非对称需求信息下两阶段供应链协调

针对由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链，其成员之间的市场需求信息不对称问题，建立了非对称信息下批发价与订货量的stackelberg博弈模型，给出了零售商和供应商分别拥有需求信息下的博弈均衡．效值实例分析了非对称信息对价格和订货量及利润的影响，同时给出了信息不对称下的供应链协调机制。     

信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商参与的价格补贴契约设计

运用前景理论和委托代理理论,探讨信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性供应商参与的价格补贴契约设计问题.通过对零售商订货行为和供心商定价策略的研究,发现信息小对称时零售商的最优订货量小于系统的最优订货量.因而价格补贴契约不能使整个供应链达到协调.最后通过算例进行丁验证.     

VMI下价格补贴机制协调模型研究

以零售商和供应商组成的供应商管理库存(VMI)供应链系统为研究对象,考虑随机需求下VMI系统中可能存在滞销成本和缺货惩罚,建立传统、Stackelberg博弈、相同权力Nash协商、不同权力Nash协商的4种价格补贴机制的协调模型。通过数值分析得出:价格补贴机制下传统的VMI协调的不合理性;Stackelberg博弈的VMI协调达不到集成供应链整体收益,但可使零售商和供应商收益得到改善;相同权力和不同权力的Nash协商均能完美协调分散式VMI,零售商与供应商各自增加的收益在协商权力相同时是相等的,在协商权力不同时与自身协商权力正相关。     

不对称信息下供应链赊销交易中的激励契约

赊销交易中,若零售商的 销售能力是私人信息,则供应商的赊销风险将增加.为给供应商提供甄别零售商销售能力的方法和 依据以控制赊销风险,运用激励理论构建激励模型并求解得到激励契约,将其与对称信息下赊销交易 和不对称信息下现金交易中的激励契约进行比较.结果表明,该激励契约能够甄别零售商的能力,不对称 信息下的产品交易量均向下扭曲,赊销交易能够减轻产品交易量的扭曲程度和降低甄别成本.最后 通过算例分析验证了主要结论.     

考虑延迟交货风险的易逝品供应链回购契约研究

考虑供应商延迟交货对终端顾客需求的影响,基于回购契约建立考虑延迟交货的供应链订货模型,并分析了延迟交货风险和需求风险的分担.研究表明:在供应商延迟交货的情况下实现协调的回购价格低于无延迟的情形;在实现协调的条件下,对于供应商而言,回购价格高而延迟交货罚金低的回购策略更有利;对于零售商而言则相反.供应商和零售商都愿意承担更多的需求不确定风险而承担较少的延迟交货风险.算例分析进一步验证了该研究结论.     

随机需求下多风险偏好零售商的供应链库存决策和协调

考虑由单个风险中性供应商和?? 个风险偏好零售商组成的供应链系统. 假设市场需求是随机的, 且每个零售商面临的需求与其订货量成正比, 采用平均CVaR 准则刻画零售商的风险偏好. 当零售商对称时, 得到系统总的均衡订货量关于零售商数量和风险偏好系数的单调性; 证明当风险偏好系数满足一定条件时, 批发价契约可以使供应链协调; 随机大需求导致系统较高的均衡订货量. 最后通过数值例子表明了需求可变性对系统总的均衡订货量的影响.

     

零售商价格竞争下的最优决策与收益共享契约

研究由一个制造商与两个竞争零售商组成的两级供应链系统的最优决策及契约协调问题,其中每个零售商面临的需求是价格敏感和随机的.当随机需求分布具有递增失败率(IFR)时,竞争的零售商存在唯一最优的定价和订购决策,并给出了最优决策的解析表达式,证明了收益共享契约能使两个竞争零售商加盟的供应链达到协调及契约成立的条件.最后通过理论推导和数值分析给出了需求价格弹性系数对最优决策及协调的影响.     

市场价格信息不对称的银企融资决策

研究市场价格信息不对称下, 受资金约束的零售商为获取最优订货量从资本市场借贷的供应链运营和融资决策问题. 采用Stackelberg 博弈, 构建并分析混同契约和甄别契约模型. 研究表明: 甄别契约能更好地激励零售商透露真实信息, 使供应链整体利润增加; 银行更偏好高价格零售商以降低借贷风险, 银行在甄别契约下的期望利润总是大于混同契约下的期望利润; 高价格零售商的期望利润受到价格波动和其类型比例的双重影响, 在一定条件下选择甄别契约会得到额外的信息租金.

     

双源供应下损失厌恶零售商的订货及补贴策略

供需不匹配一直是供应链管理领域的难点问题,多源采购策略被企业广泛应用于解决该问题。本研究考虑风险厌恶型零售商向上游两家供应商订货的问题,其中供应商1供应不可靠但价格较低,供应商2供应可靠但价格较高。为了缓解降低供应商1的供应不可靠性,零售商可以通过提前支付部分货款的方式帮助供应商1提高供应链可靠性。本研究首先构建了零售商只采用供应商1或2的采购策略,接着构建了零售商采用双源供应采购策略的模型。本研究发现,在双源供应情况下,随着零售商提前支付比例的增加,零售商将增加供应商1的订货量而降低供应商2的订货量,最优期望效用也随之增加。研究还发现相比于单源采购而言,双源供应条件下零售商所获得的最优期望效用更大。本研究也探讨了双源供应情况下,损失厌恶程度、随机需求对零售商最优策略的影响     

基于LA型供应商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约

针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。     

突发事件下回馈与惩罚契约协调的风险厌恶闭环供应链研究

针对突发事件影响产品的销售价格和再制造品的回收价格、新产品的制造成本和再制造品的再制造成本等发生扰动的情况,本文引入条件风险值(conditional value at risk-CVaR)刻画随机需求下单一风险厌恶型的零售商和单一风险中性的制造商组成的闭环供应链模型,探讨了突发事件发生前后基于订货量与实际回收量的回馈与惩罚 (orders rebate and penalty- recycles rebate and penalty, ORP-RRP)契约能否实现风险厌恶闭环供应链的协调问题。计算机仿真分析表明：突发事件造成新产品和再制造产品的价格与成本同时发生扰动时,新的ORP-RRP契约能够实现突发事件发生后风险厌恶闭环供应链的协调。最后通过数值算例验证了相关结论和契约的有效性。     

The supplier's optimal guarantee policy in newsvendor finance

The retailer is a capital‐constrained newsvendor and can borrow money from the bank if necessary. To help the retailer get a bank loan at a lower interest rate, the supplier provides guarantee for the retailer's loan up to a prespecified amount. In a Stackelberg game, the supplier decides the wholesale price and the guarantee amount as a leader, and then the retailer determines the order quantity and the amount of the loan as a follower. The supplier is risk‐neutral while the retailer's risk preference is reflected by a spectral risk measure (risk‐neutral, risk‐averse, or risk‐seeking). For a given wholesale price and guarantee amount, the retailer's objective function is quasi‐concave in the order quantity. The optimal solutions for the supplier and the retailer are derived. The supplier's expected profit with optimized wholesale price increases with the guarantee amount, and thus the supplier's optimal policy is to provide a full guarantee for the retailer's loan. When the supplier can limit his guarantee responsibility by a proportion of the outstanding loan obligation, the supplier's optimal policy is also to provide a full guarantee. Even if the retailer incurs bankruptcy costs in the event of repayment default, the supplier's optimal guarantee policy remains the same in these two different forms of limited guarantee. However, when the wholesale price is exogenous, that is, not a decision variable, the full guarantee is not necessarily optimal for supplier.     

供应商竞争关系下的第三方物流融资及物流服务决策

研究第三方物流企业（3PL）在处于竞争关系中的供应商面临资金约束时的融资策略选择问题。考虑由两个竞争关系的供应商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链,3PL企业为供应链提供代采购、物流及融资服务,分别考虑在代采购中向供应商提供融资能够获得价格折扣和代采购中考虑额外资金成本情况下,3PL融资意愿选择,向供应商提供（不提供）融资。建立3PL、供应商和零售商在不同情况下的收益模型,并给出供应商和零售商的最优定价,以及3PL的最优物流服务收费决策,通过比较融资前后各个企业的收益分析3PL参与供应链融资的积极作用。研究发现3PL向处于竞争环境下的资金短缺供应商提供融资能够增加3PL、零售商和供应链整体的收益,且3PL更愿意在考虑自身资金成本的情况下向供应商提供融资,并且供应商之间竞争越激烈,3PL和零售商的获益越大。     

基于批发价格事前和事后决策的供应链合作促销策略研究

针对单一供应商和单一零售商组成的二级供应链系统,构建了批发价格事前和事后决策下的合作促销模型,探讨了批发价格事前和事后决策对合作促销的影响,并求得Stackelber主从博弈下的均衡合作促销策略。研究结果表明,在批发价格事前决策且零售商努力影响需求、或批发价格事后决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销均不是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事前决策且供应商努力影响需求的情形下,只有当促销努力成本共担系数小于一定的阈值时,合作促销才是一个有效的激励策略;在批发价格事后决策且零售商努力影响需求的情形下,合作促销始终是有效的激励策略。最后通过算例分析验证了上述结论的有效性。     

考虑损失规避型供应商的VMI 供应链协调

给出损失规避型供应商和风险中性零售商组成的二级VMI供应链批发价格契约与协调的理论分析.主要结论是:损失规避型供应商的最优产品生产量可能小于(等于或大于)风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,且最优产品生产量为单位剩余产品净残值(单位缺货成本)的增函数、单位库存成本的减函数、一定条件下的单位批发价格(单位生产成本)的增函数或减函数;批发价格契约在一定条件下可使二级VMI供应链达到协调.     

Option contract strategies with risk‐aversion and emergency purchase

This paper considers a one‐period supply chain consisting of a risk‐averse retailer and a risk‐neutral supplier. As a Stackelberg leader, the supplier produces short life‐cycle products to the retailer and determines the option price. The newsvendor‐like retailer orders call option from the supplier with an emergency order opportunity. The analytical model shows that when the emergency purchase price is low, the risk‐averse retailer's optimal order quantity is less than that of a risk‐neutral retailer and independent of the retail price. It is surprising that when it is moderate or high, the risk‐averse retailer may order less than, equal to, or more than a risk‐neutral one. Computational studies are given to investigate the key parameters on optimal decisions and profits. It shows a risk‐averse retailer may get higher profit than a risk‐neutral one. The retailer benefits from a low emergency purchase price, while it harms the supplier.     

Multi-item integrated supply chain model for deteriorating items with stock dependent demand under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments

In this paper, we have investigated multi-item integrated production-inventory models of supplier and retailer with a constant rate of deterioration under stock dependent demand. Here we have considered supplier’s production cost as nonlinear function depending on production rate, retailers procurement cost exponentially depends on the credit period and suppliers transportation cost as a non-linear function of the amount of quantity purchased by the retailer. The models are optimized to get the value of the credit periods and total time of the supply chain cycle under the space and budget constraints. The models are also formulated under fuzzy random and bifuzzy environments. The ordering cost, procurement cost, selling price of retailer’s and holding costs, production cost, transportation cost, setup cost of the supplier’s and the total storage area and budget are taken in imprecise environments. To show the validity of the proposed models, few sensitivity analyses are also presented under the different rate of deterioration. The models are also discussed in non deteriorating items as a special case of the deteriorating items. The deterministic optimization models are formulated for minimizing the entire monetary value of the supply chain and solved using genetic algorithm (GA). A case study has been performed to illustrate those models numerically.     

考虑交通拥堵成本的零售商供货量决策模型

引入交通拥堵成本因子,考虑从零售商配送中心到市场间的路段存在交通拥堵情况下,分别建立了供应链系统中供应商定价模型和零售商供货量模型;运用动态博弈分析方法,得出了零售商和供应商满足利润最大化条件下解的均衡方程;最后,研究了一个简化的供应链网络,对上述模型进行了验证与分析。结果表明,随着交通拥堵成本因子的不断增大,零售商会逐渐减少对市场的商品供货量,通过提高市场价格和减少运输费用来弥补拥堵成本的增加。     

线性时变需求的二级供应链协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的二级供应链系统,在线性时变需求、产品的零售价格与其存储时间有关、货栈容量有限且不允许缺货的情形下,研究了供应商如何利用全数量折扣计划来激励零售商合作从而实现自身利润最大化和供应链系统完美协调的问题。从理论上证明和分析了模型最优解的存在性,同时提供了求解最优解的简单方法,并通过算例对上述结论进行佐证。     

An integrated retail space allocation and lot sizing models under vendor managed inventory and consignment stock arrangements

In this paper, we develop integrated retail shelf space allocation and inventory models for a single item with a stock dependent demand. The integrated models are developed for a supply chain operating under vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and consignment stock (CS) agreement. More precisely, the supplier is responsible for initiating orders on behalf of the retailer and decides about the size of each order, the quantity to be displayed on the shelves, and the reorder point. In addition, the supplier owns the stock at the retailer’s premises until it is sold. We develop mathematical models to assess the benefits accrued by both parties as a result of the adoption of VMI–CS partnership. Results from the numerical experimental study show that such partnership is more attractive to all supply chain members when the retailer provides a flexible display capacity. Moreover, the supplier can use his/her selling price and the maximum allocated shelf space as negotiation means to benefit from the partnership.