive evidence-based interventions help persons with disabilities to become fully integrated into the society. Objective: In this article, the guest editors present their rationale for developing this special issue on methodological advances in rehabilitation psychology. Conclusions: They suggest that rehabilitation psychology research needs to be theory driven using rigorous research designs, strategies, and techniques and describe their selection of articles designed to highlight some exciting new developments in rehabilitation psychology research and to stimulate thinking and facilitate discussion about incorporating these new techniques in theory-driven research programs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rediscovering the history of psychology: Interview with Kurt Danziger.

Kurt Danziger is a senior scholar whose innovative contributions to the history of psychology have received widespread international recognition. This wide-ranging interview covers every aspect of Danziger's work since the 1970s, including his early work on Wundt, his work on psychological methods that culminated in the book Constructing the Subject (1990), and his more recent work on psychological objects in Naming the Mind (1997). It also includes his thoughts on history of psychology in general and the related subject of historical psychology. The interviewer is a former student of Danziger and coeditor of a recent book on Danziger's work. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychologists on psychology: The inquiry beliefs of psychologists by subdiscipline, gender, and age.

Three hundred six psychologists, all members of the American Psychological Association, responded to a questionnaire on which they rated various theoretical-philosophical statements concerning the conduct of psychological inquiry. Results were considered in relation to the subdiscipline of psychology to which respondents belonged, their gender, and their decade of birth. Results for subdiscipline indicated progressively weaker relative support for naturalism, reductionism, empiricism, and experimentalism as the context of subdisciplinary inquiry became increasingly broad. Women were less attached to experimental methods than men and displayed a stronger belief in the importance of political factors in research than did their male counterparts. Finally, younger psychologists believed more strongly in the importance of presentation skills such as good writing and rhetoric with respect to research and academic success. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selected theoretical and philosophical aspects of counseling psychology: A personal view.

Counseling Psychologists have often reflected upon the special perspectives and philosophical aspects of their specialty. From the variance of our roots to the diversity of our current activities through the conflicts of contemporary psychology there is a certain stability of purpose and unity of belief about the crucial aspects of our area. Our view of human action sees persons as agents capable of managing and enhancing their inner selves, important commitments, interpersonal relationships and their world of work. This view doesn't prevail because we are segregated from or unaware of the biological determinism of Freudian thought or the environmental determinism of Skinner and other behaviorists. We have not chosen to ignore these traditions which are so much a part of psychology's history; rather, we seek in science and practice to know more about the multiplicity of influences that enter into the origins of human actions so that the exercise of agency and the possibilities for choice are enhanced. Our scientist-professional model allows us to test our theories in actual everyday situations, and return to our laboratories and classrooms with practical wisdom. This model also permits us to put theory and science at the disposal of those we serve. Whatever our future holds, at the present time we enjoy the best of two worlds as careful science and expert practice continue to inform our views of human action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The past and future of the psychology of science.

As the British statesman Edmund Burke once wrote, "Those who do not know history are destined to repeat it." (Not to be confused with George Santana's comment: "Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."). The fact is that the history of the psychology of science has been a struggle for existence. If we wish to move away from struggle and toward a comfortable existence, then we need to learn lessons from the other disciplines that successfully have made the transition from fledgling field to fully established scientific discipline. The history, philosophy, and sociology of science are just such established disciplines. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)