Evolutionarily stable sets in quantum penny flip games

In game theory, an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) is a set of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies that give the same payoffs. Similar to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ES strategy), an ES set is also a strict NE. This work investigates the evolutionary stability of classical and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip games. In particular, we developed an evolutionary game theory model to conduct a series of simulations where a population of mixed classical strategies from the ES set of the game were invaded by quantum strategies. We found that when only one of the two players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded, the results were different. In one case, due to the interference phenomenon of superposition, quantum strategies provided more payoff, hence successfully replaced the mixed classical strategies in the ES set. In the other case, the mixed classical strategies were able to sustain the invasion of quantum strategies and remained in the ES set. Moreover, when both players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded by quantum strategies, a new quantum ES set was emerged. The strategies in the quantum ES set give both players payoff 0, which is the same as the payoff of the strategies in the mixed classical ES set of this game.     

Influence of initial conditions in 2\times 2 symmetric games

It is known that quantum game is characterized by the payoff matrix as well as initial states of the quantum objects used as carriers of information in a game. Further, the initial conditions of the quantum states influence the strategies adopted by the quantum players. In this paper, we identify the necessary condition on the initial states of quantum objects for converting symmetric games into potential games, in which the players acquire the same payoff matrix. The necessary condition to preserve the symmetric type and potential type of the game is found to be the same. The present work emphasizes the influence of the initial states in the quantization of games.     

Three-player conflicting interest games and nonlocality

We outline the general construction of three-player games with incomplete information which fulfil the following conditions: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutations of players; (ii) the existence of an upper bound for total payoff resulting from Bell inequalities; (iii) the existence of both fair and unfair Nash equilibria saturating this bound. Conditions (i)–(iii) imply that we are dealing with conflicting interest games. An explicit example of such a game is given. A quantum counterpart of this game is considered. It is obtained by keeping the same utilities but replacing classical advisor by a quantum one. It is shown that the quantum game possesses only fair equilibria with strictly higher payoffs than in the classical case. This implies that quantum nonlocality can be used to resolve the conflict between the players.     

Interactive strategy sets in multiple payoff games

In game theory, it is usually assumed that each player has only one payoff function and the strategy set of the game is composed of the topological product of individual players’ strategy sets. In real business and system design or control problems, however, players’ strategy sets may be interactive and each player may have more than one payoff function. This paper, investigates the more general situation of multiple payoff and multiple person games in a normal form. In this paper, each player has several payoff functions which are dominated by certain convex cones, and the feasible strategy set of each player may be interactive with those of the other players. This new model is applied to a classical example without requiring variational and quasi-variational inequalities, or point-to-set mappings.     

Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness

We study the computational complexity of problems involving equilibria in strategic games and in perfect information extensive games when the number of players is large. We consider, among others, the problems of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in strategic games or deciding the existence of a pure Nash or a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with a given payoff in finite perfect information extensive games. We address the fundamental question of how can we represent a game with a large number of players? We propose three ways of representing a game with different degrees of succinctness for the components of the game. For perfect information extensive games we show that when the number of moves of each player is large and the input game is represented succinctly these problems are PSPACE-complete. In contraposition, when the game is described explicitly by means of its associated tree all these problems are decidable in polynomial time. For strategic games we show that the complexity of deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium depends on the succinctness of the game representation and then on the size of the action sets. In particular we show that it is NP-complete, when the number of players is large and the number of actions for each player is constant, and that the problem is -complete when the number of players is a constant and the size of the action sets is exponential in the size of the game representation. Again when the game is described explicitly the problem is decidable in polynomial time.     

Quantum games and quaternionic strategies

It is well-known that the phenomenon of entanglement plays a fundamental role in quantum game theory. Occasionally, games constructed via maximally entangled initial states (MEIS) will have new Nash equilibria yielding to the players higher payoffs than the ones they receive in the classical version of the game. When examining these new games for Nash equilibrium payoffs, a fundamental question arises; does a suitable choice of an MEIS improve the lot of the players? In this paper, we show that the answer to this question is yes for at least the case of a variant of the well-known two player, two strategy game of Chicken. To that end, we generalize Landsburg’s quaternionic representation of the payoff function of two player, two strategy maximally entangled states to games where the initial state is chosen arbitrarily from a circle of maximally entangled initial states and for the corresponding quantized games show the existence of superior Nash equilibrium payoffs when an MEIS is appropriately chosen.     

A Quantum Treatment of Public Goods Economics

Quantum generalizations of conventional games broaden the range of available strategies, which can help improve outcomes for the participants. With many players, such quantum games can involve entanglement among many states which is difficult to implement, especially if the states must be communicated over some distance. This paper describes a quantum approach to the economically significant n-player public goods game that requires only two-particle entanglement and is thus much easier to implement than more general quantum mechanisms. In spite of the large temptation to free ride on the efforts of others in the original game, two-particle entanglement is sufficient to give near optimal expected payoff when players use a simple mixed strategy for which no player can benefit by making different choices. This mechanism can also address some heterogeneous preferences among the players. PACS: 03.67-a; 02.50Le; 89.65.Gh     

Nonlocal sets of orthogonal multipartite product states with less members

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long-term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single-round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied; however, less is known for infinitely repeated quantum games. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games do not much differ from single-round games. In this work, we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single-round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma and repeated classical prisoner’s dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. When entanglement is sufficiently strong and reward is small, mutual cooperation cannot be an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game. In addition, we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma.

     

Quantum game simulator, using the circuit model of quantum computation

We present a general two-player quantum game simulator that can simulate any two-player quantum game described by a 2×2 payoff matrix (two strategy games).The user can determine the payoff matrices for both players, their strategies and the amount of entanglement between their initial strategies. The outputs of the simulator are the expected payoffs of each player as a function of the other player's strategy parameters and the amount of entanglement. The simulator also produces contour plots that divide the strategy spaces of the game in regions in which players can get larger payoffs if they choose to use a quantum strategy against any classical one. We also apply the simulator to two well-known quantum games, the Battle of Sexes and the Chicken game.

Program summary

Program title: Quantum Game Simulator (QGS)Catalogue identifier: AEED_v1_0Program summary URL:http://cpc.cs.qub.ac.uk/summaries/AEED_v1_0.htmlProgram obtainable from: CPC Program Library, Queen's University, Belfast, N. IrelandLicensing provisions: Standard CPC licence, http://cpc.cs.qub.ac.uk/licence/licence.htmlNo. of lines in distributed program, including test data, etc.: 3416No. of bytes in distributed program, including test data, etc.: 583 553Distribution format: tar.gzProgramming language: Matlab R2008a (C)Computer: Any computer that can sufficiently run Matlab R2008aOperating system: Any system that can sufficiently run Matlab R2008aClassification: 4.15Nature of problem: Simulation of two player quantum games described by a payoff matrix.Solution method: The program calculates the matrices that comprise the Eisert setup for quantum games based on the quantum circuit model. There are 5 parameters that can be altered. We define 3 of them as constant. We play the quantum game for all possible values for the other 2 parameters and store the results in a matrix.Unusual features: The software provides an easy way of simulating any two-player quantum games.Running time: Approximately 0.4 sec (Region Feature) and 0.3 sec (Payoff Feature) on a Intel Core 2 Duo GHz with 2 GB of memory under Windows XP.     

Fuzzy approaches to the game of Chicken

Game theory deals with decision-making processes involving two or more parties, also known as players, with partly or completely conflicting interests. Decision-makers in a conflict must often make their decisions under risk and under unclear or fuzzy information. In this paper, two distinct fuzzy approaches are employed to investigate an extensively studied 2×2 game model-the game of Chicken. The first approach uses a fuzzy multicriteria decision analysis method to obtain optimal strategies for the players. It incorporates subjective factors into the decision-makers' objectives and aggregates objectives using a weight vector. The second approach applies the theory of fuzzy moves (TFM) to the game of Chicken. The theory of moves (TOM) is designed to bring a dynamic dimension to the classical theory of games by allowing decision-makers to look ahead for one or several steps so that they can make a better decision. TOM is the crisp counterpart of TFM, the approach we implement here to deal with games that include fuzzy and uncertain information. The application of fuzzy approaches to the game of Chicken demonstrates their effectiveness in manipulating subjective, uncertain, and fuzzy information and provides valuable insights into the strategic aspects of Chicken     

Characterizing the Nash equilibria of a three-player Bayesian quantum game

Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We consider a version of prisoner’s dilemma (PD) in this framework with three players and characterize the Nash equilibria. A variation of the standard PD game is set up with two types of the second prisoner and the first prisoner plays with them with probability p and \(1-p\), respectively. The Bayesian nature of the game manifests in the uncertainty that the first prisoner faces about his opponent’s type which is encoded either in a classical probability or in the amplitudes of a wave function. Here, we consider scenarios with asymmetric payoffs between the first and second prisoner for different values of the probability, p, and the entanglement. Our results indicate a class of Nash equilibria (NE) with rich structures, characterized by a phase relationship on the strategies of the players. The rich structure can be exploited by the referee to set up rules of the game to push the players toward a specific class of NE. These results provide a deeper insight into the quantum advantages of Bayesian games over their classical counterpart.     

Games Played under Fuzzy Constraints

Psychological experiment studies reveal that human interaction behaviors are often not the same as what game theory predicts. One of important reasons is that they did not put relevant constraints into consideration when the players choose their best strategies. However, in real life, games are often played in certain contexts where players are constrained by their capabilities, law, culture, custom, and so on. For example, if someone wants to drive a car, he/she has to have a driving license. Therefore, when a human player of a game chooses a strategy, he/she should consider not only the material payoff or monetary reward from taking his/her best strategy and others' best responses but also how feasible to take the strategy in that context where the game is played. To solve such a game, this paper establishes a model of fuzzily constrained games and introduces a solution concept of constrained equilibrium for the games of this kind. Our model is consistent with psychological experiment results of ultimatum games. We also discuss what will happen if Prisoner's Dilemma and Stag Hunt are played under fuzzy constraints. In general, after putting constraints into account, our model can reflect well the human behaviors of fairness, altruism, self‐interest, and so on, and thus can predict the outcomes of some games more accurate than conventional game theory.     

A quantum approach to play asymmetric coordination games

We present a quantum approach to play asymmetric coordination games, which are more general than symmetric coordination games such as the Battle of the Sexes game, the Chicken game and the Hawk–Dove game. Our results show that quantum entanglement can help the players to coordinate their strategies.     

Functional interpretations of linear and intuitionistic logic

This paper surveys several computational interpretations of classical linear logic based on two-player one-move games. The moves of the games are higher-order functionals in the language of finite types. All interpretations discussed treat the exponential-free fragment of linear logic in a common way. They only differ in how much advantage one of the players has in the exponential games. We discuss how the several choices for the interpretation of the modalities correspond to various well-known functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic, including Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation and Kreisel’s modified realizability.     

Noise and the magic square game

A pseudo-telepathy game is a game for two or more players for which there is no classical winning strategy, but there is a winning strategy based on sharing quantum entanglement by the players. Since it is generally very hard to perfectly implement a quantum winning strategy for a pseudo-telepathy game, quantum players are almost certain to make errors even though they use a winning strategy. After introducing a model for pseudo-telepathy games, we investigate the impact of erroneously performed unitary transformations and also of noisy measurement devices on the quantum winning strategy for the magic square game. The question of how strong both types of noise can be so that quantum players would still be better than classical ones is also dealt with.     

The Quantum Ultimatum Game

A quantum version of the ultimatum game is studied. Both a restricted version with classical moves and the unitary version are considered. With entangled initial states, Nash equilibria in quantum games are in general different from those of classical games. Quantum versions might therefore be useful as a framework for modeling deviations from classical Nash equilibrium in experimental games.PACS:02.50.Le; 03.67.-a     

Matrix games with missing,interval, and ambiguous lottery payoffs of pure strategy profiles and compound strategy profiles

In a matrix game, the interactions among players are based on the assumption that each player has accurate information about the payoffs of their interactions and the other players are rationally self‐interested. As a result, the players should definitely take Nash equilibrium strategies. However, in real‐life, when choosing their optimal strategies, sometimes the players have to face missing, imprecise (i.e., interval), ambiguous lottery payoffs of pure strategy profiles and even compound strategy profile, which means that it is hard to determine a Nash equilibrium. To address this issue, in this paper we introduce a new solution concept, called ambiguous Nash equilibrium, which extends the concept of Nash equilibrium to the one that can handle these types of ambiguous payoff. Moreover, we will reveal some properties of matrix games of this kind. In particular, we show that a Nash equilibrium is a special case of ambiguous Nash equilibrium if the players have accurate information of each player's payoff sets. Finally, we give an example to illustrate how our approach deals with real‐life game theory problems.     

Repeated games simulating exchange auction and recursive sequences

A simplified model of multistage bidding between two differently informed agents (insider and uninformed participant) is described using repeated games with asymmetric information. The solutions for these games are obtained in the explicit form for the case of three possible bids. The game value (the maximal guaranteed insider’s payoff) and the optimal players’ strategies are expressed using a second-order recursive sequence.     

Quantum Solution of Coordination Problems

We present a quantum solution to coordination problems that can be implemented with existing technologies. Using the properties of entangled states, this quantum mechanism allows participants to rapidly find suitable correlated choices as an alternative to conventional approaches relying on explicit communication, prior commitment or trusted third parties. Unlike prior proposals for quantum games our approach retains the same choices as in the classical game and instead utilizes quantum entanglement as an extra resource to aid the participants in their choices.     

Influence of head-up displays’ characteristics on user experience in video games

Head-up displays (HUD) are important parts of visual interfaces of virtual environments such as video games. However, few studies have investigated their role in player–video game interactions. Two experiments were designed to investigate the influence of HUDs on player experience according to player expertise and game genre. Experiment 1 used eye-tracking and interviews to understand how and to what extent players use and experience HUDs in two types of commercial games: first-person shooter and real-time strategy games. Results showed that displaying a permanent HUD within the visual interface may improve the understanding of this environment by players. They also revealed that two HUD characteristics, namely composition and spatial organization, have particular influence on player experience. These critical characteristics were manipulated in experiment 2 to study more precisely the influence of HUD design choices on player experience. Results showed that manipulation of design of these HUD characteristics influences player experience in different ways according to player expertise and game genre. For games with HUDs that are perceived as very useful, the higher player expertise is, the more player experience is influenced. Recommendations for video game design based on these results are proposed.