Does Guangdong Need More Capacity

TheheateddisputesoverwhetherGuangdongProvinceneedtoinvestmoretodevelopitspowerindustryweresettledrecentlyataseminarorganizedbyGuangdongPlanningCommissionandGuangdongProvincialElectricPowerAdministration.Participantsagreedthattheprovince'spowersupplysurplusistemporary,powershortageisexpectedtooccurinthenextdecade.Guangdongneedstoinstallanother10470MWofunitsbefore2000,and13000MWduringthe10thFive-yearPlanperiod.Someoftheparticipantsbelievedthattheprovincecouldsupplyenoughpowerevenifitdoesn'…     

Transmission Pricing: Are We Finally on the Brink of a Breakthrough?

Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has been understandably wary of embracing market-based solutions, its approval of a high-voltage, direct current cable underneath Long Island Sound is a fundamental, if discrete, step in a new and promising direction for transmission pricing.     

Importing from? Capacity adequacy in a European context

In this paper we ask the question: why has capacity adequacy become a worry in developed countries in general, and Europe in particular, in recent years, and how serious is this problem? While the liberalisation process and the fast move to variable renewable energy sources play a role in this process, they are not the only causes. We discuss the extent to which regulators and policy makers are able to influence the evolution of the market and also consider the role of and challenges created by regional markets and cross-boarder integration. We conclude that policy makers can go into one of two directions. The first option is to ignore cross-border trading in their planning. While this would create security of supply for individual countries, it would come at the cost of very significant investment subsidies. The alternative is to rely on cross-border trade, an option which requires not only close cooperation and coordination, but also significant trust between the jurisdictions and institutions involved, to ensure sufficient capacity. The choice between these options is a political decision, to be made at the national and supranational levels, not by regulators, and even less by market participants.     

What Have We Learned from Asset Sales?

The unfortunate answer, so far, is not much. Regression analyses of 33 non-nuclear utility sales provided very little guidance for making a sound estimate for units outside the sample. With sales of generating units occurring at a rapid pace, however, prospects may improve in the future.     

Pricing an Integrated Energy Transmission Grid: Are FERC's Natural Gas and Electric Power Transmission Pricing Policies on a Collision Course?

FERC needs to acknowledge that gas and electric transmission facilities are competitive alternatives, and undertake to develop a consistent set of policies toward both forms of energy delivery.     

Is There a Capacity Glut,and How Long Will It Last?

Yes, an overbuild of electric generating capacity has emerged in many regions of North America, thanks to an unprecedented bulge of investments in the first merchant energy boom-and-bust cycle. The good news is that competition in wholesale generation is sending exactly the right price signals, suggesting this correction will be much faster than the last one. The bottom line: competition in the wholesale electric generation segment is working.     

Do Codes of Conduct Achieve Their Objective?

Regulators are inclined to err on the side of prohibiting actions with potential anticompetitive outcomes, even at the cost of barring efficiencies that, on net, benefit consumers. The result is decisions that diverge from the intended goal of maximum consumer welfare.     

The New York Transmission Congestion Contract Market: Is It Truly Working Efficiently?

An analysis indicates that the financial point-to-point transmission rights auction implemented by the New York Independent System Operator may not work efficiently, and that rights sold in auctions may sometimes be greatly over- or under-priced.     

Do coal and nuclear generation deserve above-market prices?

All 14 current rationales for mandating or subsidizing uncompetitive coal and nuclear plants lack technical merit or would favor competitors instead. Subsidizing distressed nuclear plants typically saves less carbon than closing them and reinvesting their saved operating cost into severalfold-cheaper efficiency. Carbon prices, not plant subsidies, best recognize decarbonizing attributes. Grid reliability needs careful integration of diverse, distributed demand-side and renewable resources, using competitive market processes and resilient architectures, but does not require ‘baseload’ plants.     

Power Marketers: Who Are They, and What Do They Do?

Although activity quintupled to 1.2 billion megawatt-hours in 1997, many electric industry participants still have only a vague idea of what the identity and role of power marketers are. Like the independent power producers before them, however, they should no longer be regarded merely as marginal side players.     

Is Real-Time Pricing a Panacea? If So,Why Isn’t It More Widespread?

RTP eventually will reside in the pricing portfolios of all major electricity suppliers for the same reason that the Berlin Wall eventually fell: You cannot indefinitely fight sound economic fundamentals of risk versus reward. Georgia Power’s experience with RTP provides an illuminating example.     

Installed Capacity Requirements and Price Caps: Oil on the Water,or Fuel on the Fire?

ICAP markets do not inherently inflate generator revenues, distort prices in a harmful way, or subsidize existing capacity that is otherwise uneconomic. Rather, they can be used with energy price caps to provide effective incentives for system adequacy.     

Deregulation and Nuclear Power Safety: What Can We Learn from Other Industries?

An examination of the U.S. aviation and rail industries and the U.K. nuclear power industry provides evidence that changes associated with deregulation can be expected to create major challenges to the management of safety by the U.S. nuclear power industry and its safety regulators.     

Electricity demand modeling in Saudi Arabia: Do regional differences matter?

The paper examines the electricity demand behavior for Saudi Arabia, using annual data for the period of 1990–2016, at regional level. The study finds that income, price and population are the main drivers of electricity demand at regional level. Although, the impacts vary across regions (central, eastern, southern and western), the estimated elasticities all are statistically significant, in both long and short run, and have the expected signs for all the regions. The income, price and population elasticities range from 0.10 to 0.93, from -0.63 to -0.06, and from 0.24 to 0.95, respectively, across regions in the long run. In the short run these intervals are (0.05, 0.47), (−0.27, −0.01) and (0.13, 1.49) respectively for income, price and population across the regions. The findings reported in this paper, should assist policy makers to develop insights about the potential regional impact of changes to electricity prices, income and population patterns.     

Options for Improving Reliability: How Do They Impact Air Quality?

While reliability and clean air goals will not come into complete alignment overnight, a combination of voluntary, regulatory, and legislative approaches can successfully integrate energy and environmental concerns over time.     

Market Monitoring by Regional Transmission Organizations: What Role Should They Play in Detecting and Mitigating Market Power?

The socially optimal mitigation policy is apt to blend several approaches. These may include the sort of bid caps that RTOs now contemplate; but those surely are not optimal by themselves, nor is it sensible to dump market problems entirely in the laps of RTOs.