Optimum RCS depressurization strategy for effective severe accident management of station black out accident

Plant specific severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) for operating plants are developed and implemented in Korea as was required by government policy on severe accident. Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) has recently reviewed feasibility of the developed SAMG for Ulchin unit 1 plant. Among the strategies referred in SAMG, we have intensively analyzed the reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization strategy during station black out (SBO) accident scenario, which has a high probability of occurrence according to Ulchin unit 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). In depressurization strategy of the current SAMG, operators need to depressurize rapidly RCS pressure below 2.75 MPa using pressurizer (PZR) pilot operated safety relief valves (POSRVs) for high pressure accident like SBO. The rapid depressurization is effective in allowing the water of safety injection tank (SIT) to be injected into the core, but an excessive discharge of the SIT water is not desirable for an economical use of SIT inventory. Lack of SIT water accelerates the core damage in case the failed electric power do not recover in due to time. The SIT inventory economy means here that we should not waste the water inventory of SIT and use it in the most efficient way to cool the core. In case we do not use it in an economical way, the SIT might be depleted too rapidly, thus leaving an insufficient reservoir for post-depressurization cooling. The quantification of this SIT inventory economy for plant specific situation is of interest to develop an optimum depressurization strategy. In this study we have analyzed an effectiveness of current depressurization strategy for SBO accident with the severe accident analysis code MELCOR 1.8.5 which has been used for regulatory purpose in KINS. The entry time of severe accident management, a grace time gained by the current strategy, and the economy of the discharge mass flow rate for Ulchin plant were evaluated. Moreover, through a simple energy balance equation we could find an optimum strategy for RCS depressurization. The proposed strategy is based on finding an optimum discharge rate for an efficient use of the SIT inventory and it allows us to handle an SBO accident with higher confidence. The proposed strategy is yet a theoretical one, but possibilities of how to incorporate this strategy into engineered safety features are also discussed.     

Detailed evaluation of coolant injection into the reactor vessel with RCS depressurization for high pressure sequences

A coolant injection into the reactor vessel with depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) has been evaluated as part of the evaluation for a strategy of the severe accident management guidance (SAMG). Two high pressure sequences of a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) without safety injection (SI) and a total loss of feedwater (LOFW) accident in Optimized Power Reactor (OPR)1000 have been analyzed by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. The SCDAP/RELAP5 results have shown that only one train operation of a high pressure safety injection at 30,000 s with indirect RCS depressurization by using one condenser dump valve (CDV) at 6  min after implementation of the SAMG prevents reactor vessel failure for the small break LOCA without SI. In this case, only one train operation of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) without the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) does not prevent reactor vessel failure. Only one train operation of the HPSI at 20,208 s with direct RCS depressurization by using two SDS valves at 40 min after an initial opening of the safety relief valve (SRV) prevents reactor vessel failure for the total LOFW.     

Safety of Super LWR, (I) Safety System Design

This paper describes design concept of safety system of the high-temperature supercritical pressure light water cooled reactor with downward-flow water rods (Super LWR). Since this reactor is once-through cooling system without water level and coolant circulation, the fundamental safety requirement is keeping core coolant flow rate while that of light water reactors (LWR) is keeping coolant inventory. “Coolant supply from cold-leg” and “coolant outlet at hot-leg” are needed for it. The advantage of the once-through cooling system is that reactor depressurization induces core coolant flow and cools the core. The downward-flow water rod system enhances this effect because the top dome and the water rods supply its water inventory to the core like an “in-vessel accumulator.” The safety system of the Super LWR is designed referring to those of LWR in consideration of its characteristics and safety principle. “Coolant supply” is kept by high-pressure auxiliary feedwater system and low-pressure core injection system. “Coolant outlet” is kept by safety relief valves and automatic depressurization system. The Super LWR is equipped with two independent shutdown systems: reactor scram system and standby liquid control system. The capacities and the actuation conditions determined in this study are to be used in safety analysis.     

Effectiveness and adverse effects of in-vessel retention strategies under a postulated SGTR accident of an OPR1000

During a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident, direct release of radioactive nuclides into the environment is postulated via bypassing the containment building. This conveys a significant threat in severe accident management (SAM) for minimization of radionuclide release. To mitigate this risk, a numerical assessment of SAM strategies was performed for an SGTR accident of an Optimized Power Reactor 1000 MWe (OPR1000) using MELCOR code. Three in-vessel mitigation strategies were evaluated and the effect of delayed operation action was analyzed. The MELCOR calculations showed that activation of a prompt secondary feed and bleed (F&B) operation using auxiliary feed water and use of an atmospheric dump valve could prevent core degradation. However, depressurization using the safety depressurization system could not prevent core degradation, and the injection of coolant via high-pressure safety injection without the use of reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization increased fission product release. When mitigation action was delayed by 30 minutes after SAMG entrance, a secondary F&B operation failed in depressurizing the RCS sufficiently, and a significant amount of fission products were released into the environment. These results suggest that appropriate mitigation actions should be applied in a timely manner to achieve the optimal mitigation effects.     

Effect of SAMG entry condition on operator action time for severe accident mitigation

The effect of SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guidance) entry condition on operator action time for prevention of reactor vessel failure in the OPR1000 (Optimized Power Reactor 1000) was evaluated with a comparison to other conditions using the SCDAP/RELAP5/MOD3 computer code in detail. Dominant severe accident sequences, such as a station blackout, a total loss of feedwater, a small and medium break loss of coolant accidents without a safety injection were evaluated in this study. The results showed that a core exit temperature of 480 °C for the SAMG entry condition was too early, but a core exit temperature of 1000 °C was too late for operator action time to prevent reactor vessel failure. The SAMG entry condition of a core exit temperature of 650 °C for the OPR1000 was suitable for the operator action timing point in order to mitigate a severe accident.     

Boiling experiments for the validation of dryout models used in reactor safety

The coolability of fragmented corium is a major issue in reactor safety. Since the long-term coolability of such particle beds is limited by the availability of coolant inside the bed and not by heat transfer limitations from the particles to the coolant, the pressure field inside the debris has a strong effect on the cooling potential in multi-dimensional cases as expected in severe accidents in light water reactors (LWR). Therefore, the determination of the pressure field for two-phase flows in porous media is one central point of interest.In this context simulation models and in particular dryout models were developed for reactor safety analyses which have to be validated by reliable experimental data. Therefore, basic experimental investigations have been carried out with inductively heated steel balls of 6 or 3 mm diameter to provide a database for the validation and modification of the friction laws included in these dryout models.The performed boiling and dryout experiments show clearly that models without the explicit consideration of the interfacial drag cannot predict the pressure distribution inside a boiling particle bed, not even qualitatively. Against it, models with an explicit consideration of the interfacial drag can describe the distribution of pressure inside a boiling particle bed.     

Melt quenching and coolability by water injection from below: Co-injection of water and non-condensable gas

The interaction and mixing of high-temperature melt and water is the important technical issue in the safety assessment of water-cooled reactors to achieve ultimate core coolability. For specific advanced light water reactor (ALWR) designs, deliberate mixing of the core melt and water is being considered as a mitigative measure, to assure ex-vessel core coolability. The goal of our work is to provide the fundamental understanding needed for melt–water interfacial transport phenomena, thus enabling the development of innovative safety technologies for advanced LWRs that will assure ex-vessel core coolability. The work considers the ex-vessel coolability phenomena in two stages. The first stage is the melt quenching process and is being addressed by Argonne National Lab and University of Wisconsin in modified test facilities. Given a quenched melt in the form of solidified debris, the second stage is to characterize the long-term debris cooling process and is being addressed by Korean Maritime University via test and analyses. In this paper, experiments on melt quenching by the injection of water from below are addressed. The test section represented one-dimensional flow-channel simulation of the bottom injection of water into a core melt in the reactor cavity. The melt simulant was molten lead or a lead alloy (Pb–Bi). For the experimental conditions employed (i.e., melt depth and water flow rates), it was found that: (1) the volumetric heat removal rate increased with increasing water mass flow rate and (2) the non-condensable gas mixed with the injected water had no impairing effect on the overall heat removal rate. Implications of these current experimental findings for ALWR ex-vessel coolability are discussed.     

Response of gas-cooled fast breeder reactors to depressurization accidents

The gas-cooled fast breeder reactor (GCFR) under design by Gulf General Atomic is cooled with helium pressurized to 85 atm and has the reactor core, the steam generators and their associated steam turbine-driven helium circulators, and auxiliary core cooling loops all contained within a massive prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCRV).The response of the GCFR to coolant depressurization accidents has been investigated and it has been shown that this class of accidents can be safely handled with considerable safety margin. Rapid depressurization is assumed to be caused by a seal failure in a large concrete plug closing one of the large PCRV cavities and the depressurization rate is controlled by a flow restrictor incorporated within the closure plug. Continued core cooling is provided by the main core cooling loops. The plant transient reponse following a depressurization accident has been calculated with a computer code developed at GGA. The results obtained indicate rather mild increases in peak clad temperature for a depressurization accident with the leak area defined by the flow restrictor.Additional cases investigating larger leak areas to explore safety margins indicate that the peak cladding temperature does not increase rapidly with increasing leak area. Secondary containment conditions in a depressurization accident have also been evaluated.     

Power-operated relief valve stuck-open accident and recovery scenarios in the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research integral system test facility

Four scaled small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) tests simulating the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) stuck-open accidents and the recovery actions in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) were performed at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) integral system test (IIST) facility. The objectives of this study are to verify the effectiveness of emergency operating procedure (EOP) and emergency core cooling system (ECCS) on reactor safety. The break sizes were volumetrically scaled down based on one and all three fully-opened PORVs which is equivalent to 0.23% and 0.69% hot leg flow area of the reference plant. The experimental results indicate that in case of high pressure injection (HPI) system failure, the rapid depressurization of the steam generators is proved to be an effective way in the depressurization of the reactor coolant system and the core cooling. In contrast, if only one HPI charging pump operates normally, which injected half (or minimum) flow rate of normal cooling water, the core cooling can be adequately provided without operating the secondary bleeding during PORV stuck-open transient. This paper also presents the scaling methods for the reduced-height, reduced-pressure (RHRP) IIST facility and the test conditions. The validity of the present scaling methodology is confirmed by the results from previous IIST counterpart tests and comparison of the present results with those of the tests performed at the full-height, full-pressure(FHFP) stuck-open tests.     

核电厂严重事故下卸压对氢气产生的影响分析

研究了1000MWe压水堆核电厂在典型的高压严重事故序列下卸压对氢气产生的影响。分析结果表明,开启1列、2列和3列卸压阀进行一回路卸压均会在堆芯熔化进程的3个阶段导致氢气产生率的明显增大：1）堆芯温度1500～2100K;2）堆芯温度2500～2800K;3）从形成由硬壳包容的熔融池（2800K）到熔融物向压力容器下封头下落。开启卸压阀的列数越多,氢气产生率的增大越明显。     

严重事故管理导则入口条件研究

严重事故管理导则的入口是从电厂应急运行规程(EOP)向严重事故管理导则(SAMG)转换的条件,也是严重事故缓解行动的重要依据。本文选取失去四级电源导致的典型高压熔堆序列以及大破口失水事故(LLOCA)导致的典型低压熔堆序列,根据严重事故堆芯剧烈氧化机理,得出了燃料温度、氢气产生速率及产氢量、入口集管过冷度以及慢化剂液位的关系。结果表明入口集管过冷度小于0且持续十几分钟,同时慢化剂系统的状态指示慢化剂液位低于6 900mm,可以作为严重事故管理的入口条件。最后,阐述了目前电厂EOP向SAMG转换的机制,并提出了改进的意见。     

稳压器卸压阀卸压效果研究

基于国际上模拟严重事故瞬态过程最详细的机理性程序SCDAP/RELAP5/MOD3.1,主要分析研究了核电站未紧急停堆的预期瞬变(ATWS)初因(失去主给水、失去厂外电和控制棒失控提升)叠加辅助给水失效导致的堆芯熔化严重事故进程,并验证阻止ATWS导致堆芯熔化进程的一次侧卸压缓解措施的充分性和有效性.计算分析结果显示,一列稳压器卸压阀不足以充分降低一回路压力,压力仍然停留在10MPa以上,存在很大高压熔堆的风险.增加一列卸压阀可把一回路压力降低到3MPa左右,安注系统得以投入,及时有效地阻止堆芯熔化进程,降低了高压熔堆风险.分析结果还显示高压安注系统的投入对一回路卸压具有重要影响.     

中压安注对RRA连接模式下严重事故进程影响分析

针对中国改进型百万千瓦级压水堆（CPR1000）核电机组在中间停堆反应堆余热排出系统（RRA）连接模式下失去高低压安注和喷淋的冷却剂丧失事故（LOCA）,采用MAAP5程序对参考机组的反应堆堆芯、反应堆冷却剂系统以及安全壳系统进行模拟计算,同时结合计算结果分析中压安注系统对该严重事故序列进程的影响,并研究其对事故的缓解作用。分析结果表明,在RRA连接模式下出现LOCA导致的堆芯裸露和升温过程中,中压安注的及时注入能有效地限制堆芯的升温行为,并可对严重事故进程起到重要的缓解作用,甚至为事故工况下失去高低压安注和喷淋时避免堆芯完整性遭到破坏提供可能。最后,根据分析结果针对现行核电机组的运行规程提出改进建议:对于中压安注箱的行政隔离行为,只对其电气开关做相应的隔离操作,而对安全壳厂房内的阀门就地部分做挂牌警示,不做现场挂锁的操作,这样不仅可避免在正常运行工况下中压安注箱误注入行为的发生,同时能够在RRA连接模式下发生LOCA时有效地保障堆芯的完整性,在保证电厂正常安全运行的同时,提高了机组在该模式下发生严重事故的缓解能力。      

ACME台架PRHR管线破口位置敏感性试验研究

为研究先进非能动（AP）型核电厂在非能动系统失效条件下的安全性能,利用我国先进堆芯冷却机理整体试验台架（ACME）开展了非能动余热排出（PRHR）管线破口失水试验研究,分析了主要的试验进程和破口位置对事故过程各阶段关键参数的影响。结果表明,ACME PRHR管线破口试验进程与冷管段小破口失水事故（SBLOCA）进程基本一致,再现了非能动核电厂自然循环阶段、自动卸压系统（ADS）喷放阶段和安全壳内置换料水箱（IRWST）安注阶段的安全特性;在不同破口位置的试验中,非能动堆芯冷却系统（PXS）均可保证堆芯得到补水,堆芯活性区始终处于混合液位以下;破口位置对ACME LOCA事故进程、反应堆冷却剂系统（RCS）初期降压速率、PRHR热交换器（HX）流量、喷放流量、堆芯液位、IRWST安注流量等参数具有显著影响,对堆芯补水箱（CMT）和蓄压安注箱（ACC）安注流量的影响较小。      

AP1000 ADS-4夹带卸压试验模拟分析

第4级自动降压系统（ADS-4）是AP1000极为重要的非能动安全设施。ADS-4能在AP1000小破口失水事故中为反应堆系统提供可控卸压。然而,大量的冷却剂可通过卸压过程中ADS-4夹带和上腔室夹带被带到安全壳中,从而引发堆芯裸露和堆芯熔化事故。为研究小破口事故中的ADS-4夹带卸压和上腔室夹带过程,在以AP1000为原型、按直径/高度比1∶5.6设计建造的ADS-4喷放卸压试验回路（ADETEL）中,研究了不同初始压力、压力容器混合液位和加热功率下的夹带和卸压行为,以及反应堆内部构件的夹带沉积效应。试验数据表明,大量的水在短时间内迅速通过ADS-4支管被夹带出来。液体的夹带率和压力容器混合液位的降低速率随系统初始压力的增加而增大。值得注意的是,在本试验特定工况下,初始压力为0.5 MPa时出现堆芯裸露。堆内构件对夹带量和压力容器混合液位无显著影响。     

Air-ingress analysis: Part 2—Computational fluid dynamic models

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is performing research and development that focuses on key phenomena important during potential scenarios that may occur in very high-temperature reactors (VHTRs). Phenomena identification and ranking studies to date have ranked an air-ingress event, following on the heels of a VHTR depressurization, as important with regard to core safety. Consequently, the development of advanced air-ingress-related models and verification and validation data are a very high priority.Following a loss of coolant and system depressurization incident, air will enter the core of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor through the break, possibly causing oxidation of the core and reflector graphite structure. Simple core and plant models indicate that, under certain circumstances, the oxidation may proceed at an elevated rate with additional heat generated from the oxidation reaction itself. Under postulated conditions of fluid flow and temperature, excessive degradation of lower plenum graphite because of oxidation might lead to a reactor safety issue. Computational fluid dynamics models developed in this study will improve our understanding of this phenomenon and is used to mitigate air ingress.This paper presents three-dimensional (3D) computational fluid dynamic (CFD) results for the quantitative assessment of the air-ingress phenomena. The 3D CFD simulation results show that the air-ingress accident is not controlled by molecular diffusion but density gradient driven stratified flow when the double-ended-guillotine break is assumed in a horizontal pipe configuration. It concludes that the previous air-ingress scenarios based on the molecular diffusion might not be correct and should be extensively modified to include real phenomena. This paper also presents a preliminary two-dimensional (2D) CFD simulation for validating an air-ingress mitigation concept using helium injection at the lower plenum. This simulation shows that the helium replaces air by buoyancy force and effectively mitigates air-ingress into the core.     

一体化多用途的非能动小型压水反应堆发生假定事故的初步分析

采用RELAP5/MOD3.2系统程序建立一体化小型反应堆的事故分析模型,包括反应堆冷却剂系统(RCS)、简化的二回路系统和专设安全设施。一体化多用途的非能动小型压水反应堆(SIMPLE)热功率为660 MWt(电功率大于200 MWe)。针对SIMPLE的直接安注管线(DVI)双端断裂事故和DVI2英寸(50.8mm)小破口失水事故(SBLOCA)进行分析。计算结果表明:对于直接安注管线双端断裂事故,破口和自动降压系统(ADS)能有效地使反应堆冷却系统降压,安注箱(ACC)和安全壳内置换料水箱(IRWST)能实现堆芯补水,确保堆芯冷却;对于DVI的SBLOCA,非能动专设安全设施能有效对RCS进行冷却和降压,防止堆芯过热。     

非能动堆芯冷却系统LOCA下冷却能力分析

本文基于机理性分析程序建立了包括反应堆一回路冷却剂系统、专设安全设施及相关二次侧管道系统的先进压水堆分析模型,对典型的小破口失水事故和大破口失水事故开展了全面分析。针对不同破口尺寸、破口位置的失水事故,分析了非能动堆芯冷却系统（PXS）中非能动余热排出系统（PRHRS）、堆芯补水箱（CMT）、安注箱（ACC）、自动卸压系统（ADS）和安全壳内置换料水箱（IRWST）等关键系统的堆芯注水能力和冷却效果。研究表明,虽然破口尺寸、破口位置会影响事故进程发展,但所有事故过程中燃料包壳表面峰值温度不超过1 477 K,且反应堆堆芯处于有效淹没状态。PXS能有效排出堆芯衰变热,将反应堆引导到安全停堆状态,防止事故向严重事故发展。     

Analysis of the in-vessel phase of SAM strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR

This study focuses on the in-vessel phase of severe accident management (SAM) strategy for a hypothetical 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR). To examine the effectiveness of SAM strategy, it is necessary to identify and assess epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The selected scenario is a station blackout (SBO) and the corresponding SAM strategy is reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization followed by water injection into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The analysis considers the depressurization timing and the flow rate and timing of in-vessel injection for scenario variations. For the phenomenological uncertainties, the core melting and relocation process is considered to be the most important phenomenon in the in-vessel phase of SAM strategy. Accordingly, sensitivity analyses are carried out to assess the impact of the cutoff porosity related to the flow area of core node (EPSCUT), the critical temperature (TCLMAX) and the minimum fraction of oxidized Zr (FZORUP) for cladding rupture, and the flag to divert gas flows in the core to the bypass channel (FGBYPA) on the core melting and relocation process. In this study, the effect of injection time on the integrity of RPV has been examined based on the quantification of the scenario and phenomenological uncertainties.     

ATWS Characteristics of Super LWR with/without Alternative Action

Anticipated-transient-without-scram (ATWS) of the supercritical-pressure light water cooled thermal reactor with downward-flow water rods (Super LWR) is analyzed to clarify its safety characteristics. At loss-of-flow, heat-up of the fuel cladding is mitigated by the water rods removing heat from the fuel channels by heat conduction and supplying their coolant inventory to the fuel channels by volume expansion. The average coolant density is not sensitive to the pressure due to the small density difference between “steam” and “water” at supercritical-pressure. Closure of the coolant outlet of the once-through system causes flow stagnation that suppresses an increase in the coolant density due to an increase in the temperature. Therefore, the increase in power is small for pressurization events. The coolant density and Doppler feedbacks provide good self-controllability of the power against loss-of-flow and reactivity insertion. An alternative action is not needed either to satisfy the safety criteria or to achieve a high-temperature stable condition for all ATWS events. Initiating the automatic depressurization system is a good alternative action that induces a strong core coolant flow and inserts a negative reactivity. It provides an additional safety margin for the ATWS events. Even the high core power rating of the Super LWR has excellent ATWS characteristics, providing a key reactor design advantage.